Anonymous ID: 99a03a Feb. 28, 2022, 3:28 p.m. No.8207   🗄️.is 🔗kun   >>8209 >>8210 >>9003 >>9071

https://independentaustralia.net/politics/politics-display/how-australian-uranium-ended-up-in-war-torn-ukraine,16099

 

How Australian uranium ended up in war-torn Ukraine

 

With war raging in Ukraine, the Australian Conservation Foundation’s Dave Sweeney looks at nuclear threats in the region, including a worrying Australian connection.

 

IN 1986, a catastrophic meltdown at the Chernobyl reactor turned the global spotlight on nuclear power and Ukraine’s nuclear industry.

 

Former Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev said Chernobyl hastened the collapse of the Soviet Union. The human, environmental and economic costs of the meltdown were massive, and continue today — as does Chernobyl’s place in the global media gaze.

 

Reports that Russian troops have captured the site have sent shivers around the world and been described by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) as a “grave concern” and Ukraine President Volodymyr Zelenskyy as a “declaration of war against the whole of Europe”.

 

Apart from the reactors at the Chernobyl complex – including the concrete sarcophagus encased reactor four – the site is home to more than two hundred tonnes of plutonium, spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste.

 

HELEN CALDICOTT: Small modular reactors — a radioactive idea

 

If the complex cooling and containment measures are breached, broken or abandoned, there is a very real chance of an uncontrolled radiation release that, according to Ukraine Interior Minister Anton Herashenko, could scatter poison over Ukraine, Belarus and the EU.

 

In the shadow of the Chernobyl disaster and a sustained record of poor performance and governance at Ukraine’s 15 other ageing reactors, one might think a proposal in the latter half of the last decade to supply Australian uranium to Ukraine would not get off the ground.

 

Yet such a plan was proposed and advanced by the Federal Government only five years ago.

 

Environmentalists and independent security analysts raised concerns about the risks inherent in the proposal and cautioned Australia – the nation that fuelled Fukushima – not to sell uranium to the country that gave the world Chernobyl.

 

As is the norm with international treaty arrangements, the sales plan was considered by the Federal Parliament’s Joint Standing Committee on Treaties (JSCOT).

 

JSCOT did eventually sign off on the uranium deal, but this was no green light for yellowcake.

 

JSCOT conceded that existing safeguards were ‘not sufficient’ and there was a risk Australian nuclear material would disappear off the radar in Ukraine.

 

HELEN CALDICOTT: Small modular reactors — same nuclear disasters

 

Its approval was conditional and required that:

 

‘…the Australian Government undertakes a proper assessment of risks and develops and maintains a suitable contingency plan for the removal of Australian nuclear material if the material is at risk of a loss of regulatory control.’

 

There has been no subsequent detail provided by the Government on the status of this modest and prudent check and balance.

 

Less than a year ago, in April 2021, the first Australian uranium made its way to Ukraine.

 

The Australian Nuclear Safeguards and Non-Proliferation Office (ASNO) is a unit within the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade that is charged with ensuring Australia’s nuclear trade, at least on paper, complies with global nuclear security commitments and safety standards.

 

In its 2020-2021 annual report, ASNO referenced the Ukraine deal and the bland language failed to cover some disturbing trends and omissions.

 

In April 2021, ASNO facilitated the first transfer of AONM (note: Australian uranium is formally referred to as Australian Obligated Nuclear Material or AONM), within fuel elements manufactured in Sweden, to Ukraine.

 

Seven reasons why small modular nuclear reactors are a bad idea for Australia

 

2021 will see the commencement of bilateral annual reporting between Australia and Ukraine, following the first transfer of AONM to Ukraine in April 2021. The Australia-Ukraine Nuclear Cooperation Agreement entered into force in June 2017

 

The IAEA has continued to draw soundly based safeguards conclusions for States with safeguards agreements. In 2020, Libya regained the broader conclusion (lost in 2019) through the implementation of safeguards activities there. Ukraine lost its broader conclusion as circumstances there prevented the IAEA from verifying certain nuclear materials in Crimea.

 

Notwithstanding the loss of the broader conclusion, on the basis of the IAEA’s evaluation of all safeguards relevant information available, the IAEA did not find indications that would give rise to proliferation concern.

 

(Note: “Broader conclusion” means an IAEA conclusion – sometimes based on highly constrained or limited data – that all nuclear material remained in peaceful activities.)

 

Even before this week’s dramatic escalation, the chain of the world’s primary nuclear “watchdog” did not stretch as far as Ukraine. Now the situation is far worse. We have scant knowledge or effective control of Australian-origin uranium.

 

This material is there now and is presumably fuelling some of Ukraine’s 15 ageing and underperforming nuclear reactors, two-thirds of which have now reached or exceeded their design life use-by date.

 

Fukushima, the 'nuclear renaissance' and the Morrison Government

 

Ukraine’s wider nuclear sector is plagued by serious and unresolved safety, security and governance issues and some reactors have previously been the focus of armed assaults from separatists.

 

Uranium is a dual-use material that can be used for civil power production or diverted for far less civil purposes. The inherent risks and the connections between nuclear technology and security threats have again been put into sharp and deeply disturbing relief in Ukraine.

 

As a supplier of a fuel that has unique properties and risks, Australia has a minimum responsibility to make sure this occurs in a transparent and responsible way.

 

This is not the situation in Ukraine.

 

In developing a coordinated national response to the growing war-fighting the Australian Government should urgently revisit, review and act on JSCOT’s call.

 

To do less runs the real risk of Australian uranium fuelling uncertainty and radioactive risk.

Anonymous ID: 99a03a Feb. 28, 2022, 3:43 p.m. No.8212   🗄️.is 🔗kun   >>8214 >>9003 >>9071

Military: “Biden has NO Nuclear Launch Codes”

 

The man calling himself President of the United States, Joseph R. Biden, cannot precipitate an atomic apocalypse because he does not have the codes needed to launch our nation’s strategic nuclear arsenal, a high-ranking military source told Real Raw News.

 

Although sources have in past times conveyed that message, RRN wanted reassurance that the bonkers Biden administration lacked both authority and ability to plunge our nation into a premeditated nuclear holocaust.

 

“The nuclear triad is safe. No one in the administration has them,” said our source, who sits in the office of Marine Corps General David H. Berger.

 

“When President Trump signed the Insurrection Act, he gave U.S. Armed Forces provisional control of the government. Only two people in the country can rescind the act, Gen. Berger, or Trump himself,” he added.

 

“And let’s be clear: If anyone launches on the U.S., we retaliate. But the decisions are in the hands of lifelong patriotic soldiers sworn to uphold the Constitution.Biden has no nuclear launch codes. He couldn’t launch a fart,” he went on.

 

Moreover, he said that although the administration cannot launch a nuclear bombardment, the same does not apply to its nuclear capable Deep State allies in the United Kingdom. U.S. Army Cyber Command at Fort Gordon has been monitoring transcontinental communications passing through 10 Downing Street and the GCHQ, an intelligence and security organization responsible for providing signals intelligence and information assurance to the government and armed forces of the United Kingdom.

 

Thus far, the U.K.’s defensive posture remains unchanged.

 

But the U.K.’s mussy Prime Minister, Boris Johnson, has become so chummy with people such as Biden, Kamala Harris, Secretary of State Anthony Blinken, and Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin, that he might just try to torch Moscow, if the criminal Biden regime made such a request.

 

“We’ve given serious consideration that the administration wants nuclear war, that it’s trying to goad Russia into launching first. Since it can’t fire, it would have to use the U.K. or France as a proxy trigger. We hope there’s still enough sanity in those countries to not want to see themselves burned to a crisp. The Ukraine situation is tenuous, regardless of who’s right and who’s wrong. It’s not like the movies where one missile is launched by accident and the other side says no big deal or no problem, we’ll just launch one at you so there’ll be parity. Even the use of shortrange, low-yield, strategic weapons would likely escalate into full nuclear commitment,” our source said.

 

“But if, say, the U.K. got wheedled into launching, and Russia returned fire only on the U.K.—an improbable scenario—we wouldn’t come to their defense. No way,” he added.

 

In closing, he said he hopes cool heads prevail and that “White Hats” doubt media claims that Vladimir Putin has gone crazy enough to launch a preemptive strike.

 

RRN is an independent publisher that relies on reader support. We fight for truth and freedom of the press in an oppressed society. We use GiveSendGo, a Christian-based fundraising company, through which to collect donations. Please do not give your hard-earned money to sites or channels that copy/paste our intellectual property. We spend countless hours vetting, researching, and writing. Thank you. Every dollar helps.

 

GiveSendGo Fundraising Link.

 

https://realrawnews.com/2022/02/military-biden-has-no-nuclear-launch-codes/

Anonymous ID: 99a03a Feb. 28, 2022, 4:53 p.m. No.8236   🗄️.is 🔗kun   >>8399

https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/2022/02/28/world-war-iii-already-there-00012340

 

 

Hill spent many years studying history, and in our conversation, she repeatedly traced how long arcs and trends of European history are converging on Ukraine right now. We are already, she said, in the middle of a third World War, whether we’ve fully grasped it or not.

 

“Sadly, we are treading back through old historical patterns that we said that we would never permit to happen again,” Hill told me.

 

Those old historical patterns include Western businesses who fail to see how they help build a tyrant’s war chest, admirers enamored of an autocrat’s “strength” and politicians’ tendency to point fingers inward for political gain instead of working together for their nation’s security.

 

But at the same time, Hill says it’s not too late to turn Putin back, and it’s a job not just for the Ukrainians or for NATO — it’s a job that ordinary Westerners and companies can assist in important ways once they grasp what’s at stake.

 

“Ukraine has become the front line in a struggle, not just between democracies and autocracies but in a struggle for maintaining a rules-based system in which the things that countries want are not taken by force,” Hill said. “Every country in the world should be paying close attention to this.”

 

There’s lots of danger ahead, she warned. Putin is increasingly operating emotionally and likely to use all the weapons at his disposal, including nuclear ones. It’s important not to have any illusions — but equally important not to lose hope.

“Every time you think, ’No, he wouldn’t, would he?’ Well, yes, he would,” Hill said. “And he wants us to know that, of course. It’s not that we should be intimidated and scared…. We have to prepare for those contingencies and figure out what is it that we’re going to do to head them off.”

 

The following transcript has been edited for length and clarity.

 

Maura Reynolds: You’ve been a Putin watcher for a long time, and you’ve written one of the best biographies of Putin. When you’ve been watching him over the past week, what have you been seeing that other people might be missing?

 

Fiona Hill: Putin is usually more cynical and calculated than he came across in his most recent speeches. There’s evident visceral emotion in things that he said in the past few weeks justifying the war in Ukraine. The pretext is completely flimsy and almost nonsensical for anybody who’s not in the echo chamber or the bubble of propaganda in Russia itself. I mean, demanding to the Ukrainian military that they essentially overthrow their own government or lay down their arms and surrender because they are being commanded by a bunch of drug-addled Nazi fascists? There’s just no sense to that. It beggars the imagination.

 

Putin doesn’t even seem like he’s trying to make a convincing case. We saw the same thing in the Russian response at the United Nations. The justification has essentially been “what-about-ism”: ‘You guys have been invading Iraq, Afghanistan. Don’t tell me that I can’t do the same thing in Ukraine.”

 

This visceral emotion is unhealthy and extraordinarily dangerous because there are few checks and balances around Putin. He spotlighted this during the performance of the National Security Council meeting, where it became very clear that this was his decision. He was in a way taking full responsibility for war, and even the heads of his security and intelligence services looked like they’ve been thrown off guard by how fast things were moving.

 

Reynolds: So Putin is being driven by emotion right now, not by some kind of logical plan?

 

Hill: I think there’s been a logical, methodical plan that goes back a very long way, at least to 2007 when he put the world, and certainly Europe, on notice that Moscow would not accept the further expansion of NATO. And then within a year in 2008 NATO gave an open door to Georgia and Ukraine. It absolutely goes back to that juncture.

 

Back then I was a national intelligence officer, and the National Intelligence Council was analyzing what Russia was likely to do in response to the NATO Open Door declaration. One of our assessments was that there was a real, genuine risk of some kind of preemptive Russian military action, not just confined to the annexation of Crimea, but some much larger action taken against Ukraine along with Georgia. And of course, four months after NATO’s Bucharest Summit, there was the invasion of Georgia. There wasn’t an invasion of Ukraine then because the Ukrainian government pulled back from seeking NATO membership. But we should have seriously addressed how we were going to deal with this potential outcome and our relations with Russia.

 

Reynolds: Do you think Putin’s current goal is reconstituting the Soviet Union, the Russian Empire, or something different?

 

Hill: It’s reestablishing Russian dominance of what Russia sees as the Russian “Imperium.” I’m saying this very specifically because the lands of the Soviet Union didn’t cover all of the territories that were once part of the Russian Empire. So that should give us pause.

 

Putin has articulated an idea of there being a “Russky Mir” or a “Russian World.” The recent essay he published about Ukraine and Russia states the Ukrainian and Russian people are “one people,” a “yedinyi narod.” He’s saying Ukrainians and Russians are one and the same. This idea of a Russian World means re-gathering all the Russian-speakers in different places that belonged at some point to the Russian tsardom.

 

I’ve kind of quipped about this but I also worry about it in all seriousness — that Putin’s been down in the archives of the Kremlin during Covid looking through old maps and treaties and all the different borders that Russia has had over the centuries. He’s said, repeatedly, that Russian and European borders have changed many times. And in his speeches, he’s gone after various former Russian and Soviet leaders, he’s gone after Lenin and he’s gone after the communists, because in his view they ruptured the Russian empire, they lost Russian lands in the revolution, and yes, Stalin brought some of them back into the fold again like the Baltic States and some of the lands of Ukraine that had been divided up during World War II, but they were lost again with the dissolution of the USSR. Putin’s view is that borders change, and so the borders of the old Russian imperium are still in play for Moscow to dominate now.

 

Reynolds: Dominance in what way?

 

Hill: It doesn’t mean that he’s going to annex all of them and make them part of the Russian Federation like they’ve done with Crimea. You can establish dominance by marginalizing regional countries, by making sure that their leaders are completely dependent on Moscow, either by Moscow practically appointing them through rigged elections or ensuring they are tethered to Russian economic and political and security networks. You can see this now across the former Soviet space.

 

We’ve seen pressure being put on Kazakhstan to reorient itself back toward Russia, instead of balancing between Russia and China, and the West. And just a couple of days before the invasion of Ukraine in a little-noticed act, Azerbaijan signed a bilateral military agreement with Russia. This is significant because Azerbaijan’s leader has been resisting this for decades. And we can also see that Russia has made itself the final arbiter of the future relationship between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Georgia has also been marginalized after being a thorn in Russia’s side for decades. And Belarus is now completely subjugated by Moscow.

 

But amid all this, Ukraine was the country that got away. And what Putin is saying now is that Ukraine doesn’t belong to Ukrainians. It belongs to him and the past. He is going to wipe Ukraine off the map, literally, because it doesn’t belong on his map of the “Russian world.” He’s basically told us that. He might leave behind some rump statelets. When we look at old maps of Europe — probably the maps he’s been looking at — you find all kinds of strange entities, like the Sanjak of Novi Pazar in the Balkans. I used to think, what the hell is that? These are all little places that have dependency on a bigger power and were created to prevent the formation of larger viable states in contested regions. Basically, if Vladimir Putin has his way, Ukraine is not going to exist as the modern-day Ukraine of the last 30 years.

 

Reynolds: How far into Ukraine do you think Putin is going to go?

 

Hill: At this juncture, if he can, he’s going to go all the way. Before this last week, he had multiple different options to choose from. He’d given himself the option of being able to go in in full force as he’s doing now, but he could also have focused on retaking the rest of the administrative territories of Donetsk and Luhansk. He could have seized the Sea of Azov, which he’s probably going to do anyway, and then joined up the Donetsk and Luhansk regions with Crimea as well as the lands in between and all the way down to Odessa. In fact, Putin initially tried this in 2014 — to create “Novorossiya,” or “New Russia,” but that failed when local support for joining Russia didn’t materialize.

 

Now, if he can, he is going to take the whole country. We have to face up to this fact. Although we haven’t seen the full Russian invasion force deployed yet, he’s certainly got the troops to move into the whole country.

 

Reynolds: You say he has an adequate number of troops to move in, but does he have enough to occupy the whole country?

 

Hill: If there is serious resistance, he may not have sufficient force to take the country for a protracted period. It also may be that he doesn’t want to occupy the whole country, that he wants to break it up, maybe annex some parts of it, maybe leave some of it as rump statelets or a larger rump Ukraine somewhere, maybe around Lviv. I’m not saying that I know exactly what’s going on in his head. And he may even suggest other parts of Ukraine get absorbed by adjacent countries.

 

In 2015, Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov was at the Munich Security Conference after the annexation of Crimea and the war in Donbas. And he talked about Ukraine not being a country, saying pointedly that there are many minority groups in Ukraine — there are Poles and there are Romanians, there are Hungarians and Russians. And he goes on essentially almost inviting the rest of Europe to divide Ukraine up.

 

So what Putin wants isn’t necessarily to occupy the whole country, but really to divide it up. He’s looked at Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya and other places where there’s a division of the country between the officially sanctioned forces on the one hand, and the rebel forces on the other. That’s something that Putin could definitely live with — a fractured, shattered Ukraine with different bits being in different statuses.

 

Reynolds: So step by step, in ways that we haven’t always appreciated in the West, Putin has brought back a lot of these countries that were independent after the Soviet collapse back under his umbrella. The only country that has so far evaded Putin’s grip has been Ukraine.

 

Hill: Ukraine, correct. Because it’s bigger and because of its strategic location. That’s what Russia wants to ensure, or Putin wants to ensure, that Ukraine like the other countries, has no other option than subjugation to Russia.

 

Reynolds: How much of what we’re seeing now is tied to Putin’s own electoral schedule? He seized Crimea in 2014, and that helped to boost his ratings and ensure his future reelection. He’s got another election coming up in 2024. Is any of this tied to that?

 

Hill: I think it is. In 2020, Putin had the Russian Constitution amended so that he could stay on until 2036, another set of two six-year terms. He’s going to be 84 then. But in 2024, he has to re-legitimate himself by standing for election. The only real contender might have been Alexei Navalny, and they’ve put him in a penal colony. Putin has rolled up all the potential opposition and resistance, so one would think it would be a cakewalk for him in 2024. But the way it works with Russian elections, he actually has to put on a convincing show that demonstrates that he’s immensely popular and he’s got the affirmation of all the population.

 

Behind the scenes it’s fairly clear that there’s a lot of apathy in the system, that many people support Putin because there’s no one else. People who don’t support him at all will probably not turn out to vote. The last time that his brand got stale, it was before the annexation of Crimea. That put him back on the top of the charts in terms of his ratings.

 

It may not just be the presidential calendar, the electoral calendar. He’s going to be 70 in October. And 70 you know, in the larger scheme of things, is not that old. There are plenty of politicians out there that are way over 70.

 

Reynolds: But it’s old for Russians.

 

Hill: It’s old for Russians. And Putin’s not looking so great, he’s been rather puffy-faced. We know that he has complained about having back issues. Even if it’s not something worse than that, it could be that he’s taking high doses of steroids, or there may be something else. There seems to be an urgency for this that may be also driven by personal factors.

 

He may have a sense that time is marching on — it’s 22 years, after all, and the likelihood after that kind of time of a Russian leader leaving voluntarily or through elections is pretty slim. Most leaders leave either like Belarusian president Alexander Lukashenko thought that he might leave, as the result of massive protests, or they die in office.

 

The only other person who has been Russian leader in modern times longer than Putin is Stalin, and Stalin died in office.

 

Reynolds: Putin came to power after a series of operations that many have seen as a kind of false flag — bombings of buildings around Russia that killed Russian citizens, hundreds of them, followed by a war in Chechnya. That led to Putin coming to power as a wartime president. The annexation of Crimea in 2014 also came at a difficult time for Putin. Now we’re seeing another big military operation less than two years before he needs to stand for election again. Am I wrong to see that pattern?

 

Hill: No, I don’t think you are. There’s definitely a pattern here. Part of Putin’s persona as president is that he is a ruthless tough guy, the strong man who is the champion and protector of Russia. And that’s why Russia needs him. If all was peaceful and quiet, why would you need Vladimir Putin? If you think of other wartime leaders — Winston Churchill comes to mind — in peacetime, Winston Churchill got voted out of office.

 

Reynolds: Speaking of Chechnya, I have been thinking that this is the largest ground military operation that Russia has fought since Chechnya. What did we learn about the Russian military then that’s relevant now?

 

Hill: It’s very important, that you bring this point up because people are saying Ukraine is the largest military operation in Europe since World War II. The first largest military action in Europe since World War II was actually in Chechnya, because Chechnya is part of Russia. This was a devastating conflict that dragged on for years, with two rounds of war after a brief truce, and tens of thousands of military and civilian casualties. The regional capital of Grozny was leveled. The casualties were predominantly ethnic Russians and Russian speakers. The Chechens fought back, and this became a military debacle on Russia’s own soil. Analysts called it “the nadir of the Russian army.” After NATO’s intervention in the Balkan wars in the same timeframe in the 1990s, Moscow even worried that NATO might intervene.

 

Reynolds: What have we learned about NATO in the last two months?

 

Hill: In many respects, not good things, initially. Although now we see a significant rallying of the political and diplomatic forces, serious consultations and a spur to action in response to bolster NATO’s military defenses.

 

But we also need to think about it this way. We have had a long-term policy failure going back to the end of the Cold War in terms of thinking about how to manage NATO’s relations with Russia to minimize risk. NATO is a like a massive insurer, a protector of national security for Europe and the United States. After the end of the Cold War, we still thought that we had the best insurance for the hazards we could face — flood, fire etc. — but for a discounted premium. We didn’t take adequate steps to address and reduce the various risks. We can now see that that we didn’t do our due diligence and fully consider all the possible contingencies, including how we would mitigate Russia’s negative response to successive expansions. Think about Swiss Re or AIG or Lloyds of London — when the hazard was massive, like during Hurricane Katrina or the global financial crisis in 2008, those insurance companies got into major trouble. They and their clients found themselves underwater. And this is kind of what NATO members are learning now.

 

Reynolds: And then there’s the nuclear element. Many people have thought that we’d never see a large ground war in Europe or a direct confrontation between NATO and Russia, because it could quickly escalate into a nuclear conflict. How close are we getting to that?

 

Hill: Well, we’re right there. Basically, what President Putin has said quite explicitly in recent days is that if anybody interferes in Ukraine, they will be met with a response that they’ve “never had in [their] history.” And he has put Russia’s nuclear forces on high alert. So he’s making it very clear that nuclear is on the table.

 

Putin tried to warn Trump about this, but I don’t think Trump figured out what he was saying. In one of the last meetings between Putin and Trump when I was there, Putin was making the point that: “Well you know, Donald, we have these hypersonic missiles.” And Trump was saying, “Well, we will get them too.” Putin was saying, “Well, yes, you will get them eventually, but we’ve got them first.” There was a menace in this exchange. Putin was putting us on notice that if push came to shove in some confrontational environment that the nuclear option would be on the table.

 

Reynolds: Do you really think he’ll use a nuclear weapon?

 

Hill: The thing about Putin is, if he has an instrument, he wants to use it. Why have it if you can’t? He’s already used a nuclear weapon in some respects. Russian operatives poisoned Alexander Litvinenko with radioactive polonium and turned him into a human dirty bomb and polonium was spread all around London at every spot that poor man visited. He died a horrible death as a result.

 

The Russians have already used a weapons-grade nerve agent, Novichok. They’ve used it possibly several times, but for certain twice. Once in Salisbury, England, where it was rubbed all over the doorknob of Sergei Skripal and his daughter Yulia, who actually didn’t die; but the nerve agent contaminated the city of Salisbury, and anybody else who came into contact with it got sickened. Novichok killed a British citizen, Dawn Sturgess, because the assassins stored it in a perfume bottle which was discarded into a charity donation box where it was found by Dawn Sturgis and her partner. There was enough nerve agent in that bottle to kill several thousand people. The second time was in Alexander Navalny’s underpants.

 

So if anybody thinks that Putin wouldn’t use something that he’s got that is unusual and cruel, think again. Every time you think, “No, he wouldn’t, would he?” Well, yes, he would. And he wants us to know that, of course.

 

It’s not that we should be intimidated and scared. That’s exactly what he wants us to be. We have to prepare for those contingencies and figure out what is it that we’re going to do to head them off.

 

Reynolds: So how do we deal with it? Are sanctions enough?

 

Hill: Well, we can’t just deal with it as the United States on our own. First of all, this has to be an international response.

 

Reynolds: Larger than NATO?

 

Hill: It has to be larger than NATO. Now I’m not saying that that means an international military response that’s larger than NATO, but the push back has to be international.

 

We first have to think about what Vladimir Putin has done and the nature of what we’re facing. People don’t want to talk about Adolf Hitler and World War II, but I’m going to talk about it. Obviously the major element when you talk about World War II, which is overwhelming, is the Holocaust and the absolute decimation of the Jewish population of Europe, as well as the Roma-Sinti people.

 

But let’s focus here on the territorial expansionism of Germany, what Germany did under Hitler in that period: seizure of the Sudetenland and the Anschluss or annexation of Austria, all on the basis that they were German speakers. The invasion of Poland. The treaty with the Soviet Union, the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact, that also enabled the Soviet Union to take portions of Poland but then became a prelude to Operation Barbarossa, the German invasion of the Soviet Union. Invasions of France and all of the countries surrounding Germany, including Denmark and further afield to Norway. Germany eventually engaged in a burst of massive territorial expansion and occupation. Eventually the Soviet Union fought back. Vladimir Putin’s own family suffered during the siege of Leningrad, and yet here is Vladimir Putin doing exactly the same thing.

 

Reynolds: So, similar to Hitler, he’s using a sense of massive historical grievance combined with a veneer of protecting Russians and a dismissal of the rights of minorities and other nations to have independent countries in order to fuel territorial ambitions?

 

Hill: Correct. And he’s blaming others, for why this has happened, and getting us to blame ourselves.

 

If people look back to the history of World War II, there were an awful lot of people around Europe who became Nazi German sympathizers before the invasion of Poland. In the United Kingdom, there was a whole host of British politicians who admired Hitler’s strength and his power, for doing what Great Powers do, before the horrors of the Blitz and the Holocaust finally penetrated.

 

Reynolds: And you see this now.

 

Hill: You totally see it. Unfortunately, we have politicians and public figures in the United States and around Europe who have embraced the idea that Russia was wronged by NATO and that Putin is a strong, powerful man and has the right to do what he’s doing: Because Ukraine is somehow not worthy of independence, because it’s either Russia’s historical lands or Ukrainians are Russians, or the Ukrainian leaders are — this is what Putin says — “drug addled, fascist Nazis” or whatever labels he wants to apply here.

 

So sadly, we are treading back through old historical patterns that we said that we would never permit to happen again. The other thing to think about in this larger historic context is how much the German business community helped facilitate the rise of Hitler. Right now, everyone who has been doing business in Russia or buying Russian gas and oil has contributed to Putin’s war chest. Our investments are not just boosting business profits, or Russia’s sovereign wealth funds and its longer-term development. They now are literally the fuel for Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

 

Reynolds: I gather you think that sanctions leveled by the government are inadequate to address this much larger threat?

 

Hill: Absolutely. Sanctions are not going to be enough. You need to have a major international response, where governments decide on their own accord that they can’t do business with Russia for a period of time until this is resolved. We need a temporary suspension of business activity with Russia. Just as we wouldn’t be having a full-blown diplomatic negotiation for anything but a ceasefire and withdrawal while Ukraine is still being actively invaded, so it’s the same thing with business. Right now you’re fueling the invasion of Ukraine. So what we need is a suspension of business activity with Russia until Moscow ceases hostilities and withdraws its troops.

 

Reynolds: So ordinary companies…

 

Hill: Ordinary companies should make a decision. This is the epitome of “ESG” that companies are saying is their priority right now — upholding standards of good Environmental, Social and Corporate Governance. Just like people didn’t want their money invested in South Africa during apartheid, do you really want to have your money invested in Russia during Russia’s brutal invasion and subjugation and carving up of Ukraine?

 

If Western companies, their pension plans or mutual funds, are invested in Russia they should pull out. Any people who are sitting on the boards of major Russian companies should resign immediately. Not every Russian company is tied to the Kremlin, but many major Russian companies absolutely are, and everyone knows it. If we look back to Germany in the runup to the Second World War, it was the major German enterprises that were being used in support of the war. And we’re seeing exactly the same thing now. Russia would not be able to afford this war were it not for the fact that oil and gas prices are ratcheting up. They’ve got enough in the war chest for now. But over the longer term, this will not be sustainable without the investment that comes into Russia and all of the Russian commodities, not just oil and gas, that are being purchased on world markets. And, our international allies, like Saudi Arabia, should be increasing oil production right now as a temporary offset. Right now, they are also indirectly funding war in Ukraine by keeping oil prices high.

 

This has to be an international response to push Russia to stop its military action. India abstained in the United Nations, and you can see that other countries are feeling discomforted and hoping this might go away. This is not going to go away, and it could be “you next” — because Putin is setting a precedent for countries to return to the type of behavior that sparked the two great wars which were a free-for-all over territory. Putin is saying, “Throughout history borders have changed. Who cares?”

 

Reynolds: And you do not think he will necessarily stop at Ukraine?

 

Hill: Of course he won’t. Ukraine has become the front line in a struggle, not just for which countries can or cannot be in NATO, or between democracies and autocracies, but in a struggle for maintaining a rules-based system in which the things that countries want are not taken by force. Every country in the world should be paying close attention to this. Yes, there may be countries like China and others who might think that this is permissible, but overall, most countries have benefited from the current international system in terms of trade and economic growth, from investment and an interdependent globalized world. This is pretty much the end of this. That’s what Russia has done.

 

Reynolds: He’s blown up the rules-based international order.

 

Hill: Exactly. What stops a lot of people from pulling out of Russia even temporarily is, they will say, “Well, the Chinese will just step in.” This is what every investor always tells me. “If I get out, someone else will move in.” I’m not sure that Russian businesspeople want to wake up one morning and find out the only investors in the Russian economy are Chinese, because then Russia becomes the periphery of China, the Chinese hinterlands, and not another great power that’s operating in tandem with China.

 

Reynolds: The more we talk, the more we’re using World War II analogies. There are people who are saying we’re on the brink of a World War III.

 

Hill: We’re already in it. We have been for some time. We keep thinking of World War I, World War II as these huge great big set pieces, but World War II was a consequence of World War I. And we had an interwar period between them. And in a way, we had that again after the Cold War. Many of the things that we’re talking about here have their roots in the carving up of the Austro-Hungarian Empire and the Russian Empire at the end of World War I. At the end of World War II, we had another reconfiguration and some of the issues that we have been dealing with recently go back to that immediate post-war period. We’ve had war in Syria, which is in part the consequence of the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, same with Iraq and Kuwait.

 

All of the conflicts that we’re seeing have roots in those earlier conflicts. We are already in a hot war over Ukraine, which started in 2014. People shouldn’t delude themselves into thinking that we’re just on the brink of something. We’ve been well and truly in it for quite a long period of time.

 

But this is also a full-spectrum information war, and what happens in a Russian “all-of-society” war, you soften up the enemy. You get the Tucker Carlsons and Donald Trumps doing your job for you. The fact that Putin managed to persuade Trump that Ukraine belongs to Russia, and that Trump would be willing to give up Ukraine without any kind of fight, that’s a major success for Putin’s information war. I mean he has got swathes of the Republican Party — and not just them, some on the left, as well as on the right — masses of the U.S. public saying, “Good on you, Vladimir Putin,” or blaming NATO, or blaming the U.S. for this outcome. This is exactly what a Russian information war and psychological operation is geared towards. He’s been carefully seeding this terrain as well. We’ve been at war, for a very long time. I’ve been saying this for years.

 

Reynolds: So just as the world didn’t see Hitler coming, we failed to see Putin coming?

 

Hill: We shouldn’t have. He’s been around for 22 years now, and he has been coming to this point since 2008. I don’t think that he initially set off to do all of this, by the way, but the attitudes towards Ukraine and the feelings that all Ukraine belongs to Russia, the feelings of loss, they’ve all been there and building up.

 

What Russia is doing is asserting that “might makes right.” Of course, yes, we’ve also made terrible mistakes. But no one ever has the right to completely destroy another country — Putin’s opened up a door in Europe that we thought we’d closed after World War II.

Anonymous ID: 99a03a Feb. 28, 2022, 5:04 p.m. No.8237   🗄️.is 🔗kun   >>8238 >>8240 >>9003 >>9071

https://scholars-stage.org/pausing-at-the-precipice/

 

Pausing at the Precipice

 

The Western response to Russian invasion falls hard and fast. The actions of the E.U., the Anglosphere nations, and Japan are both extraordinary and consequential: multiple NATO states have brazenly declared their intent to arm Ukrainian forces with conventional ammunition, precision munitions, and even military aircraft. European airspace is closed to all Russian planes. Western capitals have not only announced sanctions on Kremlin oligarchs, but also restrictions on Russia’s central bank. Russian institutions are being removed from the SWIFT system. The Norwegians— in a maneuver sure to be copied—have dumped all Russian assets in their sovereign wealth fund. Olaf Scholz repudiated the last decade of German defense and energy policy with one speech. And now there is talk of bringing Sweden and Finland into NATO.

 

None of these actions are as audacious as the Russian invasion which precipitated them. They are a natural, proportional, and even predictable response to Putin’s decision to settle the question of Ukrainian nationhood through the force of arms. Yet it is precisely the naturalness of our policy that we should be wary of. A righteous reaction may be a dangerous one. The imperatives of action disguise an ugly truth: in the field of power politics it is outcomes, not intentions, that matter most. Failure to slow down and examine the assumptions and motivations behind our choices may lead to decisions that feel right in the moment, but fail to safeguard our interests, secure our values, or reduce the human toll of war in the long run.

 

When confronted with a new geopolitical crisis my thoughts often turn to Michael Mazarr’s 2019 book, Leap of Faith: Hubris, Negligence, and America’s Greatest Foreign Policy Tragedy. Mazarr’s book is a study of the decision-making process behind the 2003 invasion of Iraq. To discover how the United States leapt headlong into catastrophe, Mazarr read all of the administration memoirs, tracked down all available open-source material on the pre-war debates, and interviewed just about everybody involved save George W. Bush himself. His book (and others like it, such as Draper’s How To Start a War or Mann’s Rise of the Vulcans) pop a few common myths about the Bush administration’s drive to war. The administration did not intentionally mislead the nation into battle; motivated reasoning, not deceit, warped their understanding of events. Oil was never central to the campaign; when it appeared in war council discussions, it did so only under the rosy assumption that Iraq’s oil revenues would be sufficient to cover reconstruction costs. Contrary to the received wisdom in many quarters today, the invasion of Iraq was not about about spreading liberal democracy in the Middle East. That justification for the war came mostly in 2004 and the years that followed, when the WMD threat had been exposed as delusion. Liberalism did not lead us into Iraq so much as keep us there.

 

Perhaps the most astonishing fact about America’s invasion of Iraq is that the National Security Council never formally debated the decision to wage war. “One of the great mysteries to me,” wrote one NSC principal after leaving office, “is exactly when the war in Iraq became inevitable.”1 His confusion is understandable: there was no moment, no meeting, where the pros and the cons of invasion were laid out in full. No one ever asked “should we invade?” Instead they debated questions like “if we decide to invade, what must we do to prepare?” and “When we invade, what must our objectives be?” Mazarr explains this curious lack of first-order thought, the origin point of the motivated reasoning that produced both flawed intelligence assessments and unnecessarily hasty demands for action, as a byproduct of moral imperatives. Here is how he introduces this framework:

1

 

George Tenet, At The Center of the Storm: My Years at the CIA (New York: Harpers Collins, 2007), 229.

 

…the second factor I am seeking to highlight: an intuitive, emergent mechanism of judgment that is driven primarily by imperatives—a sense among a nation’s leadership group at a specific moment that a given choice is “the right thing to do” in a sense that is more moralistic than calculatedly rational.

 

Most conceptions of what is called “rational” decision-making include a few essential claims about the ways in which human beings approach choices. Someone acting rationally is trying to maximize some gain and so weighs various alternatives to judge which one will give the most value in those terms. Such a conception is therefore dominantly “consequentialist.” It is obsessed with outcomes, because only by taking outcomes seriously can one anticipate benefits and costs. It is also what is termed “instrumental,” in the sense that actions aim to produce some outcome that serves the decision-maker’s interests.

 

But there are powerful alternative models for human judgment, models that emphasize values rather than consequences and paint a picture of decision-makers serving an imperative or norm rather than maximizing objectives. One of these is sociologist Max Weber’s concept of value rationality. Whereas “instrumental rationality” refers to efforts to anticipate possible outcomes and calculate advantage, value rationality describes situations in which people make decisions, not based on what they think will most benefit them, but to fulfill the right thing to do—that is, to do something right for its own sake. I am arguing that, often enough on major foreign policy issues, leaders and senior officials come to be guided by precisely such value-based, rather than instrumental or outcome-oriented, thinking. Rather than what has been called a logic of consequences (weighing the value and cost of outcomes relative to one’s goals), they employ a logic of appropriateness, a form of judgment in which decision-makers are concerned about doing what is right or appropriate given their role and the circumstances.

 

The resulting mindset looks very much like a commitment to what some scholars have labeled “sacred values.” These are distinct from material interests by their moralistic case; they are, “or ought to be, absolute and inviolable.” They cannot be compromised or traded off against other values; they are absolute rather than instrumental, and must be followed regardless of consequences. In pursuing such sacred values, decision-makers will display “harsh trait attributions to norm violators, anger and contempt, and enthusiastic support” for the enforcement of norms against those who doubt the course of action; they will “censure” and “ostracize” those who disagree. Even sacred values can promote utilitarian calculations, but more often they are “derived from rules that circumscribe certain actions independently of expected outcomes or prospects of success, and that we act in accordance with them because they are the right thing to do.”

 

Examples of such thinking are legion in the history of US foreign policy. The American commitment to Vietnam was based in part on the idea that the strategic values at stake were inviolable, that fighting communism in Southeast Asia was the right thing to do. The attack on Castro’s Cuba at the Bay of Pigs emerged from a similar sense of obligation; it had to be done, because Castro had to go. More recently, the American commitment to NATO enlargement has taken on a similar moralistic flavor: it cannot be abandoned or even qualified because the countries at stake have a right to make that choice. These and other examples demonstrate how concerns that remain political and strategic can nonetheless take on the aspect of sacred values, and present themselves not as the better or more valuable choice but as the “right” one.2

 

2

 

Michael Mazarr,Leap of Faith: Hubris, Negligence, and America’s Greatest Foreign Policy Tragedy (New York: PublicAffairs, 2019), 116-117.

 

Key to the emerging moral consensus in 2002 was the rapid, intuitive nature of the value judgements informing policy:

 

In the process, the character of these judgments diverges in another way from the sometimes nearly mathematical calculations of classic rationalism. They emerge through a sort of intuitive imagination, a creative leap to make sense out of events rather than a weighing of anticipated gains and likely risks.… Henry Kissinger has called the practice of imaginative meaning-creation “conjecture.” “The choice between… policies did not reside in the ‘facts,’ but in their interpretation,” he has written. Foreign policy decision-making demands the “ability to project beyond the known.” And in this area, “there’s really very little to guide the policy-maker except what convictions he brings to it.”

 

This is true for one dominant reason: the overwhelming complexity and uncertainty surrounding major national security choices. There are simply too many variables at work, too much nonlinearity, to judge outcomes with any degree of precision. Decision-makers lack the sort of comprehensive information assumed by rational decision-making theories and operate instead in an environment of “deep uncertainty.” And so decision-makers hunt for simplified decision rules—key values or imperatives that can slice through the complexity and offer a clear basis for choice.

 

Confronting such complex situations, decision-makers cannot read objective truth out of a situation—they must construct meaning from their experience. And the result is that the interaction of senior decision-makers with complex issues is a fundamentally interpretive and imaginative enterprise. Facts in such a world are like images in an abstract painting, or the cloud of shapes on a Rorschach blot—ambiguous and open to multiple understandings. Observers are creating meaning, not simply reading or determining it…

 

This mechanism of judgment looks and feels to the participants like rationalism. We feel as if we are considering objectives, as if we are goal-directed, as if we weigh various options based on how well they contribute to clearly identified interests we are trying to maximize. In fact, though, what we’re doing is internalizing a mass of information and allowing our unconscious to do mostly involuntary work in bubbling forth judgments. The philosopher Alfred Schütz referred to this approach as “an anticipation of future conduct by way of phantasying.” Judgment is a fundamentally imaginative enterprise. It emerges as a vision, an illusion, an invented narrative; a conviction, a belief—anything but a formally reasoned calculation.

 

Such an approach to arriving at judgments allows us to see the Iraq decision for what it was: a creeping (or sudden and powerful) feeling that a given course of action was the right one, based on simple rules or convictions that were more moralistic or normative than analytical. And the fact that the decision had this character allows us to better understand many seemingly confusing aspects of it: the moralistic language that surrounded the policy process, the resistance to dissent, and the refusal to take risks seriously. Judgments undertaken in such a frame of mind have more of the cast of faith than of consequentialist decision-making, more in common with revelation than calculation. When people are applying sacred values, they come to have an almost thoughtless conviction in what they are doing. It is right—it feels right, from the depths of their well-honed intuitive judgment—and practical arguments have little place in such a thought process.

 

George Ball, the famous dissenter in the US escalation decisions for Vietnam, wrote of the fact that analytical arguments simply bounced off people who believed they “must” do something. “To my dismay,” he wrote of the reactions to his prescient arguments that US strategy in Vietnam was bound to fail, “I found no sympathy for these views. Both McNamara and Gilpatric seemed preoccupied with the single question, How can the United States stop South Vietnam from a Viet Cong takeover? How did I propose to avoid it? The ‘falling domino’ theory was a brooding omnipresence.” Official statements of US commitment to South Vietnam, Ball continued, “had the sound and solemnity of a religious oath: ‘We now take the decision to commit ourselves to the objective of preventing the fall of South Vietnam to Communism.” The solemnity of a religious oath—exactly the right way, I think, to understand the convictions that burst to the fore after 9/11.3

 

3

 

ibid, 118-20.

 

This is a powerful framework for understanding foreign policy crises. Catastrophic misjudgment rests on the convergence of two elements: an emergent sense that there is a moral imperative to act paired with a breakdown in the formal decision-making processes designed to force policy makers to carefully weigh the potential consequences of their decisions. Combined these elements make for a “pattern of misjudgement” that changes the way officials “weigh the costs and benefits” of their decisions, as they shift from an attitude of “analytical nuance” to “morally charged commitment to acting almost regardless of consequence.”4

4

 

ibid, 112-113.

 

The first element of the diad is inevitable. The demand to “do something” is a certain sequel to the high emotions of danger and outrage—be they emotions prompted by a terrorist attack in the heart of America or an invasion on the marchlands of Europe. The “interagency” system was partially designed with this inevitably in mind. When working properly, it leads officials to confront their own assumptions and emotions. But the system is not infallible. For the Bush administration the default to intuition was the product of a dysfunctional national security team; the bureaucratic acumen and fractious interpersonal conflicts of its leading officials destroyed all procedural guide-rails that might have brought the administration back down to reality.5 We still suffer the consequences of that procedural implosion.

5

 

See my essay, “Learning From Our Defeat: On the Skill of the Vulcans,” Scholar’s Stage (26 October 2021)

 

Today the danger is different. We approach the fifth dawn of a fast-moving war; decision makers are determined to respond to an event which has not yet concluded. This rush to act while action is still possible means that all slow paced proceduralism will of necessity be suspended. In the days to come those in high places will be forced to rely on snap judgements and emotional response to guide their decisions.

 

Certain ground realities make this danger more pressing. As the dramatic policy reversal in Berlin displays, this war overturns the old assumptions that guided foreign policy across the continent. What new assumptions should guide us in the future have not yet been hashed out. The invasion of Ukraine was a violation of the moral norms upon which the European order stands. The cognitive shock and moral outrage we feel is deepened by the relative uselessness of our position. Without risk of nuclear escalation NATO’s ability to prevent Ukrainian defeat is limited. This is a humiliating position for the most powerful statesmen in the Western world. Any man forced into such circumstance will feel compelled to find some way to reassert his agency. Our emotions will demand that we do something if only to prove to ourselves that we still have the capacity to act.

 

This sort of moral resolution is not inherently bad. It is the only wellspring of daring or fortitude. But our daring must accord with the outcomes we desire! Many of the policies mentioned in the first paragraph of this missive have consequences that will endure long past the end of this war. Have we truly thought through what they might be?

 

Do we crush the Russian economy because we earnestly think that doing so will unseat Putin, reverse his army’s march in Ukraine, or deter him from similar resort to arms in the future? Or do we do it because we must do something and economic coercion is the only tool in our box?

 

Have we balanced the strategic effects of removing the Russians from SWIFT from the likely creation of a parallel SWIFT system that we have less leverage over?

 

How would America have responded if the Russians had been openly, brazenly arming insurgents in Iraq and Afghanistan? This sort of thing is not unprecedented in the history of Russian-American relations… but it has consequences. What do we think the Russian response might be?

 

One can make a convincing defense for any one of these measures. It is quite possible that all of them, combined with the other options now being discussed in Western capitals, will successfully blunt Russian aggression, strengthen NATO’s long term defense, or deter countries like China from repeating the Russian playbook in places like Taiwan. It is possible. Yet events are passing swift. The rapidly spiraling deployment of these policies does not suggest a carefully calculated campaign of pressure so much as a rushed attempt to meet the demands of our own moral imperatives.

 

The logic of the imperative has led the West into disaster before. We must be vigilant lest we blindly leap into catastrophe once again.