https://constitutioncenter.org/interactive-constitution/interpretation/article-i/clauses/756

"The Appropriations Clause would appear to categorically enjoin the President and federal agencies to spend funds only as appropriated by Congress. Even where the President believes that federal spending is urgently needed, spending in the absence of appropriations is constitutionally prohibited. Of course, where an emergency exists, a President may decide that principles more fundamental than the Constitution’s appropriations requirement justify spending. For instance, at the outbreak of the Civil War—with the Nation itself at risk—Lincoln ordered the expenditure of two million dollars in federal funds in advance of appropriations."

Articles

Preamble

I. Legislative Branch

1. Congress

2. The House of Representatives

3. The Senate

4. Elections

5. Powers and Duties of Congress

6. Rights and Disabilities of Members

7. Legislative Process

8. Powers of Congress

9. Powers Denied Congress

10. Powers Denied to the States

II. Executive Branch

III. Judicial Branch

IV. States, Citizenship, New States

V. Amendment Process

VI. Debts, Supremacy, Oaths, Religious Tests

VII. Ratification

Amendments

COMMON INTERPRETATION

Appropriations Clause

by Kate Stith

Lafayette S. Foster Professor of Law at Yale Law School

The Constitution places the power of the purse in Congress: “No Money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence of Appropriations made by Law . . .” In specifying the activities on which public funds may be spent, Congress defines the contours of federal power. This requirement of legislative appropriation before public funds are spent is at the foundation of our constitutional order.

Appropriations and Constitutional Separation-of-Powers

The Appropriations Clause is not technically a grant of legislative power, because pursuant to the Necessary and Proper Clause (Article I, Section 8, Clause 1), Congress clearly has the power to specify the objects, amounts, and timing of federal spending—even if there were no Appropriations Clause. If Congress could not limit the Executive’s withdrawing of funds from the Treasury, then the constitutional grants of power to Congress to raise taxes (Article I, Section 8, Clause 1) and to borrow money (Article 1, Section 9, Clause 2) would be for naught because the Executive could effectively compel taxing and borrowing by spending at will. Rather, the Appropriations Clause creates a legislative duty that Congress exercise control and assume responsibility over the federal fisc. Congress’s “power of the purse” is at the foundation of our Constitution’s separation of powers, a constitutionally mandated check on Executive power.

The Appropriations Clause would appear to categorically enjoin the President and federal agencies to spend funds only as appropriated by Congress. Even where the President believes that federal spending is urgently needed, spending in the absence of appropriations is constitutionally prohibited. Of course, where an emergency exists, a President may decide that principles more fundamental than the Constitution’s appropriations requirement justify spending. For instance, at the outbreak of the Civil War—with the Nation itself at risk—Lincoln ordered the expenditure of two million dollars in federal funds in advance of appropriations.

"Moreover, despite the categorical imperative of the Appropriations Clause, it would seem that Congress itself is constitutionally obligated to provide funding necessary for the President to undertake Executive powers specifically granted in Article II—to receive ambassadors, act as Commander in Chief, negotiate treaties, grant pardons, and the like. If Congress fails to provide necessary funds, then the grants of power to the President are themselves for naught. Scholars disagree on the extent to which Congress may use appropriations limitations to control the President’s exercise of discretion in carrying out his or her duty to “execute the law,” especially in the area of national security—though all agree that Congress may not, under the guise of exercising its “power of the purse,” interfere with indispensable executive (or judicial) functions. Nor may the President frustrate congressional mandates by refusing to spend directed funds."