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FROM VIETNAM TO IRAQ: AN ANALYSIS OF U.S. MILITARY INSTITUTIONAL LEARNING
ABSTRACT
How and why an organization learns is the subject of numerous academic theories and is of critical interest to institutions attempting change. It is a commonly held belief that large, hierarchical institutions are particularly slow to adapt, innovate and learn. In a military context the ability to learn, and most importantly to learn faster and more effectively that the enemy, can directly impact the outcome of war. Throughout the 20th century, the United States (U.S.) military has been one of the most decisive elements in conventional conflict, wielding unprecedented technological power and mass. The U.S. military also has a long history of irregular warfare, but has often been criticized for failing to adequately adapt to this environment. Vietnam and Iraq represent two examples of large-scale irregular wars fought by the U.S. that involved complex counterinsurgency and stability operations. In each case, the U.S. military’s ability to learn in contact was severely tested. Although some learning did occur during the Vietnam War, significant barriers prevented wide-spread adaptation resulting in a failed military campaign. A further failure to institutionalize the lessons of irregular warfare post-Vietnam left the U.S. military fundamentally unprepared for war in Iraq. However, a conscientious desire to transform into a learning institution in this same post-Vietnam era enabled not only a profoundly enhanced capacity for adaption and learning in contact during the Iraq War, but it has also facilitated the institutionalization of critical lessons into training and doctrine.