Anonymous ID: 41f9d9 April 13, 2018, 9:44 p.m. No.1035503   🗄️.is 🔗kun   >>5689

Syrian "Los Alamos" and explains the German Chlorine link:

"Behind the scenes, the independent production of chemical munitions became one of the core projects of the SSRC. It was the SSRC that set up the first facility for the industrial production of chemical weapons: the "Borosilicate Glass Project," outfitted by the West German glass company Schott. The components of the facility included chemical-reaction vessels and pipes, all of them chlorine-resistant. The project produced di-chloro, a substance that is the main source of the nerve gas sarin.

 

Press reports have placed production sites for sarin nerve agent, VX nerve agent, and mustard gas in plants near Damascus, Hama, Homs, Aleppo, and Lattakia—all around the country. Some or all of these facilities were founded ostensibly as civilian extensions of the SSRC. Syria can also tap the production capability of over a dozen government-controlled pharmaceutical plants, likewise spread across the country."

 

https:// www.meforum.org/articles/other/guile,-gas-and-germs-syria-s-ultimate-weapons

Anonymous ID: 41f9d9 April 13, 2018, 9:58 p.m. No.1035689   🗄️.is 🔗kun   >>5805

>>1035503

France, Germany. UK and Iran all helped Syria's chemical weapons programs going back many years:

French scientific institutes also played a role, through their relations with the SSRC. The tradition of Franco-Syrian relations extended to science, with the SSRC—in French, the Centre d'Etudes et de Recherches Scientifiques (CERS)—presenting itself as the equivalent of the French Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS). The Syrians took away from their French scientific exchanges a storehouse of knowledge applicable to the biological field.[30]

 

In the 1980s, a pattern developed, whereby the same west European companies were contracted to carry out Syrian and Iranian projects, suggesting that the close relations that developed in these years between Syria and Iran included consultations on CBW. For example, Karl Kolb, a West German firm, worked on questionable projects in Iran, after it had done similar work in Syria (and Iraq). Uhde, another West German firm, assisted in the establishment of a suspicious plant for medicines in Syria, after it had established a suspicious plant for insecticides in Iran. The British company MW Kellogg simultaneously set up identical plants (for ammonia and for urea) in Syria and in Iran.[31] These plants produced classic dual-use products, with civilian and chemical weapons potential. As the Syrian-Iranian relationship deepened both strategically, technologically, and in military terms, it would have been naïve to assume that CBW technologies and material did not pass freely between them.

https:// www.meforum.org/articles/other/guile,-gas-and-germs-syria-s-ultimate-weapons