SuQmaDiQ
No Outside Comms, bitch.
>Apr 8 2018 16:33:03 (EST) Q !xowAT4Z3VQ ID: 198500 955656
Location.
Exact location.
Q
>Apr 8 2018 16:39:06 (EST) Q !xowAT4Z3VQ ID: 198500 955760
Pictures leaked for this very moment.
Who/what is not pictured?
What forces shadowed No Name?
Contractors.
Special contractors.
What was delivered?
Smiles.
Exact location.
Exact.
Buildings E of spider web.
Spider web marker.
Open source.
Q
N O T H I N G B U T S P A C E T R A S H
Who lets the dogs out?
>syria.liveuamap.com/en/2018/14-april-local-sources-the-us-airstrikes-targeted-hezbollah
AYYY LMAO
I is Nexxxt
>syria.liveuamap.com/en/2018/14-april-local-sources-the-us-airstrikes-targeted-hezbollah
>syria.liveuamap.com/en/2018/14-april-local-sources-the-us-airstrikes-targeted-hezbollah
>syria.liveuamap.com/en/2018/14-april-local-sources-the-us-airstrikes-targeted-hezbollah
HGOLDMINE
North Korea not only traffics its weapons around the world; it also pushes illegal cigarettes, and drugs, like methamphetamines, which the regime manufactures itself, he said.
This combined proliferation and illicit activity make up 40 percent of all of North Korea’s economy, Bechtol said. “They need this to survive.”
In addition, it is the lucrative nature of weapons smuggling that led North Korea to forge a relationship with the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) in 1983.
In the early days, when Iran was embroiled in a lengthy and bloody war with Iraq, North Korea sold it Scud B missiles. “The Iranians instantly started firing them at Iraq. They then bought artillery, tanks and trucks – legacy Soviet-made gear from the ’50s and ’60s,” and used them throughout the Iran-Iraq war, Bechtol said.
Since then, North Korea has sold Iran Scud Bs, Cs, Ds, extended-range scuds, and played a crucial role in every step taken by Iran’s domestic missile program. It helped Iran build the Safir two-stage missile and the Sejil solid fuel missile, according to Bechtol’s research.
Within the past two years, at least two long-range missile parts shipments from North Korea arrived in Iran, he said. Iranian technicians traveled to North Korea for help in developing an 80-ton rocket booster.
Then, more missile parts arrived in the Islamic Republic in the fall of 2015, he said. “Conventional weapons sales to Iran began in the 1980s, picked up steam in the 1990s, and have “really gotten big since the start of the Syrian civil war” in 2012, Bechtol said.
This week, Iran has test-fired multiple ballistic missiles, in its latest show of regional force, and in violation of UN sanctions on Iranian missile development.
Yet Iran’s missile program would be nonexistent had North Korea not helped it develop and manufacture projectiles based on Pyongyang’s Nodong missile prototype.
“The [Iranian] Imad missile is a Nodong with an extended range,” Bechtol said.
“The Shihab-3 came after North Korea held a Nodong missile test in front of Pakistanis and Iranians in 1993, sending it over Japan. Both Pakistan and Iran agreed to buy the missile.”
Iran paid for it with cash and some oil.
The missiles arrived in Iran on a ship, with Farsi letters written on them. Since then, the North Koreans have become expert sea smugglers, with their ships changing flags many times while at sea, setting off from small Asian ports toward the Middle East, Bechtol added.
In the mid-2000s, Iran came up with a way to avoid US missile nonproliferation enforcement. It built Shihab-3 “factories,” which were actually North Korean-supervised assembly points, allowing North Korea to smuggle the missiles in pieces to the Islamic Republic by ship.
“The components are assembled under the supervision of North Korean advisers.
The same thing happens with the Scud D missiles in Syria, and with chemical weapons in Syria,” Bechtol said.
“These factories are fabricated facilities.
Iran is still relying on parts coming over from North Korea. The North Koreans split them up into components – they are harder to detect that way,” he added.
Without North Korea, Iran’s entire liquid fuel ballistic missile industry would grind to a halt, he said. The Assad regime, too, would lose its Scud missile program.
North Korea has in recent years been funneling weapons to Hezbollah and, to a lesser extent, to Hamas, according to Bechtol.
Sometimes, the weapons go from North Korea to Hezbollah via the IRGC trafficking network. At other times, the arms travel through Syria. In some instances, the weapons are shipped directly from North Korea to Hezbollah in Lebanon. Hezbollah uses Iranian money to pay for them.
From 2003 onward, Bechtol said, North Korean engineers began building underground facilities for Hezbollah, which the IDF struggled to target three years later, in the Second Lebanon War, as they “built directly into rock.”
“Hezbollah alone does not have that capability.
The Iranians contracted the North Koreans to do this. The company that did it is the Korean Mining Development Company.
They moved into Lebanon’s Bekaa Valley disguised as Chinese domestic workers.
North Korea has built many underground facilities in southern Lebanon,” he added. This activity continues to this very day. Hezbollah has an underground “city” of command and control bunkers and tunnels in southern Lebanon.
Bechtol stresses that this assistance is nonideological. “The North Koreans could not give a damn. For them, this is just a customer. The factor is the money. These sales have increased since Kim Jong Un took over, and the Syrian civil war has become a gold mine for North Korea,” he said.
http:// www.jpost.com/Arab-Israeli-Conflict/SECURITY-AND-DEFENSE-The-North-Korean-connection-447557
faggot: acQuired; faggot: locked.
>30bad1
nother faggot
shoutsout to 2008