ID: ef24f2 Nov. 6, 2020, 8:56 p.m. No.11515188   🗄️.is 🔗kun

the best normie criminals who helped the Ds pull off this scam is that all of the battleground states end in a tie so an automatic recall in initiated and Trump can be declared the winner, clearly.

ID: ef24f2 Nov. 6, 2020, 8:58 p.m. No.11515221   🗄️.is 🔗kun

>>11515181

that third pic is full of full-size pick up trucks.

 

what you would expect in texas or kansas or another red state.

not delaware and certainly not Biden supporters in delaware.

you guys are amazing in seeing this stuff.

ID: ef24f2 Nov. 6, 2020, 9:11 p.m. No.11515421   🗄️.is 🔗kun

>>11515348

this clip makes so much sense in light of this election corruption.

 

Trump is going to bring their corrupt election system down on them and charge them all with treason

ID: ef24f2 Nov. 6, 2020, 9:24 p.m. No.11515625   🗄️.is 🔗kun   >>5667 >>5757

Jessi

@jessiprincey

Replying to

@JackPosobiec

@JackPosobiec

Texas did testing on the Dominion software. The concluded they couldn’t use it because it wasn’t compliant with the Texas Election Code. Other major issues were found as well.

https://sos.state.tx.us/elections/forms/sysexam/jan2019-hurley.pdf

11:06 PM · Nov 6, 2020·Twitter for iPhone

16

Retweets

 

https://twitter.com/jessiprincey/status/1324941298420371457

https://www.sos.state.tx.us/elections/forms/sysexam/jan2019-hurley.pdf

ID: ef24f2 Nov. 6, 2020, 9:27 p.m. No.11515667   🗄️.is 🔗kun   >>5675

>>11515625

>https://www.sos.state.tx.us/elections/forms/sysexam/jan2019-hurley.pdf

 

SPECIFIC ISSUES ARISING ON THE DAY OF THE INSPECTION

  1. Some of the hardware in the Democracy 5.5 System can be connected to the

internet, but the vendor claims it is protected by hardening of data and IP address

features.

  1. The foldable ballot box offered with the Democracy 5.5 System could not be used

in early voting because it does not have the capability of having 2 locks with two

separate keys securing the box as required by Texas law.

  1. The rolling ballot box dividers for provisional or disputed ballot storage were not

present, but the vendor claimed such dividers were available. This is important

for handling the adjudication of provisional and contested ballots.

  1. The use of COTS printers with the ICX device (in ballot marker mode) is a costsavings measure, but the COTS hardware also presents issues for service, internal

drivers for the hardware and the potential for traditional additional problems with

any COTS product. For example, one examiner noted that having the printer tray

ajar during the voting process caused the system, after all the races are voted, to

wipe out all selections and require the voter to start over after the print tray is

fixed. This would require a poll worker interaction and could greatly slow down

the voting process.

  1. The Verified Voter Paper Audit Trail ("VVPAT") used with the ICX in DRE

mode stores a voters selections in a sequential order, meaning that if a single ICX

is used at a voter location and a limited number voters appear at the polling place,

the secrecy of the ballot may be compromised by remembering the order in

which voters used the ICX in comparison to the VVPAT tape.

  1. The precinct ballot scanner jammed on several occasions and was very slow in

scanning the hand-marked ballots.

  1. The central scanner/tabulator also jammed on multiple occasions and ballot

batches had to be re-run through the scanner. If this happened on a busy election

night, it could create a significant delay in vote tabulation.

  1. The "pigtail" portion of the cord connection to the power supply to the VVPAT

portion of the ICX was easily accessible and could be unplugged by any voter.

When the pigtail was unplugged at the examiners inspection, the process to get

back to a voter-ready condition was unclear and complicated to the point that the

battery had to be removed and reinstalled in the device. The vendor, after the

inspection, stated that this power connection can be made behind a sealed door in

a different configuration; however, it is clear an end-user may choose to configure

the VVP AT in a way that allows this to occur.

Page 13

  1. The ICX machines had a problem with straight party voting in that the deselection

of the straight party choice on a single race eventually leads to the deselection of

all of the other straight party selections.

  1. Use of non-sequential numbered paper ballots as required by the Texas

Constitution cannot be created within the Democracy 5.5 System. Instead, the

only way to comply with this requirement of the law would be to hand-write

and/or pre-print paper with serial numbers in a range for the selected precinct and

then manually intermingle the ballots so their numbers are not sequential.

  1. The adjudication portion of the tabulation process in the election management

software was problematic and showed that the handwritten write-ins subject to

adjudication were not easily picked up by the ballot scanner. This poor resolution

on the scanner also failed to pick up some of the printed wording on the ballots.

In a follow-up, the vendor stated that only black Sharpie markers should be used

for marking the ballots; however, when the black sharpie was used during testing,

it did, on a few occasions, bleed through to the back side of the two-sided ballot in

such a way that it could confuse the ballot scanner or kick the ballot out.

  1. The paths for the import of election data in into the election management program

also showed multiple opportunities for mistakes that required three (3) separate

restarts of the adjudication process.

 

cont

ID: ef24f2 Nov. 6, 2020, 9:28 p.m. No.11515675   🗄️.is 🔗kun

>>11515667

cont

 

GENERAL OBSERVATIONS

A. The hardware for the Democracy 5.5 System had multiple problems that could

potentially be fixed with actions by the vendor. Some of these fixes would be

simple, but others would require substantial engineering (such as resolution

scan of the ballot readers).

B. The software issues with Democracy 5.5 system are more problematic

because these problems impact the entirety of the System and cannot be fixed

on an individual component basis.

C. The issues identified above could be corrected, but those corrections should be

made and the System represented before the hardware and software

components can be recommended for certification.

 

RECOMMENDATION

Based on the foregoing observations and my examination of the Democracy 5.5 System,

its accompanying literature and the presentation made by Dominion officials both in its literature

and at the examination, I cannot recommend that the Democracy 5.5 System be certified as

 

compliant with the requirements of the TEXAS ELECTION CODE and the TEXAS ADMINISTRATIVE

CODE. My opinion could potentially change of corrections to the identified problems (in my

report and other reports) are properly corrected and presented to the Secretary's office.