that is why it looked so suspicious to everybody.
show me a biden supporter in delaware that drives a pick up truck…
that is why it looked so suspicious to everybody.
show me a biden supporter in delaware that drives a pick up truck…
the best normie criminals who helped the Ds pull off this scam is that all of the battleground states end in a tie so an automatic recall in initiated and Trump can be declared the winner, clearly.
that third pic is full of full-size pick up trucks.
what you would expect in texas or kansas or another red state.
not delaware and certainly not Biden supporters in delaware.
you guys are amazing in seeing this stuff.
>Biggest drop to ever be provided on Pol. Study and prepare. The masses tend to panic in such situations. No war. No civil unrest. Clean and swift.
this way….
this clip makes so much sense in light of this election corruption.
Trump is going to bring their corrupt election system down on them and charge them all with treason
Jessi
@jessiprincey
Replying to
@JackPosobiec
@JackPosobiec
Texas did testing on the Dominion software. The concluded they couldn’t use it because it wasn’t compliant with the Texas Election Code. Other major issues were found as well.
https://sos.state.tx.us/elections/forms/sysexam/jan2019-hurley.pdf
11:06 PM · Nov 6, 2020·Twitter for iPhone
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https://twitter.com/jessiprincey/status/1324941298420371457
https://www.sos.state.tx.us/elections/forms/sysexam/jan2019-hurley.pdf
>https://www.sos.state.tx.us/elections/forms/sysexam/jan2019-hurley.pdf
SPECIFIC ISSUES ARISING ON THE DAY OF THE INSPECTION
Some of the hardware in the Democracy 5.5 System can be connected to the
internet, but the vendor claims it is protected by hardening of data and IP address
features.
The foldable ballot box offered with the Democracy 5.5 System could not be used
in early voting because it does not have the capability of having 2 locks with two
separate keys securing the box as required by Texas law.
The rolling ballot box dividers for provisional or disputed ballot storage were not
present, but the vendor claimed such dividers were available. This is important
for handling the adjudication of provisional and contested ballots.
The use of COTS printers with the ICX device (in ballot marker mode) is a costsavings measure, but the COTS hardware also presents issues for service, internal
drivers for the hardware and the potential for traditional additional problems with
any COTS product. For example, one examiner noted that having the printer tray
ajar during the voting process caused the system, after all the races are voted, to
wipe out all selections and require the voter to start over after the print tray is
fixed. This would require a poll worker interaction and could greatly slow down
the voting process.
The Verified Voter Paper Audit Trail ("VVPAT") used with the ICX in DRE
mode stores a voters selections in a sequential order, meaning that if a single ICX
is used at a voter location and a limited number voters appear at the polling place,
the secrecy of the ballot may be compromised by remembering the order in
which voters used the ICX in comparison to the VVPAT tape.
The precinct ballot scanner jammed on several occasions and was very slow in
scanning the hand-marked ballots.
The central scanner/tabulator also jammed on multiple occasions and ballot
batches had to be re-run through the scanner. If this happened on a busy election
night, it could create a significant delay in vote tabulation.
The "pigtail" portion of the cord connection to the power supply to the VVPAT
portion of the ICX was easily accessible and could be unplugged by any voter.
When the pigtail was unplugged at the examiners inspection, the process to get
back to a voter-ready condition was unclear and complicated to the point that the
battery had to be removed and reinstalled in the device. The vendor, after the
inspection, stated that this power connection can be made behind a sealed door in
a different configuration; however, it is clear an end-user may choose to configure
the VVP AT in a way that allows this to occur.
Page 13
The ICX machines had a problem with straight party voting in that the deselection
of the straight party choice on a single race eventually leads to the deselection of
all of the other straight party selections.
Use of non-sequential numbered paper ballots as required by the Texas
Constitution cannot be created within the Democracy 5.5 System. Instead, the
only way to comply with this requirement of the law would be to hand-write
and/or pre-print paper with serial numbers in a range for the selected precinct and
then manually intermingle the ballots so their numbers are not sequential.
The adjudication portion of the tabulation process in the election management
software was problematic and showed that the handwritten write-ins subject to
adjudication were not easily picked up by the ballot scanner. This poor resolution
on the scanner also failed to pick up some of the printed wording on the ballots.
In a follow-up, the vendor stated that only black Sharpie markers should be used
for marking the ballots; however, when the black sharpie was used during testing,
it did, on a few occasions, bleed through to the back side of the two-sided ballot in
such a way that it could confuse the ballot scanner or kick the ballot out.
The paths for the import of election data in into the election management program
also showed multiple opportunities for mistakes that required three (3) separate
restarts of the adjudication process.
cont
cont
GENERAL OBSERVATIONS
A. The hardware for the Democracy 5.5 System had multiple problems that could
potentially be fixed with actions by the vendor. Some of these fixes would be
simple, but others would require substantial engineering (such as resolution
scan of the ballot readers).
B. The software issues with Democracy 5.5 system are more problematic
because these problems impact the entirety of the System and cannot be fixed
on an individual component basis.
C. The issues identified above could be corrected, but those corrections should be
made and the System represented before the hardware and software
components can be recommended for certification.
RECOMMENDATION
Based on the foregoing observations and my examination of the Democracy 5.5 System,
its accompanying literature and the presentation made by Dominion officials both in its literature
and at the examination, I cannot recommend that the Democracy 5.5 System be certified as
compliant with the requirements of the TEXAS ELECTION CODE and the TEXAS ADMINISTRATIVE
CODE. My opinion could potentially change of corrections to the identified problems (in my
report and other reports) are properly corrected and presented to the Secretary's office.
>Florida plate at Delaware speech. But muh covid!