Anonymous ID: 8930a8 Nov. 22, 2020, 12:30 p.m. No.11741060   🗄️.is 🔗kun   >>1093 >>1141

https://www.thegatewaypundit.com/2020/11/dominion-voting-systems-connecting-dots/

 

worth a read

 

Dominion Voting Systems: Connecting the Dots

 

2002.

Diebold Elections Systems Inc. is formed. Previously, DESI was run by Bob Urosevich, who worked in the election systems industry since 1976. In 1979, Mr. Urosevich founded American Information Systems. He served as the President of AIS, now known as Election Systems & Software, Inc. (ES&S), from 1979 through 1992. Bob’s brother, Todd Urosevich, is Vice President, Aftermarket Sales with ES&S, DESI’s chief competitor. In 1995, Bob Urosevich started I-Mark Systems, whose product was a touch screen voting system utilizing a smart card and biometric encryption authorization technology. Global Election Systems, Inc. (GES) acquired I-Mark in 1997, and on July 31, 2000 Mr. Urosevich was promoted from Vice President of Sales and Marketing and New Business Development to President and Chief Operating Officer. On January 22, 2002, Diebold announced the acquisition of GES, then a manufacturer and supplier of electronic voting terminals and solutions. Global Election Systems subsequently changed its name to Diebold Election Systems, Inc.

 

Fast forward to the election year that followed the creation of Diebold Election Systems. There had been known glitches within Diebold’s software that could alter an election in other candidates favor. Multiple News Outlets wrote articles pertaining to the threat of Election Rigging via E-Voting. Those same media outlets now in 2020, that claim e-voting to be safe and not subject to tampering/glitches even whilst saying the exact opposite 15 years prior. Michael Meacher from “The Guardian” wrote this back in 2005.

Anonymous ID: 8930a8 Nov. 22, 2020, 12:34 p.m. No.11741093   🗄️.is 🔗kun   >>1141

>>11741060

Developing an Analysis of Threats to Voting Systems: Workshop Summary

Hilton Washington DC North Hotel , Gaithersburg, Maryland

October 7, 2005

 

The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) hosted a workshop to allow the U.S.

election community to participate in developing an analysis of threats to voting systems. The

workshop took place on October 7, 2005, at the Hilton Washington DC North in Gaithersburg,

Maryland.

 

It Only Takes One Person

One person acting alone can cause many computer-based machines

to malfunction.

One person can write a piece of software (a "virus" or a "Trojan

horse" – we'll call them generically an "intrusion'") that can

corrupt any number of machines. A machine can be infected at

any time before an election. Software can even be infected before

it is put on the machine, even at the factory.

Intentional sabotage (by an authorized programmer) is also

always a possibility. Consider that the software is held to be a

"secret" by the vendors; this possibility cannot be dismissed.

 

https://www.nist.gov/system/files/documents/itl/vote/threatworksummary.pdf

Anonymous ID: 8930a8 Nov. 22, 2020, 12:38 p.m. No.11741141   🗄️.is 🔗kun

>>11741060

>>11741093

The government is keen to deploy e-voting despite evidence of ballot rigging

 

https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2005/feb/02/houseofcommons.society

 

Meanwhile, the government remains keen on electronic voting and is aiming at "an e-enabled election some time after 2006". Will this raise turnout or simply increase the risk of fraud? Several pilots have been held. In 2003, six local authorities electronically counted ballot papers where votes had also been cast electronically. Surprisingly, there has been no manual checking of the e-counting results.

 

However, a full-blown test run of e-voting has been carried out elsewhere, with very instructive results. It shows that e-voting is neither secure nor tamper-proof, and allegations are surfacing that it may have affected the result. This dry run was the recent US presidential election.

 

Electronic voting machines made by the Diebold company use the Gems (Global Election Management Systems) software, which was used to count over a third of the votes in three-quarters of the states in the election. It was also used in electronic touch-screen machines predominantly employed in electoral battleground states like Florida.

 

E-voting machine companies refuse to open up their software for public viewing. The certification of their machines is also kept secret. Computer investigators claim that the machines are extremely insecure and vulnerable to hacking via the internet, particularly via remote modems.