>it's not easy being green
tyb
>As in don't they have to go through extra checks?
Not that I'm aware of, but could be.
As far as I've seen, military ballots end up at the election center through some number of methods, at least one of which is USPS. From what I've seen, USPS has mishandled MIL ballots.
>Are Anons ready to take this video seriously yet???
Yes this is possible.
Will MIL do it?
Bureaucracies don't like things like that.
When they do big things like that, they usually turn out like SHIT.
We'll see.
>tech ideas
P.S.: I'm an operating system expert and have done years of research on exactly what you're talking about. Advanced systems well beyond what you're talking about have already been contemplated.
Don't stop thinking this way.
The biggest hurdles we face (IMO) are:
1) Need completely new hardware industry.
2) Need completely new software industry.
3) Need completely new operating systems.
4) Need software that I will only describe as 8kun/qresearch on fucking steroids.
Have a nice day.
P.P.S: Everything I just mentioned is a lot easier than most experts think. You get the right people and they can crank all that out relatively quickly, including the hardware.
Interesting. WAPO is causing more traffic to Q?
Almost makes me think this was planned.
Q is using the election fraud against the cabal.
Noice.
>we would never get there as long as we are dealing with commercial servers that are owned by corps. or govts.
Eggzactly.
IMO, for any hardware system you can FULLY trust with any reasonable level of confidence, you must have:
1) 100% open hardware design so you can verify by yourself that it is secure (note: It is possible and actually quite easy to design a secure hardware system with insecure parts.)
2) 100% open source software operating system.
3) 100% open source software applications.
4) All OS & App software must be written in a safe language.
5) Safe language must be written in safe language, open source and auditable.
6) Sufficient tools and hardware support to do a core-based forensic audit of the contents of memory which is compared to the structure of the open source code. (This is possible but AFAIK nobody has ever done it. Perhaps MIL.)
7) OS/Apps must be a capability system or you'll go insane trying to figure out what part of it has permission to do each little thing it needs to be able to do and how that affects security.
The above gets you a machine you can be confident cannot be compromised.
The above means you can't have closed source software or hardware. But, that's only for that machine. This creates a conflict with capitalism and selling hardware/software. Note that a secure machine can communicate with an insecure machine without the possibility of a security problem if the protocol is properly designed. This ends up being pretty easy with a safe language as noted above. This problem is solved by using separate hardware systems (cheap/easy these days) for proprietary hardware or software. This removes the obstacle and also gives you a really nice way to distribute software ELIMINATING PIRACY.
As far as networking goes, if you're redoing the operating systems and languages, there are all sorts of things that should be done. I'll leave those out because I have lots of tricks up my ASS and I'm not willing to disclose them yet.
Woot.
Appendix A: I did forget one thing:
Any new operating systems can derive extreme stability by making the entire system distributed. Have everyone who uses the platform bring hardware, software and communications to the party. This eliminates the need for anyone to have to pay for the software. If you can reach critical mass with such a system, you're golden and the system will maintain itself.
Appendix B: Security / tripwires
You can prevent a lot of cabal fuckery by making a distributed system randomly check itself like crazy. They won't be able to introduce changes without the fuckery being noticed by the 'tripwire' checking systems. Must reach critical mass for this to be effective, though.
Break down the monoliths of the monopolies.
Appendix C: Boobs.
>Can you personally verify all hardware including chips including all firmware all by yourself?
See the part where I said that it is possible (and actually pretty easy) to make a secure hardware design with insecure hardware.
Learn electronics. It is a lot easier than people think. Software is WAY harder. I learned this accidentally and now wish I'd learned electronics decades ago because it is so friggin' easy.
>Implying such a safe language can not produce any security issues.
Not at all. Bugs can easily cause security problems. However, that's what debugging is for. Systems will servo toward being secure. The safe language assures you don't get stupid shit like buffer overflow exploits, memory leaks, wild pointers, etc. That covers most of the actual surface area of exploits. Make a system that is good enough and developers will be on it like an ant hill. Give it a few years of beating and you'll have a robust system.
Also, 99% of the people can barely tie their shoes and won't be able to check code changes. They'll have to trust someone. Such is the way of the world with everything. So, you have to achieve a critical mass sufficient so there are enough smart people that others can trust to not fuck the system all to hell. Look at /qresearch/ and look at what we're capable of. A very small percentage of vigilant patriots would be able to check code changes and blow whistles quickly. Also keep in mind that adding systems into the operating system that make this easy would happen.
Special note: C/C++ were designed to be insecure. Look up Multics, then find the Air Force attacks. Most of it is declassified. Then connect the dots. The cabal tactically sabotaged computing for all of us. Have a nice day.
>Nonsense.
Believe what you want.
>Software programming is very difficult.
>If it was possible to make it that easy, someone would have already done so.
Then stay incapable and let others do it for you. Asshat.
>Could you piggyback existing infrastructure networks
Yes and no…. They're just pipes for bits. If you can send/receive bits, then you're good. If someone can cut your cord, then you're fucked. What I mentioned doesn't attempt to address that problem, but it is a potential valid problem. I suggest governmental regulation is the only thing that could come close to solving that. So, clean up the gov't. first.
If you're talking about anti-surveillance, there are fairly easy ways to make yourself opaque to everyone, including NSA. Not good to talk about unless you like becoming an NSA target in a jiffy. But yes, it is possible to make your comms completely un-decipherable if you're willing to have physical control over both endpoints.
>That why Dennis Ritchie says to use Ada instead?
I have no idea, but I wouldn't trust Ada either.
If I don't control the entire hardware/software (everything), then I don't trust the system.
Guess what I'm working on!
The world economy pretty much depends on an internet-like communications system at this point. The only 'gotcha' I see that could frustrate that is cabal-like interference. If Q is legit, then that won't be a problem.
If Q is not legit…well….get used to turnips.