We're completely comfy, but you better fucking livestream your suicide when the world goes shit on you.
Here's the link to the fucking plan faggot, no other reason why Q would post it twice.
COIN is a complex effort that integrates the full range of civilian and military agencies. It is often more population-centric (focused on securing and controlling a
given population or populations) than enemy-centric (focused on defeating a particular enemy group). Note that this does not mean that COIN is less violent than any
other conflict: on the contrary, like any other form of warfare it always involves loss
of life. It is an extremely difficult undertaking, is often highly controversial politically, involves a series of ambiguous events that are extremely difficult to interpret, and often requires vastly more resources and time than initially anticipated. In
particular, governments that embark upon COIN campaigns often severely underestimate the requirement for a very long-duration, relatively high-cost commitment (in terms of financial cost, political capital, military resources and human
life). The capabilities required for COIN may be very similar to those required
for peacekeeping operations, humanitarian assistance, stabilization operations, and
development assistance missions. However, the intent of a COIN campaign is to
build popular support for a government while marginalizing the insurgents: it is
therefore fundamentally an armed political competition with the insurgents. Consequently, control (over the environment, the population, the level of security, the
pace of events, and the enemy) is the fundamental goal of COIN, a goal that distinguishes it from peace operations or humanitarian intervention. Within these broad
characteristics, the specific nature of any particular COIN campaign arises from the
complex interaction of three key factors: the characteristics of the environment
(physical, economic, political and human) in which it takes place; the nature of the
insurgent group (or groups); and the nature of the counterinsurgent government
and its security forces
https://2009-2017.state.gov/documents/organization/119629.pdf