>>12930127

Here:

https://www.psywar.org/malaya.php

Forty years ago when we were studying what was then called 'Guerrilla Warfare,' the Army taught us that there were just three successful cases where a legitimate government in power had beaten back a Communist insurgency. They were the Philippines, Greece, and Malaya. I can still remember a Colonel explaining that in the Philippines the victory against the HUKs was won by land reform, in Greece by tightening the borders and not allowing the guerrillas to slip into Albania for refuge and resupply, and in Malaya by separating the insurgents from the general population and letting them starve in the jungle. Since that time, there have been dozens of insurgencies, some successful, some not.

I study American Psychological Operations and do not claim to be an authority on British PSYOP in Malaya. However, PsyWar specialist Lee Richards obtained copies of a number of propaganda leaflets dropped on the Malayan guerrillas and asked me to put something together in the way of a narration. The following is my attempt to tell the story of PSYOP during the Malayan campaign. If any reader cares to add to this story with personal narrations, additional leaflets or translations, they are more than welcome to do so. Although I have used a number of different sources for this brief report, The Malayan Emergency: an Example of a Successful Counter-Insurgency Campaign, by Major Zolkopli bin Hashim of the Malaysian Army is my main reference source.

I have used a number of reference papers as secondary sources, since they quite often are filled with statistics that are not found in regular studies. Among them is R. W. Komer's Rand Advanced Research Project study "The Malayan Emergency in Retrospect: Organization of a Successful Counterinsurgency Effort, and James A. Bortree's Naval Postgraduate School thesis "Information Operations during the Malayan Emergency."

It appears that the British also ran a very sophisticated clandestine propaganda campaign in Malaya and went so far as to establish a regional office of their top secret Information Research Department (IRD) in Singapore in 1949. Paul Lashmar and James Oliver say in Britain's Secret Propaganda War 1948-1977, Sutton Publishing, UK, 1998:

In this early period, the IRD's role was not limited to persuading the public, but often included in convincing other parts of the British government to take the Communist threat seriously… By 1950, events and the IRD had had apparently succeeded and the Colonial Office was eager to perceive the Malayan Communist party as part of the Kremlin's world-wide campaign against the Western powers…

Not least to insure the support of the United States, it became essential that challenges to British colonial rule should be understood within the framework - that of a substantial Soviet and Communist threat…the Empire was to be given a shot in the arm rather than a shot in the head….

Every book written on the Malayan Emergency credits C. C. Too with being the mastermind behind the British psychological operations that destroyed the Communist insurgent movement. Probably the best biography of Too is The Story of a Psy-Warrior, Lim Cheng Leng, Malaysia, 2000. The author points out that Too was not recognized during the Emergency and it was many years afterwards that he finally received public recognition. The author describes him as a student:

A clear and fast thinker, with photographic memory, magnetic gaze and oratorical skills.

He met many Communist Party members as a scholarship student and President of the student body of Raffles College. He was regularly recruited to join them but declined. He said that the Communists were:

A gang of half-educated, swollen headed, power-mad adolescent demagogues trying to take over the country. I told them many facts which, as self-claimed leaders, they should have known but did not. What they were really trying to carry out boiled down to nothing but a gigantic swindle.

Born Too Chee Chew, he was nicknamed C. C. Too in 1945 by two American Office of Strategic Services (OSS) officers who had trouble remembering his full name. Shortly afterwards, he convinced a high-ranking Communist official to defect after a friendly evening discussion. It became clear that he had a natural expertise in psychological operations.

In early 1950 the Emergency Information Service was formed. Too joined the organization in February 1951. He initiated a study of the enemy's mentality and strategy. He asked to see every captured document. Since he understood the Communist Chinese terminology and phrasing he quickly became an expert, often correcting erroneous translations by civil servants and British officers. However, continued disagreements with the way the British used or ignored his information and fought the war caused him to resign in March 1953.

In Early 1955, O. W. Wolters was named head of the Psychological Warfare Section. He brought Too back into the fold in April 1955. By November 1956, Too was the head of the section. He soon become the leading authority and an expert in what he called "study and research." He wanted to know more about the Communists and their theories then they knew themselves. He could anticipate the actions of the Communists because he was able to think like them. He obtained this skill by analyzing and recording the Communist documents and directives that passed his desk. Lim Cheng Leng says:

C. C. Too's noted style was to borrow chapter and verse from the enemy's work program, which included sending in the "eyes and ears" to find out the likes and dislikes of the villagers; the problems and the things that bothered them. Such PSYOP reach-out varied from area to area and from place to place.

He knew that the Communists always sent an advance party in disguise into an area to discover local problems and prepare their campaign. He copied them and did exactly the same thing. He believed that it was more important to propagandize the people than the insurgents. The terrorists based their actions on the opinion of the populace so it was the latter that needed to be convinced. He thought that his most important weapons were the press, the radio, and leaflets and other media such as booklets and magazines. Terrorists may not believe the leaflets or the radio, but they would believe what they were told by the masses, so it was the people who should be swayed. He would convince the people by showing them that they were better off with the government than with a Communist dictatorship.

https://www.psywar.org/malaya.php

One of the concerns regarding Covid-19 vaccines that has emerged from studies of the earlier SARS and Middle East respiratory syndrome (MERS) outbreaks is the possibility that a Covid-19 vaccine could enhance disease, a phenomenon called vaccine-associated enhanced disease (VAED).4,5 In the COVE trial, severe Covid-19 developed in 30 participants, all in the placebo group; thus, the mRNA-1273 vaccine provided 100% protection against severe Covid-19 disease, with no evidence of VAED.2 In the earlier SARS and MERS preclinical studies, VAED occurred with low neutralizing antibodies.4,5 Thus, it will be important for the FDA and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention to continue to monitor clinical trials for safety after issuing an EUA, including assessment of VAED risk.

From here

https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7787216/

Federal Gun Control Bill vs. State and Local Gun Rights

Hugo Hythloday

Published 12th Feb

The second amendment to the constitution of the US says: “…the right of the people to keep and bear Arms shall not be infringed.”

The Sabika Sheikh Firearm Licensing and Registration Act, currently making its way through the House Judiciary Committee, says “It shall be unlawful for a person to possess a firearm or ammunition, unless … the person is carrying a valid license”, gives their personal information to a public registry, and pays an $800 per year “insurance” fee to the Attorney General’s office.

Expanding on the summary above, the proposed bill includes numerous additional restrictions on gun ownership as well as many details of the processes associated with those restrictions.

Under the bill, a “system for licensing the possession of firearms and ammunition in the United States, and for the registration with the Bureau [of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives] of each firearm present in the United States” is to be established.

The database would include the type of firearm, the identity of the owner, the date of acquisition, the location of storage, and identity of anyone borrowing the firearm. It would be publicly accessible by anyone.

In order to obtain a license to own a gun or ammunition, an individual would need to undergo a background check, a psychological evaluation including interviews with family member or ex-partners, complete a certified 24-hour-long training course, and pay an “insurance” fee of $800 per year.

Possession of a firearm without said license would carry a punishment of $75,000 to $150,000, 15 to 25 years in prison, or both. Similarly, punitive penalties would be imposed for related breaches under the bill, such as the sale of a firearm to a person without a license, giving a firearm to a minor, or not having the “insurance” policy while holding a license.

Those holding a firearm license would need to renew it every year for the first five years, and every three years after that. Each request for renewal would require the completion of at least 8 hours of firearm training in the two years prior to the request.

These provisions would apply on the federal level, regardless of existing state law in place across different parts of the US.

https://www.lotuseaters.com/federal-gun-control-bill-vs-state-and-local-gun-rights-12-02-21