According to admissions in the statement of facts, from approximately February 2013 to May 2015, BJB, through Arzuaga, conspired with sports marketing executives—including Alejandro Burzaco, the controlling executive of Torneos y Competencias, S.A. (Torneos), a sports media and marketing company headquartered in Argentina—and others, to launder through the United States at least $36,368,400 in bribes paid to soccer officials in exchange for broadcasting rights to soccer matches. BJB conspired to execute these illegal transactions through accounts at the Bank to conceal the true nature of the payments and promote the fraud. Burzaco pleaded guilty in November 2015 to racketeering conspiracy and other offenses in connection with his involvement in paying bribes to soccer officials.
For example, Burzaco and co-conspirators agreed to pay approximately $30 million to the senior vice president of FIFA, who was also the president of the Asociación del Fútbol Argentina, for his support in the award of regional broadcasting rights to the 2018, 2022, 2026 and 2030 editions of the World Cup. As part of the money laundering conspiracy, BJB, through Arzuaga, transferred approximately $25 million of this money into a sub-account at the Bank and held it there for this senior FIFA official.
Torneos and its co-conspirators also agreed to pay tens of millions of dollars in bribes to several officials of the Confederación Sudamericana de Fútbol (CONMEBOL)—all of whom were also FIFA officials—for the rights to the Copa América tournament (including the 2015, 2019, and 2023 editions of the tournament, and the 2016 Copa América Centenario, a commemorative centennial edition of the tournament played at stadiums across the United States). The officials who were to receive bribes included, among others: Eugenio Figueredo, a member of FIFA’s executive committee and former president of both CONMEBOL and the Asociación Uruguaya de Fútbol, the Uruguayan soccer federation; Marco Polo Del Nero, another member of FIFA’s executive committee and a former president of the Confederação Brasileira de Futebol (“CBF”), the Brazilian soccer federation; and José Maria Marin, a member of multiple FIFA standing committees, and another former president of the CBF.
Burzaco and Torneos also paid bribes through BJB to numerous CONMEBOL officials in furtherance of a scheme to obtain the broadcasting rights to the Copa Libertadores tournament. In addition to the aforementioned soccer officials, bribes were also paid to, among others: Juan Ángel Napout, who served as a FIFA Vice President, a member of FIFA’s Executive Committee, and president of CONMEBOL, and Romer Osuna, a member of the FIFA audit and compliance committee and former treasurer of CONMEBOL.
At the time of the conduct, BJB’s Anti-Money Laundering (“AML”) controls failed to detect or prevent money laundering transactions related to the soccer bribery schemes. Had Arzuaga’s supervisors or compliance personnel meaningfully reviewed Arzuaga’s due diligence on Torneos and his responses to transaction alerts, they would have known there were multiple, significant red flags, including facially false contracts, payments to third parties at the direction of a FIFA official, and services purportedly rendered by shell corporations—all of which would have alerted the Bank to the bribery, money laundering, or other illegal activity.
According to BJB’s admissions, the Bank knew that Arzuaga’s clients’ accounts were associated with international soccer, which was generally understood to involve high corruption risks. Nevertheless, a BJB executive directed the opening of these accounts be fast-tracked in the hope that these clients would provide lucrative business.
As outlined in the agreement, the Department reached this resolution with BJB based on a number of factors, including BJB’s failure to voluntarily disclose the conduct to the Department; the nature and seriousness of the conduct, including that the bank played an essential role in this scheme for over two years; and the bank’s prior criminal history. BJB did not receive any cooperation credit because it made misleading representations about relevant facts in the case, which had the effect of hindering the Department’s investigation, and it did not come forward with all evidence pertaining to the involvement of senior management. However, the Bank received some credit for its significant efforts to remediate its compliance program. Accordingly, the total criminal penalty reflects a five percent reduction off the bottom of the applicable U.S. sentencing guidelines fine range.