Coulee Dam vulnerable to bombing
— Nov 29th, 1996
COULEE DAM (AP) A small group of determined saboteurs who knew just where to place explosives at Grand Coulee Dam could cause catastrophic destruction downstream, a federal report says.
The worst-case scenario would drain much of Lake Roosevelt, the reservoir behind the Columbia River dam, according to the recent 20-page report from the federal Office of Managing Risk and Public Safety.
Security is a low priority and is considered after water and power issues and making access convenient for employees, contractors and tourists, the report said.
As recently as last year, "there was a strong foundation on which to build an effective physical security program," the report said.
"Unfortunately, management emphasis on areas other than security has seriously degraded the level of security at Grand Coulee Dam."
If the 11 spillgates that span the top of the dam were to fail while Lake Roosevelt was full, 2.2 million acre-feet of water the top 30 feet of the lake, 40 percent of capacity would drain over the next 12 to 24 hours, said Peter Brooks, chief of hydrologic engineering at the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers in Portland, Ore.
The initial wave would travel at a rate of 935,000 cubic feet per second, Brooks said. The next dam downstream, Chief Joseph Dam, is designed to handle 1.2 million cfs, but cities would be flooded all the way to Portland.
The report by the federal risk-management office was written by inspectors who visited the dam in July and August. The effort was part of a national evaluation of federal facilities ordered by the Justice Department in June 1995, two months after a bomb killed 168 people at a federal building in Oklahoma City.
Here are some of the report's 40 findings on the Grand Coulee Dam:
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The dam had no documented security plan, no security officer and only one of its four security cameras was working.
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Door locks and knobs had been permanently removed or welded over on the dam's Third Powerhouse, making it impossible to secure. It's not uncommon for local youngsters to enter the powerhouse and skate, skateboard and play with electric maintenance carts during non-duty hours.
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There was an apparent policy of leaving doors unsecured. A re-keying process was begun but two grand master keys already had been lost, compromising the process.
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Anyone can receive a special tour with detailed information on the dam's water and power delivery systems.
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There were no barriers to keep boats away from powerhouses on the downriver side. Alarms were inadequate. No background checks were required for contractors working on the dam.
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Unauthorized vehicles could gain access to two powerhouses by following authorized traffic through gates. A contractor gate was left open day and night.
Steve Clark, manager of the dam for the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, disputed the report's contention that a terrorist attack could cause catastrophic destruction downstream.
Clark also said the dam does have a security plan, and that he was correcting security problems pointed out by the inspectors.
Grand Coulee and Coulee Dam police chiefs told the inspectors there are three militia groups in northern Okanogan County, and freemen moving into an area near Moses Lake. The chiefs said they believe the groups present a threat to the dam and its employees. The report recommended the dam operators restore the recently closed 24-hour dispatch center, which monitored cameras, alarms and access. But employees estimated it would take a nuclear bomb to cause total failure of the massive concrete structure.
But a bomb like the one used in Oklahoma City could cause major damage to powerhouses and generators, the report said.
moar: https://products.kitsapsun.com/archive/1996/11-29/354141_coulee_dam_vulnerable_to_bombin.html