Chess endgame

In chess and chess-like games, the endgame (or end game or ending) is the stage of the game when few pieces are left on the board.

The line between middlegame and endgame is often not clear, and may occur gradually or with the quick exchange of a few pairs of pieces. The endgame, however, tends to have different characteristics from the middlegame, and the players have correspondingly different strategic concerns. In particular, pawns become more important as endgames often revolve around attempting to promote a pawn by advancing it to the eighth rank. The king, which has to be protected in the middlegame owing to the threat of checkmate, becomes a strong piece in the endgame. It can be brought to the center of the board and act as a useful attacking piece.

Whereas chess opening theory changes frequently, giving way to middlegame positions that fall in and out of popularity, endgame theory always remains constant. Many people have composed endgame studies, endgame positions which are solved by finding a win for White when there is no obvious way to win, or a draw when it seems White must lose.

Usually in the endgame, the stronger side (the one with more material using the standard piece point count system) should try to exchange pieces (knights, bishops, rooks, and queens), while avoiding the exchange of pawns. This generally makes it easier to convert a material advantage into a won game. The defending side should strive for the opposite.

Chess players classify endgames according to the type of pieces that remain.

The question we should be asking (prompted by my thinking about the relevance of game theory) is which payoff matrix is of relevance. Here, it makes sense to differentiate between the objectives of Mr. Trump and the United States as a whole.

To degrade China's ability to ascend the quality ladder, and maintain US technical leadership in advanced production technologies.

To reduce the bilateral trade deficit with China.

To reduce the overall US trade deficit.

To increase the Republican party's ability to retain control of the legislative branch.

To activate nativist and xenophobic groups within the Trump electoral coalition.

To satisfy atavistic desires to impose pain on foreign parties.

Surely, this is not an exhaustive list, but I think it covers a lot of possibilities.

It is useful to then consider the efficacy of (i) anti-dumping duties, (ii) Section 232 tariffs, and (iii) Section 301 tariffs in the context of these objectives, keeping in the mind the targeting principle - the core idea of which "is that if a new regulation of some sort is required, the most efficient intervention targets the specific variable of direct interest."

Hence, if (1) is the objective, then strict implementation of the CFIUS process, augmented by perhaps additional legislation (and funding), combined with increased expenditures in civilian and military R&D, tax breaks for R&D, and increased educational funding aimed at science and technology (including grants for higher educational system), would be in order. I don't see moves toward the second - perhaps more important aspect - of retaining our technological lead in Mr. Trump's agenda.