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>“Idi Amin gives away his plans to invade Israel.” - https://youtu.be/phPMSCcpb40
“Idi Amin’s Israeli Connection” Part 1
https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/idi-amins-israeli-connection
June 27, 2016
On June 27, 1976, an Air France jet carrying around two hundred and forty passengers, twelve crew members, and four hijackers took off from Athens Airport. Before it could reach its destination, in Paris, it suddenly veered south to Libya, where it refuelled and then headed toward the equator, finally landing in Entebbe, in the East African nation of Uganda.
One issue that probably won’t be discussed during Netanyahu’s visit is why the hijackers chose Entebbe. The short answer is that Idi Amin, Uganda’s erratic dictator at the time, was a staunch supporter of the Palestinian cause and a professed enemy of Israel. But there is a longer answer: Israel itself helped install Amin in power, creating a monster who turned on his former patrons.
Israel had had a special relationship with Uganda since the latter's independence from Great Britain, in 1962. Beginning in the nineteen-fifties, David Ben-Gurion, then Israel’s Prime Minister, sought strategic partnerships with states on the edge the Arab world, including Uganda, Kenya, Iran, and Turkey, to counter the hostile nations on Israel’s own borders. As part of what became known as the Peripheral Doctrine, Israel trained and equipped Uganda’s military and carried out construction, agriculture, and other development projects.
Just months after the Six-Day War, in 1967, Israel sold Uganda weapons worth seven million dollars. In 1969, Israel began funnelling weapons through Uganda into southern Sudan, where a ragtag rebel group known as the Anyanya had been fighting the Arab-dominated Sudanese government since the nineteen-fifties. Israel’s purpose was to distract the Sudanese Army so that it would not join forces with Egypt, which was mobilizing to retaliate for the capture of the Sinai Peninsula.
Uganda’s President at the time, Milton Obote, was a Pan-Africanist who envisioned a united Africa that would challenge the legacy of division and colonialism. Like most African leaders, he condemned Israeli "aggression" against Egypt and wanted to cut off support to the Anyanyas. But Amin, the Ugandan Army’s commander at the time, was a great admirer of Israel. He had briefly enrolled in a paratrooper course there (uncompleted), and was friendly with Colonel Baruch Bar-Lev, Israel’s military attaché in Uganda; Amin’s numerous wives and children even socialized with Bar-Lev’s wife and children. Amin came from an area near the Sudanese border, so was well placed to insure that Israeli arms continued to flow to the Anyanya, against Obote’s wishes.
Obote’s Presidency had been fraught with tribal conflict. Increasingly unpopular at home, he announced a turn to the left at a political rally on December 18, 1969. His government would “fight relentlessly” against “ignorance, disease, colonialism, neo-colonialism, imperialism, and apartheid,” he declared. Private companies and freehold land would be nationalized. As Obote was leaving the stadium that evening, he was shot through the cheek by an unknown gunman. He survived, but was now aware that vultures hovered over his Presidency.
Obote soon began to suspect that Amin might be one of those vultures. During a trip to Cairo, according to the Israeli military historian Yehuda Ofer, Amin called Bar-Lev because he was worried that, when he returned, he would be arrested for the murder of an Obote ally. Bar-Lev was eager to help Amin, who was serving Israel’s interests in Sudan, and he advised the Ugandan commander to form a battalion within the Army to protect himself. The Israelis would train it. This unit, consisting of paratroopers, tanks, and armed jeeps, proved instrumental a few months later when, in January, 1971, Amin overthrew the regime while Obote was in Singapore for a meeting of the British Commonwealth.
The coup had taken Britain’s High Commissioner to Uganda, Richard Slater, by surprise, so the next morning he paid a visit to Colonel Bar-Lev, who happened to be sitting with Amin. Bar-Lev informed Slater that Amin had control of the entire Army. Officers sympathetic to Obote were out of action—some were dead, others had fled their barracks. The bullet-ridden cars of Cabinet ministers now stood abandoned on Kampala’s streets. The Israelis would continue to provide advice for weeks afterward, while the last traces of resistance to the coup were eliminated.