''JANUARY 14, 2019''

Split between Ukrainian, Russian churches shows political importance of Orthodox Christianity

BY DAVID MASCI

''Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko stands with Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew I of Constantinople (center) and Metropolitan of Kiev Epiphanius I (right) at a ceremony to sign the decree that proclaims the independence of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church. (Ozan Kose/AFP viaGetty Images)''

The recent decision by the Ukrainian Orthodox Church to split from its Russian counterpart after more than 300 years of being linked reflects not only the continuing military conflict between the two countries in recent years, but also the important political role Orthodox Christianity plays in the region.

Ukraine is an overwhelmingly Orthodox Christian nation, with nearly eight-in-ten adults (78%) identifying as Orthodox (compared with 71% in Russia), according to a 2015 Pew Research Center survey of much of the country (some contested areas in eastern Ukraine were not surveyed). This is up from 39% who said they were Orthodox Christian in 1991 – the year the officially atheist Soviet Union collapsed and Ukraine gained its independence. With roughly 35 million Orthodox Christians, Ukraine now has the third-largest Orthodox population in the world, after Russia and Ethiopia.

In addition, Orthodox Christianity is closely tied to Ukraine’s national and political life. Roughly half of all Ukrainians (51%) say it is at least somewhat important for someone to be Orthodox to be truly Ukrainian. The same is true for Russia, where 57% say being Orthodox is important to being truly Russian. In both countries, about half (48% in each) say religious leaders have at least some influence in political matters, although most Ukrainians (61%) and roughly half of Russians (52%) would prefer if this were not the case.

The split between the Orthodox churches in the two countries is part and parcel of a wider history of political tensions between Russia’s geopolitical ambitions in the region and Ukraine’s resistance to them – even as some other predominantly Orthodox countries in Eastern Europe look toward Russian for political and religious leadership. For example, majorities of Orthodox Christians in countries such as Serbia (77%) and Georgia (62%) say Russia has an obligation to protect Orthodox Christians outside its borders, but fewer Orthodox Ukrainians (41%) feel this way.

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Indeed, even though the survey was conducted in 2015 – while the Ukrainian Orthodox Church was still under the jurisdiction of the Russian Orthodox Church – a plurality of Orthodox Ukrainians (46%) said they looked to the leaders of the Ukrainian national church (either the patriarch of Kiev or the metropolitan of Kiev and all of Ukraine) as the highest authority of Orthodoxy. Just 17% saw the patriarch of Moscow (currently Kirill I) as their spiritual leader, and an even smaller share (7%) said they looked to the ecumenical patriarch of Constantinople (currently Bartholomew I) for leadership, even though he is technically the foremost leader of the world’s roughly 300 million Orthodox Christians.

But attitudes in Ukraine toward Russia’s political and religious leadership are also highly divided between the eastern and western parts of the country. Eastern Ukrainians have more positive attitudes toward Russia than do western Ukrainians. For example, the 2015 survey found that over half of those living in the east (55%) say Russia has an obligation to protect Orthodox Christians living outside its borders. In western Ukraine, meanwhile, a majority (58%) disagree with this view. The patriarch of Moscow also receives higher support in eastern Ukraine than in western Ukraine. Western Ukrainians are more likely to look to their own national patriarchs as the highest authority of the Orthodox Church.

Due to fighting in eastern Ukraine between pro-Russian forces and the Ukrainian government, the 2015 survey used in this analysis covered only 80% of the country’s population and excluded the southernmost province of Crimea (which Russia annexed in 2014), as well as the eastern provinces of Donetsk and Luhansk. Given ongoing geopolitical tensions between the two countries, western Ukrainian attitudes toward Russia are not likely to have improved since 2015. But support for Russia in eastern Ukraine may have been somewhat higher had we been able to survey the contested provinces of the country.

Topics Interreligious Relations Religious Leaders & Institutions Orthodox Christianity

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>>15719126

>Due to fighting in eastern Ukraine between pro-Russian forces and the Ukrainian government, the 2015 survey used in this analysis covered only 80% of the country’s population and excluded the southernmost province of Crimea (which Russia annexed in 2014), as well as the eastern provinces of Donetsk and Luhansk. Given ongoing geopolitical tensions between the two countries, western Ukrainian attitudes toward Russia are not likely to have improved since 2015. But support for Russia in eastern Ukraine may have been somewhat higher had we been able to survey the contested provinces of the country.

>JANUARY 14, 2019

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>>15719120

>independence of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church.

>>15719126

Orthodox Church of Ukraine

Origin 2018 Kyiv

Independence 5 January 2019 (recognized and autocephaly granted)

Recognition Autocephaly recognized by: Ecumenical Patriarchate (5 January 2019)

Patriarchate of Alexandria (8 November 2019) Church of Greece (19 October 2019) Church of Cyprus (24 October 2020)

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Orthodox_Church_of_Ukraine

The church was united at the unification council in Kyiv on 15 December 2018 as a condition for recognition of it by the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople and was granted the tomos of autocephaly (decree of ecclesial independence) by the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople in Istanbul on 5 January 2019. The unification council voted to unite all the existing Ukrainian Orthodox major jurisdictions: the Ukrainian Orthodox Church – Kyiv Patriarchate (UOC-KP) and the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church (UAOC) as well as a part of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate (a branch of the Moscow-based Russian Orthodox Church, which claims jurisdiction over Ukraine). The Unification Council elected Epiphanius Dumenko – previously the Metropolitan of Pereiaslav-Khmelnytskyi and Bila Tserkva (UOC-KP) – as its primate, the Metropolitan of Kyiv and all Ukraine.

According to the statute that the OCU adopted at the unification council, "Orthodox Christians of Ukrainian provenance in the Orthodox diaspora" should henceforth be subject to the jurisdiction of the diocesan bishops of the Ecumenical Patriarchate (Article 4 of the Statute).[15][16]

This provision is also enshrined in the OCU's tomos of autocephaly.[17][18][19]

In March 2019 Metropolitan Epiphanius said that the transfer of parishes of the dissolved Kyiv Patriarchate to the jurisdiction of the Ecumenical Patriarchate had already begun.[20]

The creation and subsequent recognition of the OCU by other autocephalous Orthodox Churches have met staunch opposition and attempts at subversion on the part of the Russian Orthodox Church (Moscow Patriarchate) as well as the government of Russia.[21]

>>15719282

>Beth Sanner

Beth Sanner is an American government official, currently serving as the Deputy Director of National Intelligence for Mission Integration. She was appointed to the position in May 2019. Prior to this, Sanner assumed leadership for the President's Daily Brief in April 2017. Wikipedia

President: Donald Trump; Joe Biden

Education: American University, National War College

https://www.linkedin.com/in/beth-sanner?trk=public_profile_browsemap

About

An innovator, change agent, and c-suite level leader with more than three decades of experience in national security, I have briefed the President of the United States for two years, managed the Intelligence Community's most influential analytic enterprises (the PDB and the National Intelligence Council) for six years, and as Deputy Director for National Intelligence led the IC's integration of core mission areas across 18 agencies and tens of thousands of employees spanning strategic analysis, collection architecture, S&T innovation, and great power competition.

During my government tenure, I was known for measurably improving workforce engagement, developing and executing values-based vision and strategy, and leveraging the power of organizations to achieve impact beyond their traditional domains.

I'm excited about bringing and adapting this expertise to help private-sector companies achieve their objectives.

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>>15719331

SES@ CIA

Senior Executive – Directorate of Analysis

Central Intelligence Agency

2000 - 201313 years

Over a decade of experience leading analytic components that informed US policy and strategy on South Asia, Russia, Europe, Southeast Asia, Central and Eastern Europe, and the Balkans. I also led the Career Analyst Programa full-time program to train all new CIA analystsintroducing curriculum, technology, and facilities that has enabled generations of analysts to "train like we fight."

U.S. Department of State Graphic

Special Adviser for Balkan Affairs

U.S. Department of State

1997 - 19981 year

The White House Graphic

National Security Council Russian and European Directorates

The White House

Jan 1991 - Oct 19932 years 10 months

Briefed the President, Vice President, and National Security Adviser on European and Russian issues. Led the coordination of the President's policy on East and Central Europe from mid-1992. Chaired interagency meetings to plot strategy and tactics. Key member of Vice President's team promoting a new relationship on space issues with Russia. Coordinated interagency preparations and follow-up initiatives for last US-Soviet Summit and first US-Russian Summit.

KEKBOMB

twatter trend

White House press secretary Jen Psaki responds to Senator Ted Cruz calling her ‘Peppermint Patty’ at the Conservative Political Action Conference

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