Brian Cates - Political Columnist ⭐️⭐️⭐️

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(Clandestine RR)

HUGE news from US Counterintelligence!

This is an official statement from the Office of National Counterintelligence Security. This is EXTREMELY juicy. Read it and tell me what they are describing.

The head of US Counterintelligence is ADMITTING THERE IS A DEEP STATE AND WE HAVE BEEN INFILTRATED…

They are confirming all of the major themes we have been pushing. Let’s break it down.

A “Global threat” of “state and non-state actors are targeting the United States”. Infiltrating “every sector of the US economy”. A “diverse and dynamic threat” utilizing “legal and quasi-legal methods, including mergers, acquisitions, investments, joint ventures, partnerships, and talent recruitments programs to acquire US technology and innovation.”

The 3rd paragraph is spot on and reads like things we all have been writing for years: “This new form of conflict is not fought on a foreign battlefield, but on our power grids, our computer networks, our LABORATORIES AND RESEARCH FACILITIES, our financial institutions, our healthcare providers, and our federal, state and local tribal governments. This battle will not be won by weapons and warriors, but by public and private sector partnerships and through American dedication and diligence.”

HOLY SHIT…

So what does this mean? It confirms that the US government KNOWS it’s been infiltrated. But why are they talking about it now? HUNTER BIDEN.

This entire statement is a direct shot at Hunter Biden and his shady dealings in Ukraine. Hunter Biden using quasi-legal partnerships and investment funds (Rosemont Seneca) to use US innovation and technology on foreign soil, to conduct research at biological laboratories and research facilities (Metabiota).

This whole statement covers the entire network of the deep state using the Biden and Kerry family members as proxies to conduct black site biological operations.

This is huge. It means that the good actors in US government are not going to cover for the treasonous activity committed by deep state actors, and it largely confirms that good actors in our government know about this infiltration and therefore have contingencies for this infiltration.

Now, I’m 100% positive they knew about it LONG before they released this statement, but them publicly admitting that we have been infiltrated is a massive step in the direction of justice and confirms essentially all of what we have been preaching for years.

Every aspect of American society was infiltrated by foreign actors and American actors on behalf of a global threat. Folks, the US GOV just confirmed the Deep State is real.

https://www.linkedin.com/posts/national-counterintelligence-and-security-center_protecting-an-organization-is-not-solely-activity-6914579416006156288-GZT1

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Tyb

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https://www.dni.gov/files/NCSC/documents/SafeguardingOurFuture/12.13.2021%20Protect%20Your%20Org%20from%20the%20Foreign%20Intel%20Threat.pdf

Page 1NATIONALCOUNTERINTELLIGENCEANDSECURITY C E N T E R

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Protect Your Organization from the

Foreign Intelligence Threat

Introduction by Michael J. Orlando, Senior Official Performing the Duties of the Director of NCSC

Today the global threat environment is more diverse and dynamic than ever. As spelled out in the latest Annual

Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community (IC), a growing number of state actors and non-state

actors are targeting the United States. They are no longer just interested in obtaining classified U.S. secrets but

also are collecting information from almost all U.S. Government agencies and virtually every sector of the U.S.

economy. Personal data, trade secrets, intellectual property, technology, and research and development are all

being targeted by adversaries who have the capabilities, patience, and resources to get them.

To achieve their objectives, foreign adversaries are employing a range of illegal techniques, including insider

threats, cyber penetrations, supply chain attacks, and blended operations that combine some or all these methods.

They are also using a variety of legal and quasi-legal methods, including mergers and acquisitions, investments,

joint ventures, partnerships, and talent recruitment programs to acquire U.S. technology and innovation.

Ultimately, they seek to degrade our economic power and national security, compromise our critical infrastructure,

and undermine our democratic institutions and ideals.

This new form of conflict is not fought on a foreign battlefield, but in our power grids, our computer networks,

our laboratories and research facilities, our financial institutions, our healthcare providers, and our federal, state,

local, and tribal governments. This battle will not be won by weapons and warriors, but by public and private

sector partnerships and through American dedication and diligence.

This document is designed to provide public and private-sector organizations with an overview of counterintelligence

(CI) and security best practices to help guard against foreign intelligence threats. The document includes links

to risk mitigation materials that can help organizations improve their physical security, personnel security,

operations security, cybersecurity, defensive CI, insider threat mitigation, and supply chain risk management.

Intelligence Community Campus, Bethesda, Maryland

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What is the Threat from Foreign Intelligence Entities?

Their Methods

• Elicitation: The use of conversation to extract

information, either in person, by email, on the

phone, or through social media.

• Social Engineering: The impersonation of others

to seem legitimate and surreptitiously acquire

passwords or other key data.

• Economic Espionage: The theft or misappropriation

of a trade secret with the intent or knowledge that

the offense will benefit a foreign entity.

• Human Targeting: The targeting of individuals with

access to sensitive information, who, for example,

might unexpectedly meet someone who shares their

interests or seeks an ongoing relationship.

• Cyber/Technical: Digital technologies used to

compromise or acquire information stored or

transmitted electronically.

1 NCSC, National Threat Identification and Prioritization Assessment, 2018.

The term “foreign intelligence entity” refers to a known or

suspected foreign state or non-state organization or person

that conducts intelligence activities to acquire U.S. informa-

tion, block or impair U.S. intelligence collection, influence

U.S. policy, or disrupt U.S. systems and programs. This term

includes foreign intelligence services–defined as state

intelligence services–and also can pertain to international

terrorists, transnational criminal organizations, foreign

cyber actors, or foreign corporations or organizations.1

Regional adversaries and ideologically motivated entities,

such as hackers and public disclosure organizations, also

pose a growing threat to the United States. These actors

have been able to advance their goals through the prolifer-

ation of more advanced and commercially available cyber

and surveillance technologies.

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What?

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The National CI Strategy of the United States of America

2020-2022 spells out three principal trends that characterize

the current and emerging threat environment:

• The number of threat actors targeting the United States is growing

• These actors have an increasingly sophisticated set of intelligence capabilities at their disposal and they

are employing them in new ways to target the United States

• Threat actors are using these capabilities against an expanded set of targets and vulnerabilities

In short, today’s threat environment no longer is characterized by the traditional spy-versus-spy game played by

competing state intelligence services. It has evolved to include a broader range of actors using a wider variety of

tools, both licit and illicit, to collect against a broader set of targets. These threat actors are employing innovative

combinations of traditional spying, economic espionage, and supply chain and cyber operations to acquire

sensitive information, research, and technology from the U.S. economy as well as to gain access to our critical

infrastructure. Threat actors also are conducing malicious influence campaigns that employ cyber operations,

media manipulation, and political subversion to sow divisions in our society, undermine confidence in our

democratic institutions, and weaken our alliances.

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“The United States is entering into

a period of intensifying strategic

competition with several rivals, most

notably Russia and China. Numerous

statements from senior U.S. Defense

officials make clear that they expect

this competition to be played out

primarily below the threshold of

major war—in the spectrum of

competition that has become

known as the gray zone.”

—RAND Corporation, Gaining

Competitive Advantage in the Gray Zone:

Response Options for Coercive Aggression

below the Threshold of Major War, 2019

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The National CI Strategy of the United States of America

2020-2022 spells out five strategic objectives for the U.S.

Government in countering these threats. In addition to

addressing its core CI mission of protecting classified

information and facilities, the strategy dictates that

the U.S. Government should:

• Protect the nation’s critical infrastructure

• Reduce threats to key U.S. supply chains

• Counter the exploitation of the U.S. economy

• Defend American democracy against foreign influence

• Counter foreign intelligence cyber and technical

operations

The strategy recognizes the U.S. Government cannot

address these threats alone, but needs the assistance of the

private sector, an informed American public, and our allies.

Sound CI and security procedures must become part of

everyday American business practices. The U.S. Government

needs the private sector at its side combating these threats.

How Do We Counter the Threat?

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What Steps Can Organizations Take?

A Common Understanding

The first step is a common understanding of the threat landscape. While

adversaries are using increasingly complex, multi-pronged techniques to

target organizations, they are all working to achieve basic human goals.

Threat actors operate in both the physical and virtual worlds, but threat

activity is not unique to either domain. Malicious actors in cyberspace

represent key threats to organizations in the virtual domain, but humans

inside an organization who wittingly or unwitting harm their organization

(insider threats) can pose just as grave a threat. An entity may have world-

class cyber defenses, but it is still vulnerable without an effective insider

threat program. Comprehensive efforts to counter foreign adversarial

threat should, therefore, address both the physical and cyber worlds and

the humans and machines operating in each.

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Traditional Security Practices

Both the public and private sectors are familiar with and practice traditional

security disciplines. From deploying gates and guards, to using reference

and background checks, to enhancing passwords and firewalls, to making available reporting mechanisms for

employees, basic security practices remain essential to countering adversarial threat. NCSC and its partners

offer several guides and practices to help build and strengthen traditional security practices.

• Physical Security: The Department of Homeland Security (DHS)-led Interagency Security Committee

(ISC) is charged with enhancing the effectiveness of non-military federal facilities in the United States.

They offer many physical security policies, standards, and best practices, including risk management

practices to the public and the private sector.

• Personnel Security: As the primary support element enabling the Director of National Intelligence to

execute her Security Executive Agent authorities, the NCSC Special Security Directorate (SSD) works

with all federal agencies on the development and implementation of personnel security policy guidance for

the federal national security workforce. SSD also works through the National Industrial Security Program

Policy Advisory Committee and through other targeted outreach efforts to share policy guidance with

private sector partners representing cleared contractor organizations.

• Cybersecurity: The goal of cybersecurity is to ensure the integrity, confidentiality, and availability of

organizational systems, networks, and data. Many resources are available to help organizations enhance

their cyber resilience and security. Cyber-related government and industry standards can be found at the

National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). Additional cyber resources can be found at the

Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and the

National Security Agency.

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• Operations Security (OPSEC): OPSEC is a process by which an organization

identifies its critical assets and information, assesses threats, vulnerabilities, and

the impact of potential loss, evaluates risk, and then deploys countermeasures

in a continuous cycle to effectively mitigate those risks. NCSC serves as the

mission manager for the National OPSEC Program (NOP) and provides training

and awareness materials for public and private sector partners. The NCSC NOP

also provides liaison and assistance, governance and advocacy, and research

and analysis for federal partner organizations.

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CI Practices

CI can be defined as information gathered and activities

conducted to protect against espionage, to protect

other intelligence activities, and to prevent sabotage

or assassinations conducted by or on behalf of foreign

government or elements thereof, foreign organizations,

or foreign persons or international terrorist activities.

Traditionally, CI has been viewed as primarily an

Intelligence Community or military practice, i.e., “spy

versus spy.” Contrary to this perception, CI is critical

to both public and private sector organizations as

they work towards an enterprise-wide effort to protect

against foreign intelligence entities. In today’s world,

where adversaries threaten America’s critical infrastructure,

economy, and the global information ecosystem, the

threat from foreign intelligence entities requires strong

public-private partnerships.

A critical part of successful CI is understanding how foreign

intelligence entities operate in the most basic form, such

as targeting and developing human assets (witting and

unwitting) to advance their agendas. Traditional intelligence services conduct this activity through the

Recruitment Cycle: Spot, Assess, Develop, Recruit, Handle, and Terminate (cease handling the asset).

NCSC and its partners offer many resources to help organizations develop appropriate CI awareness campaigns

to inform their workforces. These include the NCSC Know the Risk, Raise your Shield campaign and Safeguard-

ing Our Future materials, and the Think before You Link materials developed by the United Kingdom’s

Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure. In addition, the Department of Defense’s Center for the

Development of Security Excellence has resources and training available for CI awareness, including infor-

mation on foreign intelligence entity collection methods and foreign travel threats. Furthermore, the FBI has

numerous CI resources available for public and private sector partners.

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The Recruitment Cycle

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Protecting Against the Insider Threat

Insider threats are individuals with authorized access to an organization’s information, facilities, personnel, or

other resources who use that access to wittingly or unwittingly cause harm to the organization. Insider threats

can commit acts of corporate or traditional espionage, unauthorized disclosure, fraud, theft, sabotage, and even

workplace violence. Trusted insiders may commit these negative acts on their own or they may be co-opted or

exploited by foreign adversaries.

Executive Order 13587 requires all Executive Branch departments and agencies with access to classified information

to develop an insider threat program in accordance with National Insider Threat Program Policy and Minimum

Standards. Formal insider threat programs are a best practice for private and public sector organizations,

regardless of access to classified information.

Countering insider threats is a whole-of-organization effort. The traditional security practices detailed above,

combined with effective hiring practices, training and awareness campaigns, workforce wellness and support

efforts, and the promotion of positive workplace culture and organizational trust are all essential elements of

effective insider threat programs.

Insider threat programs are multi-disciplinary efforts that focus on proactive risk mitigation and information

sharing while protecting the privacy and civil liberties of the workforce. Effective insider threat programs leverage

resources across an organization, such as human resources and employee assistance programs, cybersecurity,

traditional security, CI, legal and others, to identify anomalous behaviors that indicate an employee may be

headed on a critical path toward harm. These programs then facilitate appropriate organization action to

address the behavior, often resulting in positive outcomes for both the individual and the organization.

NCSC, the National Insider Threat Task Force, and their partners offer a wealth of resources, information,

guides, and awareness materials to help organizations establish and improve insider threat programs.

Personal Predispositions

• Medical/psychiatric

conditions

• Personality or social

skills issues

• Previous rule violations

• Social network risks

Concerning Behaviors

• Interpersonal

• Technical

• Security

• Financial

• Personnel

• Mental health/additions

• Social network

• Travel

Problematic Organizational

Response

• Inattention

• No risk assessment

process

• Inadequate investigation

• Summary dismissal

or other actions that

escalate the risk

Stressors

• Personal

• Professional

• Financial

HOSTILE ACT

Factors Along the Critical Path to Insider Risk

Source: Eric Shaw and Laura Sellers: Application of the Critical-Path Method to Evaluate Insider

Threat. Studies in Intelligence Vol 59, No. 2 (June 2015).

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Supply Chain Risk Management

The exploitation of key supply chains by foreign adversaries, especially when executed in concert with cyber

intrusions and insider threat activities, represents a complex and growing threat to strategically important U.S.

economic sectors and critical infrastructure. Foreign adversaries are attempting to access our nation’s key supply

chains at multiple points—from concept to design, manufacture, integration, deployment, and maintenance–by

a variety of means. NCSC offers multiple resources on supply chain risk management.

A supply chain risk occurs when the capability and intention of an adversary aligns with the opportunity to

exploit a vulnerability. This scenario could allow an adversary to extract intellectual property, sensitive government

data, and personally identifiable information. It could also allow an adversary to surveil, deny, disrupt, or

otherwise degrade a component, system, or service, thereby adversely affecting critical industrial control systems,

services, and products.

The increasing reliance on foreign-owned or controlled hardware, software, or services, as well as the proliferation

of networking technologies, including those associated with the Internet of Things, creates vulnerabilities in our

nation’s supply chains. By exploiting these vulnerabilities, foreign adversaries could compromise the integrity,

trustworthiness, and authenticity of products and services that underpin government and American industry. They

also could subvert and disrupt critical networks and systems, operations, products, and weapons platforms in a time

of crisis. For these reasons, supply chain security must be a priority in the acquisition process.

Tools and Technologies to Protect Each Stage

of the Supply Chain Life

https://www.dni.gov/files/NCSC/documents/SafeguardingOurFuture/12.13.2021%20Protect%20Your%20Org%20from%20the%20Foreign%20Intel%20Threat.pdf

For notables

>>16008275, >>16008284, >>16008285, >>16008301, >>16008304, >>16008306, >>16008307, >>16008308, >>16008309 Official Statement From The Office Of National Counterintelligence Security Admitting There Is A Deep State And We Have Been Infiltrated…

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