Anonymous ID: f972fa May 20, 2022, 8:03 p.m. No.16314180   🗄️.is đź”—kun

>>16314050

the WHO is a part of the UN, not a seperate entity.

 

"The World Health Organization (WHO)[1] is a specialized agency of the United Nations responsible for international public health.[2] The WHO Constitution states its main objective as "the attainment by all peoples of the highest possible level of health".[3] Headquartered in Geneva, Switzerland, it has six regional offices and 150 field offices worldwide.

 

The WHO was established on 7 April 1948."

 

UN membership = WHO membership

 

Supra-governmental organizations are governed by treaty law. USA is in UN/WHO and is bound by treaty law, as are all other member states.

 

Other UN-specialized agencies (to which all member states are subjected to participation in/under) include:

 

1 Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO)

2 International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO)

3 International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD)

4 International Labour Organization (ILO)

5 International Maritime Organization (IMO)

6 International Monetary Fund (IMF)

7 International Telecommunication Union (ITU)

8 United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO)

9 United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO)

10 Universal Postal Union (UPU)

11 World Bank Group (WBG)

11.1 International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD)

11.2 International Development Association (IDA)

11.3 International Finance Corporation (IFC)

12 World Health Organization (WHO)

13 World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO)

14 World Meteorological Organization (WMO)

15 World Tourism Organization (UNWTO)

16 Former specialized agency

17 Related organizations

17.1 Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO) Preparatory Commission

17.2 International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)

17.3 International Organization for Migration (IOM)

17.4 Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW)

 

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_specialized_agencies_of_the_United_Nations

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/World_Health_Organization

Anonymous ID: f972fa May 20, 2022, 8:12 p.m. No.16314229   🗄️.is đź”—kun   >>4240 >>4250 >>4283

>>16314208

>>16314214

and 8kun.top of course.

WHO/UN will eliminate all ip address registrants deemed misinformation, or harmful conspiracy in the face of a pandemic. they may event call disinformation, by their definition, a pandemic. and guns. and wealth inequality. and resource access inequality. and mental health etc etc

 

Why wouldn't they?

Anonymous ID: f972fa May 20, 2022, 8:22 p.m. No.16314298   🗄️.is đź”—kun   >>4302 >>4312 >>4318 >>4321 >>4329 >>4382 >>4384

Doesn't matter. US is already UN/WHO members. As long as that stands, Lock Step will be the course. No president or congress in any member nation can override the existing treaty law. But withdrawl can happen.

 

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vienna_Convention_on_the_Law_of_Treaties

 

Here is an 80 pg doc on

https://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2653&context=faculty_scholarship

 

EXITING TREATIES

Laurence R. Helfer*

This Article analyzes the under-explored phenomenon of unilateral exit from international agreements and intergovernmental

organizations. Although clauses authorizing denunciation and

withdrawal from treaties are pervasive, international legal scholars

and international relations theorists have largely ignored them. This

Article draws upon new empirical evidence to provide a comprehensive

interdisciplinary framework for understanding treaty exit. It examines

when and why states abandon their treaty commitments and explains

how exit helps to resolve certain theoretical and doctrinal puzzles

that have long troubled scholars of international affairs.

Anonymous ID: f972fa May 20, 2022, 8:25 p.m. No.16314312   🗄️.is đź”—kun   >>4318 >>4321 >>4329 >>4382

>>16314298

>EXITING TREATIES

I. SIX DISTINGUISHING CHARACTERISTICS OF TREATY EXIT

Although many observers conflate exit with a state’s failure to

comply with its treaty obligations, the act of quitting a treaty is distinctive in at least six ways from unsanctioned violations of international law.

First, exit, as I have defined it, is a formal, public act that requires the denouncing state to inform its treaty partners or an intergovernmental organization of its intention to withdraw.18 The

inherently public nature of such an act contrasts with many treaty

breaches (to use the parlance of international law practitioners and

scholars) or treaty defections (the term favored by political scientists and economists), where states shirk from a promised course of

conduct while hiding that fact from other cooperating states.19

Given the international legal system’s relatively weak monitoring

and sanctioning mechanisms,20 one might reasonably wonder why a

government would ever choose public exit if private cheating is

both available and unlikely to be detected.

A second distinctive feature of exit follows from its public nature—the ability of states to use it to challenge or revise disfavored

legal norms or institutions or to placate domestic interest groups.

Withdrawing from an agreement (or threatening to withdraw) can

give a denouncing state additional voice, either by increasing its

leverage to reshape the treaty to more accurately reflect its interests or those of its domestic constituencies, or by establishing a rival legal norm or institution together with other like-minded

states.21 Exit thus sits at a critical intersection of law and power in

international relations.

 

pt1

Anonymous ID: f972fa May 20, 2022, 8:26 p.m. No.16314318   🗄️.is đź”—kun   >>4321 >>4329 >>4382

>>16314298

>>16314312

>EXITING TREATIES

 

Third, exit, unlike breach, is an internationally lawful act.22 To

denounce a treaty, all that a state must do is to follow the often

quite minimal conditions (usually procedural) that the treaty specifies.23 This lawfulness has important consequences for the imposition of sanctions and for the distribution of a treaty’s burdens and

benefits. In particular, exit enables a state to cease cooperation

with other treaty parties while avoiding or at least reducing opportunities to be penalized for noncompliance. A state that properly

follows the procedures for withdrawal from a treaty cannot be

called upon to defend its failure to comply before a tribunal created by that treaty, nor can it be targeted for treaty-authorized

sanctions (although extra-treaty sanctioning mechanisms may be

available—a point I explore below). Moreover, because no breach

of the treaty has occurred, the remaining states are unable to exercise their right under international law to engage in reciprocal acts

of noncompliance.24 They can, of course, seek to exclude the withdrawing state from the benefits of treaty membership. But their

ability to do so depends upon the nature of the activities that the

treaty regulates and whether they generate externalities that affect

non-parties.

Fourth, exit implicates domestic foreign affairs issues distinct

from those raised by treaty breaches. A country’s failure to comply

with its treaty commitments may stem from a variety of causes,

ranging from simple inattention or inadvertence, to delays or resource constraints, to deliberate decisions of national policy. Depending on the explanation, such noncompliance can be attributed

to legislators, executive branch officials, judges, private parties, or

some combination thereof. A different set of actors, however, may

be implicated in the formal and public denunciation of a treaty or

 

pt 2

Anonymous ID: f972fa May 20, 2022, 8:27 p.m. No.16314321   🗄️.is đź”—kun   >>4329 >>4382

>>16314318

>>16314298

>>16314312

the withdrawal from an intergovernmental organization.25 Where

national legal systems create such cleavages, the exit-breach distinction may implicate the balance of power among governmental

actors, raising important issues of domestic politics.26

Fifth, the public, formal, and lawful qualities of exit have distinct

consequences for a state’s reputation for compliance with international law, a key factor in explaining interstate cooperation.27 On

the one hand, the lawful, public, and generally infrequent nature of

exit suggest that a denouncing state will suffer relatively little harm

to its standing as a law abiding country—at least where it regularly

participates in multilateral agreements. Exit clauses allow treaty

parties to address openly the consequences of shifting domestic

preferences or changed circumstances. A state that takes these issues seriously, follows the specified procedures, and explains the

basis for its actions projects a real (if somewhat backhanded) respect for international rules, particularly where it is possible to profess adherence in theory but fail to comply in fact. On the other

hand, where exit involves a politically salient act such as abandoning a broad package of international obligations or membership in

 

pt 3

Anonymous ID: f972fa May 20, 2022, 8:28 p.m. No.16314329   🗄️.is đź”—kun   >>4382

>>16314321

>>16314318

>>16314298

>>16314312

an intergovernmental organization, it may do more pervasive and

lasting damage to a state’s reputation than the breach of a specific

treaty commitment.28 I provide a framework for reconciling these

competing perspectives and for distinguishing the reputational consequences of treaty exit and treaty breach later in this Article.

Finally, exit interacts with a treaty’s other provisions to raise important issues concerning the form and structure of international

agreements and institutions. Consider two preliminary examples.

First, denunciation clauses function as an insurance policy, providing a hedge against uncertainty that allows a state to renounce its

commitments if the anticipated benefits of cooperation turn out to

be overblown. The existence of this insurance policy enables states

to negotiate more expansive or deeper substantive treaty commitments ex ante, although it also raises troubling opportunities for

strategic action ex post. Second, treaty makers can use exit clauses

to segregate states according to their tastes for cooperation, helping to determine the optimal composition of a treaty’s membership.29 At the negotiation stage, a restrictive denunciation clause or

a total ban on exit helps to weed out states that are less serious

about future compliance. After a treaty enters into force, however,

a permissive exit provision provides a safety valve for treaty parties

that—as a result of changes in treaty rules, domestic preferences,

external events, or some combination of these factors—would otherwise become habitual rule violators. As these examples illustrate,

the decision of how constraining or capacious to make a denunciation or withdrawal clause raises difficult tradeoffs for treaty negotiators.

 

pt 4 of 4

Anonymous ID: f972fa May 20, 2022, 8:42 p.m. No.16314371   🗄️.is đź”—kun   >>4378

>>16314286

When WHO (UN) takes over, and via the Great Reset of the WEF, there will be no borders or nations as there have been. Sectors and areas, all under one shitstem.

 

Unless some force arrests everyone in Davos (WEF meeting happening now) AND Geneva (WHO meeting happening now), it does not appear there is time nor action stopping this. (The vote for WHO control). And they have already illustrated the sectoor where they WILL declare a (monkeypox) pandemic- 27 nations of the EU, Canada, Australia, US so far.

 

Vote is sometime on or after May 22…