Anonymous ID: 6ecdf3 July 1, 2022, 12:43 a.m. No.16571625   ๐Ÿ—„๏ธ.is ๐Ÿ”—kun   >>1630 >>1651

https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v11/d346

In the past, CIA has utilized only fully controlled and disciplined agent assets as a safeguard against unilateral and irresponsible action by Cuban exiles intent upon the liberation of their country. If sabotage and resistance activities are to be undertaken on a larger scale, it will be necessary to accept the risks involved in utilizing autonomous Cuban exile groups and individuals who will not necessarily be responsive to our guidance. CIA proposes the following โ€œrules of engagementโ€ to govern the conduct of these autonomous operations:

 

(1)

It is the keystone of autonomous operations that they will be executed exclusively by Cuban nationals motivated by the conviction that the overthrow of the Castro/Communist regime must be accomplished by Cubans, both inside and outside Cuba acting in consonance.

(2)

The effort will probably cost many Cuban lives. If this cost in lives becomes unacceptable to the U.S. conscience, autonomous operations can be effectively halted by the withdrawal of U.S. support; but once halted, it cannot be resumed.

(3)

All autonomous operations will be mounted outside the territory of the United States.

(4)

The United States Government must be prepared to deny publicly any participation in these acts no matter how loud or even how accurate may be the reports of U.S. complicity.

(5)

The United States presence and direct participation in the operation would be kept to an absolute minimum. Before entering into an operational relationship with a group, the U.S. representative will make it clear that his Government has no intention of intervening militarily, except to counter intervention by the Soviets. An experienced CIA officer would be assigned to work with the group in a liaison capacity. He would provide general advice as requested as well as funds and necessary material support. He may be expected to influence but not control the conduct of operations.

(6)

These operations would not be undertaken within a fixed time schedule.

Anonymous ID: 6ecdf3 July 1, 2022, 12:44 a.m. No.16571630   ๐Ÿ—„๏ธ.is ๐Ÿ”—kun

>>16571625

 

Sabotage/Harassment Program

 

The broad target categories against which the sabotage/harassment operations would be mounted and a preliminary evaluation of their effect, can be summarized as follows:

 

A. Electric Power

 

Disruption of any of the existing power grids which might be effected by damage to or destruction of the generating facilities or of the critical sub-stations in the distribution network, would significantly weaken the existing economic and social structure, particularly in view of the fact that in many areas the power now available is not adequate to meet the demands of industrial and public consumers. Smaller acts of

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sabotage/harassment by the populace such as throwing chains over high tension lines to short them out, would also exacerbate the current power shortage, and the cumulative effect of all such actions could cause a prolonged breakdown of the power system as there is already a shortage of spare parts and replacement materiels.

 

B. Petroleum, Oil and Lubricants (POL)

 

Damage to or destruction of POL production and/or storage facilities would seriously affect almost all aspects of the Cuban economy. The electric power industry depends almost entirely upon POL as fuel for the generating plants and the sugar industry depends upon POL powered processing and transportation facilities as does all intra-province transportation. Production and storage facilities are susceptible to external attacks by heavy weapons or by more subtle methods if internal assets having an appropriate degree of accessibility can be developed. The loss of refining facilities could be offset by increased Bloc shipments of refined products but such a shift would require a period of readjustment during which there would be a heavy strain on the Cuban economy. An additional burden on the Bloc refining capacity would also exist until Cubaโ€™s refining capacity is restored.

 

C. Transportation

 

Damage to or destruction of railway and/or highway rolling stock or the destruction of key bridges would lead to breakdowns in the regional economics which to a large degree are dependent on the distribution of imported products. The processing and export of the vitally important sugar crop is also entirely dependent on transportation. It is not anticipated that we could achieve that degree of disruption which would cause a collapse of the economy or social structure, but even a minor degree of disruption will adversely affect the standard of living and the output of the economy, both of which are key factors in the stability of the regime. The type of operations envisioned in this category would range from fairly sophisticated attacks by external or internal assets against the rolling stock, key bridges and repair facilities to simple low risk acts by the populace such as the derailing of rail transportation or placing tire puncturing material on highways.

 

D. Production Processing and Manufacturing Facilities

 

While the Cuban economy primarily depends on imports for indigenous consumption and even though the sugar crop is by far the most important item in Cuban exports, there are still a number of other facilities such as the nickel complex at Nicaro, cement plants, distilleries, and the myriad industries associated with the provision of food, clothing and shelter, which are worthwhile targets in that stopping or lessening their output will weaken the economy and breed discontent against the regime. These targets are particularly susceptible to attack by external or internal assets in that due to their profusion and their relatively low strategic

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importance they are not well guarded or otherwise secured against attack.

 

The selection of specific targets within the above categories and the determination of timing and tactics will be predicated upon detailed analysis of the following factors:

 

1.

The extent to which the target can be physically damaged.

2.

The resultant effect upon the Cuban economy.

3.

The cost or effort required if additional burdens are placed on Bloc support.

4.

The psychological effect on the Cuban population.

5.

Anticipated adverse reactions.

6.

Operational capabilities and limitations of CIA assets.

Anonymous ID: 6ecdf3 July 1, 2022, 1:03 a.m. No.16571665   ๐Ÿ—„๏ธ.is ๐Ÿ”—kun   >>1676

>>16571651

>Aug 14, 2015

https://www.i24news.tv/en/news/international/americas/82055-150814-kerry-in-havana-for-banner-day-in-us-cuba-relations

Kerry, the first secretary of state to visit Cuba since 1945, said the shift in US policy did not mean Washington would stop pressing for change on the communist island.

 

"The leaders in Havana and the Cuban people should also know that the United States will always remain a champion of democratic principles and reforms," he said, in a speech delivered partly in Spanish.

 

"We remain convinced the people of Cuba would be best served by a genuine democracy where people are free to choose their leaders."

 

The thawing in the Cold War conflict has been criticized by Obama's conservative opponents.

 

Kerry's visit drew barbed comments from leading Republicans, including 2016 presidential contenders Marco Rubio and Jeb Bush.

 

Rubio, a Cuban-American senator from Florida, slammed the Obama administration for the absence of Cuban dissidents from the flag-raising ceremony.

 

"All the people in Cuba fighting for democracy, when they protest, they are rounded up, arrested and beaten. None of them were invited to this event," he told Fox News.

 

Cuban Foreign Minister Bruno Rodriguez said the country was ready to discuss any issue with the United States, including human rights โ€“ "though we may not always agree," he added, speaking alongside Kerry at a joint press conference.

 

In eight months of negotiations since the rapprochement was announced, the two sides have made progress on a number of divisive issues, most notably the removal of Cuba from Washington's list of "state sponsors of terrorism."

 

But Rodriguez warned that Cuba still has tough demands on the table as the two sides continue talks.

 

They include the full lifting of the "blockade" or economic embargo that the US has maintained on Cuba since 1962 and the return of the "usurped" Cuban territory of the American navy base at Guantanamo Bay, he said.

 

Kerry also took a stroll through Old Havana, with an eye on meeting ordinary Cubans in the historic colonial district.

 

He will not, however, meet with either Castro or his elder brother Fidel, the icon who led Cuba from its 1959 revolution until his retirement in 2006.

 

Underlining the sticking points still complicating relations, Fidel Castro said in an essay published in Cuban state media Thursday his 89th birthday that the United States owes Cuba "many millions of dollars" because of the trade embargo.

 

Cuba says the embargo has cost it $116 billion.

 

The United States for its part says Cuba owes $7 billion to American citizens and companies whose property was seized after Castro came to power.

 

Kerry reiterated that the Obama administration "strongly favors" lifting the embargo.

 

But Obama faces an uphill battle as he needs approval from Congress, where both houses are currently controlled by his Republican opponents โ€“ many of them deeply hostile to Havana.