So, by that metric, Burger is right. But assuming the Constitution means what the Founders intended or understood is a huge assumption. There’s a more flexible, evolving theory of the Constitution — typically endorsed by people on the left — that says the meaning of the Constitution gradually changes over time or is impacted by major public events or social movements. On that theory of constitutional interpretation, calling the personal right a “fraud” is a non-sequitur. This is the great irony of the Heller opinion — it’s a decision by an arch-originalist, celebrated by conservatives, that only makes sense if the Constitution is a living document.
COHEN: We all are waiting for the Supreme Court’s ruling in New York State Rifle & Pistol Association, Inc. v Bruen. Of course, I haven’t read every essay or analysis on the case or the oral argument that took place on it last fall, but I have yet to come across a Second Amendment scholar or gun policy expert who says the Court’s conservative majority will side with New York and against the interests of gun owners. What’s your sense of the scope of the decision we are most likely to see here? What’s your prediction?
MILLER: Other than feeling very confident that the existing New York State pistol licensing law will be struck down, I have very little sense of the scope of the decision we’re likely to see in the next month or two. The justices at oral argument seemed genuinely concerned that a broad ruling on public carry would embroil them in all kinds of minutiae about where guns can be prohibited — campuses, subway cars, Times Square on New Year’s Eve, etc. I cannot believe that they have much appetite for transforming every federal district court judge in the country into a gun zoning czar. That said, there’s a conservative supermajority on the Court that is clearly ready to flex its muscles on issues that conservatives have long cared about — from abortion restrictions, to free exercise, to gun rights — so I can’t rule out a broad and broadly disruptive ruling that would upend not only New York’s regulations but would call into question the constitutionality of nearly every gun regulation, in every state, at every level of government.
COHEN: You have written a great deal on the Second Amendment and how policymakers can and should approach the tension between gun rights and gun regulations. One article that caught my eye, posted last year, advocated for an “equilibrium adjustment” approach to Second Amendment law, a sort of sliding scale of reasonableness that would presumably protect some existing gun laws while striking down others. Sounds optimistic to me, given what we know of the Court’s ideological makeup. Are you looking for anything in Bruen that would help you evaluate whether the Court is receptive to this “equilibria” approach?
MILLER: The primary point I wanted to make in that article is that if the Court ends up leaning heavily or exclusively on text, history, and tradition to decide Second Amendment cases, the process of reasoning from analogy from those sources has to apply equally on both sides of the rights/regulation equation. The Court has firmly rejected arguments that only 18th-century weapons are protected by the Second Amendment. But that argument should apply to regulations too
— more than just those regulations that existed in the 18th century are constitutional. So, if the Court holds that new kinds of weapons
— like 9-millimeter pistols
— are “similar” enough to historical weapons to count as an “arm” under the Second Amendment, the Court should say new kinds of regulations
— like prohibiting guns on the subway
— are “similar” enough to historical regulations to be constitutional.
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