>>1756625 (lb)
To clarify page numbering for the purpose of distributing sections for review:
We are taking pages counted from the beginning, the way PDF Reader numbers them, not pages as numbered on the report. The report is preceded with an executive Summary, Table of Contents, etc. (pages numbered wtih small roman numberals).
So when I start working on pages 81-100, that page 81 happens to be marked 52 at the bottom
Anon review of OIG Report pp.81-100 14June2018
pp. 80-83
p.80 Yates said they wanted to treat the investigation like another, get regular briefings, but not put undue pressure on line staff.
p.81 Yates: "was one of those small handful of cases that how you do it can be defining for the Department of Justice…."
"Nobody should get any special treatment. Nobody should be treated more harshly…because of who they were. That’s what I mean it should be like any other case. But we weren’t stupid. I mean, we recognized that the profile and import of this matter was such that we needed to
make sure that things were done correctly." DAG office gets involved in case of disagreements between litigation dept and other gov agency. "Normally the DAG’s office is not running an investigation and we weren’t running this one.” Yates got more frequent updates on Midyear Investigation than on other cases.
p.82 Yates: "…not aware that McCabe attended meetings with the Midyear prosecutors, nor did she know that Comey was closely involved in the investigation."
Axelrod considered it “extra important to make sure things were…done…by the book, following procedures. Making sure that when people
criticize[d] whatever the outcome was that we’d be able to say no, this was done straight down the middle on the facts and on the law.”
Axelrod wanted to give Toscas (primary supervisor over investigation) tspace to do whatever they thought necessary in the investigation. "So that at the end…I just wanted to make sure that any allegation that there was some sort of political interference with this investigation wouldn’t hold water."
p.83 Carlin: standard practice for cases to be handled by career staff supervised by a DAAG. Emphasized need to "go more by the book" and follow "normal procedure". Carlin chose Toscas
based on his historical expertise with investigations involving “espionage, the straight-up a spy [cases], and the leak mishandling type portfolio.”
"I knew…whatever decision was made in the case, it was going to be a high-profile controversial decision. And so…you might need to explain later what process do we follow at the Department."
Carlin discussed this with Lynch and Yates…that the team had the authority to make investigative and prosecutorial decisions… told Lynch and Yates that “like other sensitive matters, we would periodically update them.” Lynch and Yates knew that this was how Carlin was handling the investigation and supported this structure. Carlin …also explicitly communicated this to Giacalone and McCabe at FBI.
Anon review of OIG Report pp.81-100 14June2018
pp. 84-85
p.83 (end)
Investigative Strategy aimed to determine whether any individuals were criminally liable under the laws against mishandling of classified info. 3 primary lines of inquiry:
collect/examine emails that traversed Hillary's servers and other relevant evidence
interview relevant witnesses
analyze whether classified info was compromised by hostile cyber intrusions.
p.84
Included review of 30,490 work-related emails and attachments that Hillary's attorneys had produced to State Dept.
Also attempted to recover or reconstruct 31,830 remaining emails that Clinton’s attorneys called "personal" and did not produce to State Dept. These had been deleted, "wiped", from CLinton's then-current server. Also assumed some work-related emails could have been deleted BEFORE Clinton's attorneys reviewed for production.
Forensic analysis of Clinton's servers + equip., her other devices (Blackberries, cellphones), laptops used by Clinton's attorneys. Also got email from certain individuals who communicated with Clinton by email, originated classified email chains she received, or transferred her emails elsewhere.
Did NOT try to obtain every device or the contents of every email account traversed by classified email.
Witnesses perceived systemic problems in State Dept's handling of classified data. Investigators didn't try to remediate this but pushed that problem back onto the State Dept to remediate. Why? Because they didn't want to prolong the investigation by years!
p.85 Once investigators found info they suspected ought to be classified, they asked the relevant agencies to determine classification level for that info.
Looking for criminal intent they examined:
classified markings
statements by persons that indicated intentional evasion of laws re: classified info
statements indicating that persons knew certain info was classified although not marked as such
evidence classified info was forwarded to persons without proper clearances or need to know
evidence that classified info had been properly marked before transferral to unclassified systems w/o markings
Witness interviews
Those who set up and administered Clinton's servers to understand her intent and measures set up for intrusion protection. FBI learned server structures, backup devices.
Those involved in sending/receiving the info on unclassified systems. To learn if they believed the info was classified, where the info originated from, why they sent it to unclassified systems.
Anon review of OIG Report pp.81-100 14June2018
p.85 (bottom) Witness interviews continued
Interviewed those who knew how & why 31,830 Clinton emails were deleted from her servers & other locations. Did Clinton or her attys delete or direct deletion for improper purpose? to avoid FOIA or Fed Records Act?
p.86
Interviewed State Dept employees re: policies/practices on fed records retention. Did State Dept. sanction Clinton's private server use? Did they take steps to protect Clinton's private server?
Intrusion Analysis Special agents used forensics to determine if unauthorized actors (foreign, domestic) attempted to log in, scan, etc. and if these attempts were successful.
And compared with "various FBI datasets to assess whether emails containing classified information had been compromised." → interesting → what datasets would FBI have access to that could reveal this info?
p.87 intentionally blank
end of chapter 3
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