dasting

https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/1997/february/q-transition

"…Information warfare has been a part of combat for centuries. Commanders always have attempted to disrupt, intercept, corrupt, deceive, or otherwise influence the opposition's information flow. The difference today is that the information system itself can be treated as a weapon system. This broadens the spectrum of warfare, blurring the edges of conflict, from commencement to resolution. If information warfare is ongoing, then the modern commander is continually engaged in warfare.

These functions will be executed by skilled information warriors, who will collect, analyze, and act on data. Associated hardware will permit data dissemination and decision execution. At every point, individual analysis will be the factor that determines operational success.

Psychological operations were used effectively during the Gulf War, but were delayed in employment. To get the needed machinery in place as soon as possible after a crisis occurs—because early employment is most effective5—an information warfare control ship with a production capability and connectivity to shore-based experts could provide a unique capability. In addition, organic helicopters, properly equipped, could disseminate psychological operations material.

Physical Destruction. Physical destruction, from the sea, comes in the form of conventional attack and defense, which relies on missiles or guns. All major U.S. Navy surface combatants are protected, at a minimum, by one or more Phalanx 20-mm Gatling gun systems. To counter hostile missile platforms, larger surface vessels, and aircraft, most Navy ships are armed with a point defense missile system, such as the Sea Sparrow or the new rolling airframe missile weapon systems. An information-era warship should have both gun and missile defensive systems to protect itself and attack fleet targets.

A more potent option would be to marry an information warfare control ship to the proposed arsenal ship. The information warfare control ship could develop targets, send them forward through the targeting process, then either pass them off to the arsenal ship for attack or control the engagement while using the arsenal ship's weapons.

Deception Operations. Deception operations are intended to change an opponent's perception of the battlefield. Throughout history, this has been accomplished by deceiving the enemy with respect to timing, location, and activity at various echelons and levels of war. Conceivably, an information warfare control ship could carry out strategic, operational, and tactical deception. The June 1995 Journal of Electronic Defense outlines five fundamentals of deception that could help determine the potential assets available on an information-era warship:

First Rule: To be effective, a deception operation must be one that causes the enemy to believe what he expects.

Second Rule: Timely feedback is an essential element of all major deception operations. Third Rule: Deception must be integrated with operations.

Fourth Rule: Denial of information on the true activities is also essential; it will depend, in significant part, on stealth and C3 countermeasures activities.

Fifth Rule: The realism required for any deception activity is a function of the sensor and analysis capabilities available to the opponent and the time available to analyze the situation, disseminate the data to appropriate points, and take appropriate actions.7

An information warfare control ship would bring together the diverse disciplines needed to carry out a deception operation within these rules. Electronic attack, through intrusion, could meet the first criterion; intelligence collection could fulfill the second. Command and control, in the form of the embarked commander, could fulfill the third rule. Electronic defense, principally through emission control, could fulfill the fourth rule. The fifth rule could be met through a combination of collection and command-and-control functions.