About that New York Times Story Concerning the “Online Leak” of U.S. Ukraine and Geopolitical Plans
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April 8, 2023 | Sundance
By now people are familiar with a New York Times (original source) story of a leak of sensitive classified information regarding U.S. operations in Ukraine and other geopolitical efforts. The New York Times was the first with the story, asshared with them by “senior Biden administration officials.”
WASHINGTON — Classified war documents detailing secret American and NATO plans for building up the Ukrainian military ahead of a planned offensive against Russian troops were posted this week on social media channels, senior Biden administration officials said. (more)
Now, let’s use this opportunity to expand our knowledge base,overlay the known frameworks that operate within our government, and simultaneously give a perspective that will not surface anywhere else.
First, the story surfaces from the New York Times. What does that tell us? It tells us the stakeholders in a background narrative surrounding the issueas constructed are domestic intelligence interests. If there was a State Dept stakeholder interest, the story would have been presented by CNN. If there was a U.S. foreign intelligence operation stakeholder interest, the story would have surfaced in the Washington Post.
The story surfaces in the New York Times, indicating aU.S. domestic intelligence interest; and the story is sourced directly to the White House via “senior Biden administration officials.” What does that mean? It means the narrative that flows from the story has a direction toshape opinion from the perspective of U.S. governmentdomestic public relations. It means the narrative is intended tosway a domestic audiencewith a motive toward something else.
Secondly, and in full alignment with the first point, the centerpiece of the story is focused on a leak that surfaces in “social media.” This fits perfectly with the domestic intelligence stakeholders (DHS, National Security Council, etc). We know domestic intelligence operates in the backbone of social media platforms.An example is DHS and domestic Intelligence Community (IC) work as outlined in the Twitter files.
Put them together, a domestic IC product surfaced (being called leaked)into social media platformscontaining portals controlled by domestic IC. The domestic IC then report on the leaks to the outlet used by the domestic IC. See how these fit?
If you follow the bouncing ball, what you immediately suspect is the •
domestic IC planted the ‘classified information==’ in the platforms they can access, then turn around and report on the leak of the classified information to media they use for domestic narrative engineering.
♦ Motive – But why would the IC plant classified information, then turn around and report on the classified information they planted? This is where you need to learn how the motives work, against a bigger picture.
The leak (planted information) and then the telling of the leak (NYT story) creates an opportunity for thedomestic IC to frame a Russian dis/mis/mal-information narrative. But why would the IC want to immediately stir up a misinformation or disinformation narrative against Russia?…
https://theconservativetreehouse.com/blog/2023/04/08/about-that-new-york-times-story-concerning-the-online-leak-of-u-s-military-and-geopolitical-intentions/