Yes and no.
Do you build a back door into the bank vault?
Great effort is put into CPU and hardware design to minimize software and even hardware based intrusion into secure programs/protocols.
Classic strategies of reading from memory addresses to compose a dump of memory frames don't work because of hardware implementations of scrambling the memory map. Whereas an array used to occupy a physical map of memory, today it is scattered between random locations and stitched together into a virtual array by an algorithm, and that layer is hard coded.
A decryption algorithm is no longer something you can snag by reading locations in memory (even if you manage to expand your access outside execution layers).
In theory, you could design in a means to disable this and perform a proper dump - but this would compromise all TS systems.
The dell inspirion with an orange sticker on it is not some special model. It's just a dell with special handling instructions.
Part of why I'm not a fan of SIPR over NIPR…. glorified term for using a VPN to tunnel a classified network over a civilian network infrastructure or otherwise non-secure system. It may secure the data against practical interception, but expose the hardware to intrusion.
But you just have to get Hillary's signature, and it can be done.
The surveillance state is far more limited than it first appears. Most of the spying is application level - faceberg and google being baked into the operating system. Just getting a device that isn't infested with these things is an undertaking most people don't have the experience or desire to follow through with. Going farther to obscure yourself from network based surveillance is another hurdle that most people have no real need for, let alone the knowledge/experience to attempt. It can be done.
Of course, if you're worth having a grayfish-like suite deployed against you, you probably know how to clear your baffles and know it's an issue of compartmentalizing exposure rather than being completely undetectable.