Olga says: 'Thank you Baker!'
>What the fuck I did wrong so I have biden and mutants like this?
>Please answer me.
It's a matter of perspective, Anon. Consider the last 123 years. Were you cannon fodder in France? Were you captured or killed in the Soviet Union? Go to the Gulag? Were you disappeared in South America? Meet MACV-SOG in the dark? Did you offend Pol Pot by wearing eyeglasses? Did you own more than ten cows when RTLM called for your elimination? 'Biden and the Mutants', while not pleasant, is a relative relief.
>May this day be remembered as the day when humanity and extraterrestrial life joined forces
What about fluids, Mate? Have they joined bodily fluids?
LOL.
Playbook known.
https://jfsc.ndu.edu/portals/72/documents/jc2ios/additional_reading/1c3-jp_3-13-4_mildec.pdf
>Enjoying the movie, anons?
Indeed, Anon. Thank you. We will learn a lot from disclosure.
The President, after all, is the "Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States." U.S.Const., Art. II, § 2. His authority to classify and control access to information bearing on national security and to determine whether an individual is sufficiently trustworthy to occupy a position in the Executive Branch that will give that person access to such information flows primarily from this constitutional investment of power in the President, and exists quite apart from any explicit congressional grant. See Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy, 367 U. S. 886, 367 U. S. 890 (1961). This Court has recognized the Government's "compelling interest" in withholding national security information from unauthorized persons in the course of executive business. Snepp v. United States, 444 U. S. 507, 444 U. S. 509, n. 3 (1980). See also United States v. Robel, 389 U. S. 258, 389 U. S. 267 (1967); United States v. Reynolds, 345 U. S. 1, 345 U. S. 10 (1953); Totten v. United States, 92 U. S. 105, 92 U. S. 106 (1876). The authority to protect such information falls on the President as head of the Executive Branch and as Commander in Chief.
…
"As to these areas of Art. II duties, the courts have traditionally shown the utmost deference to Presidential responsibilities." United States v. Nixon, 418 U. S. 683, 418 U. S. 710 (1974). Thus, unless Congress specifically has provided otherwise, courts traditionally have been reluctant to intrude upon the authority of the Executive in military and national security affairs. See, e.g., Orloff v. Willoughby, 345 U. S. 83, 345 U. S. 93-94 (1953); Burns v. Wilson, 346 U. S. 137, 346 U. S. 142, 346 U. S. 144 (1953); Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U. S. 1, 413 U. S. 10 (1973); Schlesinger v. Councilman, 420 U. S. 738, 420 U. S. 757-758 (1975); Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U. S. 296 (1983).
U.S. Supreme Court
Department of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518 (1988)
Department of the Navy v. Egan
No. 86-1552
https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/484/518/
18a U.S. Code § 6 - Procedure for cases involving classified information
(e)Prohibition on Disclosure of Classified Information by Defendant, Relief for Defendant When United States Opposes Disclosure.—
(2)Whenever a defendant is prevented by an order under paragraph (1) from disclosing or causing the disclosure of classified information, the court shall dismiss the indictment or information; except that, when the court determines that the interests of justice would not be served by dismissal of the indictment or information, the court shall order such other action, in lieu of dismissing the indictment or information, as the court determines is appropriate. Such action may include, but need not be limited to—
(A)dismissing specified counts of the indictment or information;
(B)finding against the United States on any issue as to which the excluded classified information relates; or
(C)striking or precluding all or part of the testimony of a witness.
An order under this paragraph shall not take effect until the court has afforded the United States an opportunity to appeal such order under section 7, and thereafter to withdraw its objection to the disclosure of the classified information at issue.
https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/18a/compiledact-96-456/section-6
MILDEC operations apply four basic deception techniques: feints, demonstrations, ruses, and displays.
Joint Publication 3-13.4
Military Deception
>underwater 'trafficking railroad' exists
Underwater taxis for hire, too, offering exclusive and private service!
Donald J. Trump
@realDonaldTrump
I have long given the order to help Argentina with the Search and Rescue mission of their missing submarine. 45 people aboard and not much time left. May God be with them and the people of Argentina!
4:32 PM · Nov 22, 2017
https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/933448074348900354?
The submarine had been sailing from Ushuaia to Mar del Plata when it was declared missing last Wednesday with 44 crew members on board, reports said.
https://www.wionews.com/world/trump-assures-aid-to-argentina-over-missing-submarine-24885
President Donald Trump on Monday shared a message of support for the grieving families of the 44 crew members on a submarine that sank a year ago.
https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-6408677/Trump-tweets-support-crushed-wreckage-Argentine-submarine-year-sank.html
18a U.S. Code Compiled Act 96-456 - CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PROCEDURES ACT
https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/18a/compiledact-96-456
>Ooooh! Anon remembers the "We went in and got her" parts of Potus' speech!
Anon recalls that too, much later than 2017. Whoever the 45th passenger was died about 700 hundred miles from Antarctica. It is interesting that the date corresponds to Captain Green's mission and loss.
Caption: Scene – The crash took place at the Waddesdon Estate, the former country seat of the Rothschild banking dynasty, (Pictures: PA)
>The question will be how does Trump introduce not only what these documents actually are which I assume are going to implicate Biden
Consider that these need not focus on Biden. It seems the House and Senate have been delegated that task. Rather, consider the secret Iran Nuclear Deal, malfeasance by the Intelligence Community, FBI, FVEY, Courts, FISA Court, political corruption, and the contents of three safes managed by an Israeli kompromat spy network. The prosecution runs the risk of dismissal if they deny the defendant the right to disclose classified information. The law says the prosecution can provide a substitute summary instead of the originals but it doesn't give the prosecution much wiggle room:
Relief for Defendant When United States Opposes Disclosure.—
(2)Whenever a defendant is prevented by an order under paragraph (1) from disclosing or causing the disclosure of classified information, the court shall dismiss the indictment or information; except that, when the court determines that the interests of justice would not be served by dismissal of the indictment or information, the court shall order such other action, in lieu of dismissing the indictment or information, as the court determines is appropriate. Such action may include, but need not be limited to—
(A)dismissing specified counts of the indictment or information;
(B)finding against the United States on any issue as to which the excluded classified information relates; or
(C)striking or precluding all or part of the testimony of a witness.
> Judge could just dismiss all of this and no one sees anything.
True. Hopefully the overall strategy is consistent with expectations of DECLAS and disclosure.
>Not constitutional nor applicable.
It was originally the Classified Information Procedures Act. It does not cover classification authority, rather it governs the procedures to be used by the Federal Courts in cases involving classified material.