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30.JAN.2023Harvard Analysis
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Strained Tensions
Rising violence is not the only factor that contributed to the termination of Operation Barkhane in Mali. Diplomatic relations between Paris and Bamako began to falter following the May 2021 coup and January 2022 push back against democratic elections. Macron’s announcement explicitly named the primary reason for France’s withdrawal as the junta’s unwillingness to solve its growing security issues. Conversely, thejunta blamed Francefor its failure to keep its promise in their partnership. They then reported that Mali had no choice but to seek other partners, referring to their hiring Russian mercenaries from the Wagner Group.
France has become increasingly unpopular throughout the Sahel, although Malians may be especially angry about French activity in the region. Most French view Françafrique, France’s sphere of economic; political; and military influence in its former colonies, as a policy of the past, while many Malians continue to live with the system’s negative impacts. Opposition to France, triggered by the perceived failure of Operation Barkhane, has become a rallying cry. Over the past few years, there have been an increasing number of complaints and demonstrations against the continued “meddling” of France in its former colonies, both in urban and rural areas.
This tide of anti-French sentiment helped the Malian junta garner massive popular support during the 2020 coup. Even now, the junta continues to draw on popular grievances to maintain its legitimacy. In a recent speech at the 2022 UNGA, Mali’s interim Prime Minister, Colonel Abdoulaye Maiga, lashed out at France, claiming they had “stabbed [Mali] in the back,” with their “neocolonialist, condescending, paternalist, and vengeful policies.”
According to some French, this point of view is not totally unfounded.General Didier Castres, a former deputy chief of staff during the beginning of Operation Barkhane, also found that France’s patronizing approach frustrated the Malian Governmentand local populations over time, saying “we acted like a big brother who would turn to his little brother and tell him what to do and not do. We’ve been the know-it-all trying to apply templates that weren’t suited to them.”
Moreover, France’s counter-terrorism efforts in West Africa remain unpopular in Paris, especially because of the monetary cost; Operation Barkhane is thelongest and most costly French military operation since World War II. Even as early as June of 2021, there were serious doubts among the French population concerning Barkhane.
A Precarious Position
Following Macron’s February announcement, European diplomats at the EU-African Union Summit reaffirmed that Africa is a “key issue” for Europe. They formally recognized that even if Europe remains Africa’s main partner, both in terms of trade and direct investments, the continent has its choice of partners.
The level of future security involvement of European countries, especially France, in the Sahel is unknown. This summer, following his April reelection, Macron said that he wants to “rethink of all our (military) postures on the African continent” and build on the “Europe-Africa axis which is, today, at the heart of all our multilateral policies.” Clearly, France will not be leaving the Sahel anytime soon. Practically, however, it is difficult to determine what Macron’s “rethinking” entails.
On both sides of the Mediterranean, there is a somewhat loud contingency that advocates for stronger barriers between the continents, though the reason for which differs. Andrew Lebovich, a fellow at the European Council for Foreign Relations, wrote that the French withdrawal from Mali reflects its outstanding need for “states in the region [to] take on greater security and governance responsibilities for themselves,” especially in light of the August 2020 and May 2021 coups. Boubacar Ba, a security analyst in Bamako, seemed to disagree, arguing that “we must find our way out of the cliche that the West has the solution.” Imam Mahmoud Dicko also expressed concern about French control, saying, “I do not see why France can refuse or accept this situation [dialogue with the jihadists]. It is not France that we are asking to discuss with, it is in Mali, which is a sovereign country!” and “It is not up to France to impose its solutions.”
Yet, the future of both continents is not mutually exclusive. Clearly, counterterrorism in the style of Operation Barkhane is not effective. There is a long and dark history between the two, and now, with each having vested economic and security interests in the other. Combatting terrorism in the Sahel cannot be the sole responsibility of West African nations, when the situation has far greater ramifications.
https://hir.harvard.edu/how-france-failed-mali-the-end-of-operation-barkhane/