Anonymous ID: b8cd24 Sept. 2, 2023, 3:10 p.m. No.19479300   🗄️.is 🔗kun   >>9337 >>9474

This ALT

 

1871

14-Aug-2018 3:46:46 PM PDT

Q !!mG7VJxZNCI

8ch/qresearch

Ex 1.1

(MOS)

/        

(Alt + US Media) (US Politicians)

/                

(…………………..)(…………………….)

Those who scream the loudest….

Find the connections.

1:1:1:1

Primary>>AffiliateA>>AffiliateB>>AffiliateC>>

Marching to the same beat?

Coincidence?

Logical thinking.

Q

 

https://qposts.online/post/1871

 

Will become very relevant soon!

 

On Monday, October 16, Jason Reza Jorjani published an explosive article, “The Coming Persian War,” on his website. It should have been front-page news the next day at The New York Times and The Washington Post, and possibly for weeks to come.

 

Jorjani’s article focuses on Donald Trump’s ominous Iran speech on Friday, October 13, but I want to focus on some of the truly amazing background details that Jorjani gives linking his work with the Iranian Renaissance movement and the Altright Corporation to a shadowy network of power-brokers and influence agents with connections to business, politics, and secret societies that people today loosely call the “Deep State.”

 

Among the figures that Jorjani names are Lieutenant General Michael Flynn, who served briefly as President Trump’s National Security Adviser; Walid Phares, a Right-wing Lebanese Maronite Christian who has advised both Mitt Romney and Donald Trump on Middle East affairs; former White House Chief Strategist Steve Bannon; Michael Bagley, president of Jellyfish, a private intelligence firm, and former intelligence director of the infamous Blackwater/ Xe /Academi mercenary company (founded by ex-Navy SEAL Erik Prince, brother of Betsy DeVos, Trump’s Secretary of Education); and a mysterious London-based figure Jorjani refers to only as “X,” a fellow based in some sort of secret society with tentacles in many pies, including the White Nationalist London Forum, Iranian exile groups, billion-dollar petroleum deals, and overthrowing the government of Venezuela.

 

https://counter-currents.com/2017/10/the-altright-corporation-and-the-american-deep-state/

Anonymous ID: b8cd24 Sept. 2, 2023, 3:19 p.m. No.19479337   🗄️.is 🔗kun

>>19479300

Court case for Jellyfish’s President Michael Bernard Bagley

 

United States v. Bagley (1:19-cr-00263)

District Court, E.D. Virginia

 

https://storage.courtlistener.com/recap/gov.uscourts.vaed.452427/gov.uscourts.vaed.452427.20.0.pdf

Anonymous ID: b8cd24 Sept. 2, 2023, 3:29 p.m. No.19479399   🗄️.is 🔗kun   >>9421 >>9516

>>19479347

FYI

Flynn & McChrystal are Best friends and business partners.

Self described Irish Mafia of Fort Bragg

 

Flynn broke rules he thought were stupid. He once told me about a period he spent assigned to a C.I.A. station in Iraq, when he would sometimes sneak out of the compound without the “insane” required approval from C.I.A. headquarters, in Langley, Virginia. He had technicians secretly install an Internet connection in his Pentagon office, even though it was forbidden. There was also the time he gave classified information to NATO allies without approval, an incident which prompted an investigation, and a warning from superiors. During his stint as Mullen’s intelligence chief, Flynn would often write “This is bullshit!” in the margins of classified papers he was obliged to pass on to his boss, someone who saw these papers told me.

 

The greatest accomplishment of Flynn’s military career was revolutionizing the way that the clandestine arm of the military, the Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC), undertook the killing and capture of suspected terrorists and insurgents in war zones. Stanley McChrystal, Flynn’s mentor, had tapped him for the job. They were both part of the self-described “Irish mafia” of officers at the Fort Bragg Army base, in North Carolina. In Afghanistan and Iraq, Flynn ordered JSOC commandos to collect and catalogue data from interrogations, captured electronic equipment, pocket trash—anything that could yield useful information. By analyzing these disparate scraps of intelligence, they were able to discover that Al Qaeda was not a hierarchical group after all but a dynamic network of cells and relationships. As I learned while doing research for my book “Top Secret America,” Flynn and McChrystal dramatically increased the pace of JSOC attacks on enemy hideouts by devising a system in which commandos on missions transferred promising data—cell-phone numbers, meeting locations—to analysts, who could then quickly point them to additional targets to hit. Multiple raids a night became common.

 

McChrystal, who was appointed to run JSOC in 2003, brought Flynn in as his intelligence chief to help him shake up the organization. Flynn was one of the few high-ranking officers who disdained the Army’s culture of conformity. But McChrystal also knew he had to protect Flynn from that same culture. He “boxed him in,” someone who had worked with both men told me last week, by encouraging Flynn to keep his outbursts in check and surrounding him with subordinates who would challenge the unsubstantiated theories he tended to indulge.

 

In mid-2007, Flynn returned home with three years of JSOC secrets in his head. He had witnessed close-quarters combat and killings. He had helped load the bodies of dead and wounded Seal Team 6 and Delta Force warriors into evacuation helicopters. Like his comrades, he had spent twenty hours a day, seven days a week, focussed on killing the enemy. Sometimes women and children were killed, too. He wouldn’t even take a break to attend his son’s wedding, a moment of personal sacrifice he mentions often when reflecting on those days.

 

In 2012, Flynn became director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, in charge of all military attachés and defense-intelligence collection around the world. He ran into serious trouble almost immediately. I’ve spoken with some two dozen former colleagues who were close to Flynn then, members of the D.I.A. and the military, and some who worked with him in civilian roles. They all like Flynn personally. But they described how he lurched from one priority to another and had trouble building a loyal team. “He made a lot of changes,” one close observer of Flynn’s time at the D.I.A. told me. “Not in a strategic way—A to Z—but back and forth.”

 

https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/the-disruptive-career-of-trumps-national-security-adviser