Anonymous ID: 8c1ca1 Feb. 16, 2024, 2:24 a.m. No.20422410   🗄️.is 🔗kun

OpenAI Sora

 

Here comes the narrative seed

>"Your Honor that wasn't me that must be AI"

 

>"No no no silly followers of mine on Twitter, that video of me doing heinous thing isn't real! That's some AI bullshit"

 

Planned & prepared for.

 

https://youtu.be/MAxxJzfkIWU

Anonymous ID: 8c1ca1 Feb. 16, 2024, 2:41 a.m. No.20422429   🗄️.is 🔗kun   >>2441

https://thefederalist.com/2024/02/15/did-our-intelligence-agencies-suggest-the-russia-hoax-to-hillary-clintons-campaign/

Did Our Intelligence Agencies Suggest The Russia Hoax To Hillary Clinton’s Campaign? - The Federalist

BY: MARGOT CLEVELAND - FEBRUARY 15, 2024 - 5 MIN READ

 

Tuesday’s explosive news — that long before the FBI launched Crossfire Hurricane on July 31, 2016, the U.S. intelligence community had asked foreign intel agencies to surveil 26 people connected to Donald Trump — raises the question of whether our intelligence community colluded with the Clinton campaign in these efforts. After all, it was then-Biden campaign adviser and now-Secretary of State Antony Blinken who “set in motion the events that led to” 51 former intel officials issuing the public statement that falsely framed the Hunter Biden’s laptop story as Russian disinformation.

 

If a Biden campaign adviser conspired with some of the biggest names in the intelligence community a month before the 2020 election to bury the damaging scandal, it is no stretch to think the Hillary Clinton campaign might have sought an assist from the same folks to interfere in the 2016 presidential election.

 

We’ve also long known the Clinton campaign funded the Steele dossier, the primary evidence used by the FBI to obtain four Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act wiretap orders against a Trump campaign associate. The Clinton campaign’s efforts to peddle the Russia-collusion hoax to the FBI and the media are likewise well-established.

 

But did the Clinton campaign’s plot to portray Trump as a Russian asset also involve the intelligence community, and if so, when did those efforts start?

 

Open-source material suggests the Clinton campaign’s efforts to push the Russia angle against Trump began in June 2016, when the Democrat law firm Perkins Coie contracted with Fusion GPS, which in turn retained Christopher Steele to investigate Trump’s connections to Russia. While there are several connections between the Clinton campaign and members of the intelligence community beginning in July, there is a dearth of evidence suggesting coordination between the two before then.

 

That does not mean there was none, or that the Obama administration’s intelligence community wasn’t seeking to help Clinton by enlisting its foreign Five Eyes allies — the United Kingdom, Canada, New Zealand, and Australia — to target Trump. The evidence to date, however, and specifically sources’ recent statements to journalists Matt Taibbi, Michael Shellenberger, and Alex Gutentag, suggest our intelligence agencies launched the Russia-collusion hoax months before the Clinton campaign joined in full force.

 

Revisiting the timeline, however, suggests something further: that members of the intelligence community may have hinted that the Clinton campaign should advance a Russia-collusion narrative premised on the same sort of intel coming from the foreign intelligence services.

 

Here, we have two key data points. First, declassified handwritten notes from former CIA Director John Brennan memorialized him briefing then-President Obama on intelligence that Clinton, on July 26, 2016, had approved “a proposal from one of her foreign policy advisers to vilify Donald Trump by stirring up a scandal claiming interference by Russian security services.”

 

Second, two weeks earlier, then-Clinton campaign foreign policy adviser and former U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright spoke at the “2016 Race to Change the World” conference in Cambridge on July 11-12, 2016. Albright’s fellow speakers included, among others, Sir Richard Dearlove, the former head of MI6, and Sir Malcolm Rifkind, the former defense and foreign secretary. Also in attendance was Stefan Halper, who would later serve as a confidential human source for the FBI during the Crossfire Hurricane investigation. Halper had also reportedly served as a source for the CIA.

 

The organizer of that conference, Steven Schrage, has publicly claimed that during the various events, Halper ignored Trump campaign volunteer Carter Page until after Dearlove arrived. Halper then “seemed desperately interested in isolating, cornering, and ingratiating himself to Page and promoting himself to the Trump campaign,” according to Schrage.

Anonymous ID: 8c1ca1 Feb. 16, 2024, 2:48 a.m. No.20422440   🗄️.is 🔗kun

https://strategic-culture.su/news/2024/02/15/will-syrsky-become-the-avdeevka-butcher/

 

Will Syrsky Become the Avdeevka Butcher?(Ukraine news)

 

Lucas Leiroz

 

February 15, 2024

The new commander-in-chief of the Kiev troops tends to repeat the “meat grinder” promoted by him in Bakhmut.

 

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Contact us: info@strategic-culture.su

 

You can follow Lucas on X (formerly Twitter) and Telegram.

 

Aleksandr Syrsky replaced Valery Zaluzhny as commander-in-chief of the Ukrainian armed forces. As always happens when command changes are made, there are many expectations about what the new Ukrainian leader’s military administration will be like. Some pro-Kiev channels try to portray him as a great military strategist. However, there is no reason to believe that Syrsky really represents a good future for Ukrainian forces.

 

For the Western media, Syrsky deserves to be recognized as responsible for Ukraine’s survival during the first phases of the conflict. Due to his prominent role on the Kiev battlefield, he is often praised for leading the so-called “Ukrainian resistance” in the early months of the special military operation. Some biased analysts consider him a “military genius” for allegedly “preventing the capture of Kiev by the Russians.”

 

With this, there are now expectations that Syrsky’s rise to a higher position in the armed forces could mean a “game changer” on the battlefield. Some specialists see him as a hope for the Ukrainian regime, believing that his administration could enable a reversal of the military scenario. However, these “analyses” appear to be mere unfounded propagandistic narratives, incapable of reflecting the reality of the conflict.

 

First, it is necessary to deny the myth that Ukrainian forces have any merit in the so-called “Battle of Kiev”. Western media spread the narrative that Russia “tried to capture” Kiev and failed due to the efforts of the Syrsky-led “Ukrainian resistance.” None of this is true. Moscow never intended to take Kiev. If these were really Russian plans, the number of soldiers and vehicles deployed to Kiev would be much greater and there would be no retreat.

 

What happened in the first days of the special military operation was a small-scale raid on the outskirts of Kiev in a diversionary maneuver. The Russians made the Ukrainians believe that they would take the capital, thus forcing the enemy to concentrate efforts on Kiev and lessen attention on Donbass. Thus, Russian forces quickly advanced into Donbass and managed to establish important positions in that region while the Ukrainians were distracted in Kiev. After establishing these positions, the Russians retreated to Donbass, which has always been Moscow’s strategic and territorial priority. In the end, there was never a “battle for Kiev”, but a battle for the Russian-majority regions that had raids on Kiev as part of its strategic planning.

 

This alone would be enough argument to discredit the propagandists who want to describe Syrsky as a “great military leader”. However, there are still more points to be clarified about the new commander. Instead of praising his work in Kiev, Western “analysts” should pay attention to how Syrsky performed in the Artyomosvk/Bakhmut region during the largest infantry battle in post-WWII European history.

 

Syrsky was one of the main Ukrainian commanders during the so-called “Bakhmut meat grinder”. Under his command, tens of thousands of Ukrainian lives were lost in high-intensity attritions with Russia’s Wagner Group, resulting in the first battle won by a PMC against a regular army in human history. Even when the city was already evidently lost and there was no longer any strategic interest for the Ukrainians to continue fighting, Syrsky ignored the elementary principles of military strategy and did not review his policy of systematically sending troops (most of them poorly trained) to a true “kill zone” created by experienced Russian units. Not by chance, Syrsky became known as the “butcher of Bakhmut”.

 

Syrsky’s failure in Artyomovsk has been ignored by pro-Ukrainian “experts”, but this is a fundamental factor to be mentioned, as it can help predict how the general will perform in his new role. Many insiders believe he will repeat his Bakhmut attitudes on the current Avdeevka front, which will certainly lead to terrible human losses for the Ukrainian regime – and at a time when Kiev’s forces are even more weakened.

 

If he uses in current battles the same suicidal tactics that he used in Bakhmut, Syrsky will cause irreversible damage to the Ukrainian armed forces. The country no longer has enough human and material resources to deal with a new “meat grinder”. A repetition of this type of scenario would make Kiev very close to absolute military defeat and political collapse.

Anonymous ID: 8c1ca1 Feb. 16, 2024, 3:20 a.m. No.20422532   🗄️.is 🔗kun   >>2543

https://www.politico.eu/article/russia-no-longer-top-threat-germany-g7-munich-security-conference-concern-ukraine-war-fades/

 

Russia no longer perceived as top threat by Germans(FEBRUARY 12, 2024)

 

Russia is showing no signs it plans to wind down its unprovoked assault on Ukraine two years after launching a full-scale invasion — but Germans now view issues like migration and the threat from radical Islam as more immediate concerns than the menace in the Kremlin.

That’s according to new research published Monday ahead of the Munich Security Conference, a gathering of top political and defense officials which kicks off in Germany on Friday.

While Russia was perceived as the number one threat in Germany in last year’s Munich Security Index, it has now slipped back to seventh place in the annual report.

The pattern is replicated across the G7 group of countries — the threat posed by Russia was cited as the top concern in surveys conducted in late 2022 for the 2023 Munich Security Index, but has dropped to fourth overall a year later.

The findings come at a crucial moment in the war, as Ukraine seeks to shore up European support as the United States’ commitment to the war effort falters due to continuing Republican opposition in the U.S. Congress.

The European Union agreed a €50 billion aid package for Kyiv earlier this month, but there's already evidence it’s insufficient as Ukraine’s financial needs grow by the day.

The survey’s conclusion that the German public is less concerned by the Russian threat than it once was is a sign of the shifting priorities in Europe as the intractable war enters its third year.

While Ukraine has inflicted significant damage on the Russian army since the war began, its 2023 counteroffensive made slow progress. In a bid to reset his country’s military strategy, President Volodymyr Zelenskyy replaced his top general Valery Zaluzhny last week with Oleksandr Syrskyi, and embarked on a wider leadership reshuffle.

The war in Ukraine is expected to dominate this year’s Munich Security Conference. Though it has not been confirmed, Zelenskyy himself is widely expected to make an appearance — two years after he flew to Munich to make a desperate plea for international help at the conference just days before Russia's full-scale invasion began.

The Munich Security Index 2024 also reveals how the war in Ukraine is competing with other geopolitical threats and priorities.

Concern about mass migration and radical Islamic terrorism now top the list of threats in Germany — a turnaround from the previous year.