>>20574926 pb

>>20574950 pb

I could go on about this all day, and I hope that they were just masking the work that I did. For example, he said mac address encryption which is Operating System encryption which I said. But claiming damages is what failed not the proofs.

That being said, when I created my own election system it worked the opposite way that normal security works. The encryption is not on a "server" solely as the entirety of one truth, keys, that if compromised effects millions of votes. The encryption is on the individual device of the voter and the server has zero access to tamper with that vote, by encrypting the values of the ballot. Meaning one would have to 1. take control of the user device by some type of brute force attack, 2. they would have to know all their information that they filled out, which would be not only their full name, but who they voted for, and he is the hard part: they would have to know what type of combined information that the user provided: such as a contact string of either phone number or email address, then what form of identity did they give; such as a SS number, driver's license, or passport number. So the private key in essence is in the exact information. If they could somehow get at all this over time, it would only affect one out of millions of votes, which a. is still highly doubtful b: too time consuming, and c: if you guessed wrong about which identifier was filled out: SS, DL, or passport, you still would not get back the ballot to alter.

Hope that is clear.