>>20579691
>Q trolled them
The Significance of Deception in Contemporary Information Warfare
the major methods of deception are:
โข Presenting data to the adversary that represents the truth as you would want them to perceive it. This is achieved by presenting a tailored subset of โrealโ data, and/or manipulated data, and/or depriving the foe of any data, and/or disrupting the foeโs data collection, and/or
โข Setting the context in which the foe interprets that data, and/or
โข Producing โnoiseโ in the communication channel so that the foe receives only the data allowed by the deceiver.
Information Warfare and Deception, Informing Science, Volume 9, 2006
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/49277989_Information_Warfare_and_Deception
Deception in Support of Operations Security (DISO). DISO is a MILDEC activity that protects friendly operations, personnel, programs, equipment, and other assets against foreign intelligence and security services (FISS) collection. The intent of a DISO is to create multiple false indicators to confuse or make friendly force intentions harder to interpret by FISS, limiting the ability of FISS to collect accurate intelligence on friendly forces. DISOs are general in nature, they are not specifically targeted against particular adversary military, paramilitary, or VEO decision makers, but are, instead, used to protect friendly operations and forces by obfuscating friendly capabilities, intent, or vulnerabilities. JP 3-13.4 https://jfsc.ndu.edu/portals/72/documents/jc2ios/additional_reading/1c3-jp_3-13-4_mildec.pdf
D5 (https://www.newsweek.com/qanon-conspiracy-posts-trump-news-d5-december-5-george-bush-storm-great-1245823) Successful feint. See Q #2553.
CBTS and /qresearch were used as MILDEC conduits.
"Within MILDEC, conduits are information or intelligence gateways to the deception target. Conduits may be used to control flows of information to a deception target. It is rare that a deceptive message is sent directly to the deception target itself. Most often, deception messages are sent to intelligence collectors (conduits) with the expectation that the deceptive message will systematically make its way to the deception target." (JP 3-13.4 I-4)