Op-Ed: Shattering the Lynchpin Myth: The US Army’s Misguided Dominance in Pacific Strategy
John Konrad June 12, 2024
by Captain John Konrad (gCaptain Op-Ed) In a viral video with over 200,000 views on X, General Charles Flynn, a 4-star Army commander in the Pacific and brother of former Trump national security advisor Michael Flynn, delivered a passionate yet misguided speech on the primacy of the Army in the Pacific theater – a strategy his command has been calling linchpin – where he told seapower strategists to “zip-it“. As he leaned into the camera, his words dripped with the fervor of a man defending a bygone era of military dominance, oblivious to the evolving realities of modern warfare in the maritime domain.
Flynn’s assertion that the Pacific is an “Army theater” because it’s labeled as a “joint operation” is laughable. The notion that artillery and ground forces could effectively dominate a region spanning 60 million square miles of ocean is a strategic fantasy. It’s as if the battles of Midway, Coral Sea, and Leyte Gulf never happened—battles that decisively showcased the indispensability of naval and air power in the Pacific.
These Army Generals are seriously unhinged. They had their time in the sun and lost repeatedly. Now they fear losing control.
Even IF the Pacific was a “land power theater” we don’t want more of the same
We want, we need, different tactics and strategies
This guy is dangerous https://t.co/cbX6fwtoV0
— John ? Konrad V (@johnkonrad) June 12, 2024
His rhetoric ignores the sobering realities of recent Army failures in the maritime domain. The Army’s decision to divest from watercraft capabilities, the alarming age and inefficiency of their Corps of Engineers ships, the fact the Corps resorted on heavy US Coast Guard and civilian contractor support to clear the Baltimore Bridge, the embarrassing collapse of the JLOTS pier in Gaza, and their plans to divest Army prepositioning ships all point to a service struggling to maintain relevance in an increasingly maritime-centric world.
Let’s break down Flynn’s delusions. He suggests that the Army can seamlessly coordinate with the militaries of island nations—countries that prioritize land forces due to economic constraints and rely on American naval power for protection. This overlooks the fundamental reason for their reliance on ground troops: they lack the resources to maintain a formidable navy or air force. Flynn’s vision of a land-centric war in the Pacific dismisses the critical roles of the Navy, Air Force, Marines, Coast Guard, and Merchant Marine.
In the event of a conflict with China, the logistics of moving and sustaining Army equipment across vast oceanic distances would necessitate a robust naval and air presence. Flynn’s dismissive attitude towards these branches undermines the essence of joint operations. Jointness doesn’t mean sidelining the Navy and Air Force; it means leveraging the unique strengths of each service to create a cohesive and effective force.
In this context, the Army’s claim of being a pivotal joint logistics facilitator is undermined by the current condition of the U.S. sealift capabilities. As noted by Air Force General Jacqueline D. Van Ovost, the TransCom commander, the United States is “alarmingly behind in modernizing a viable sealift fleet to achieve our national goals.” Additionally, the deteriorating and diminishing Ready Reserve Force faces a critical shortage, lacking 1,800 mariners required to staff its ships.
This isn’t merely about joint operations. It’s about asserting what Flynn believes is the Army’s rightful dominance in the Department of Defense budget and influence. If the focus was on inter-service cooperation for victory, the General would have incorporated the US Coast Guard, US Merchant Marine, and US Space Force into his discourse. Notably, he only called attention to the US Navy and US Air Force, the two services that compete with him directly for control.
The reality is stark: the Pacific conflict, if it comes to pass, will require a diverse and integrated approach. It will demand the mobility and firepower of the Navy, the reach and precision of the Air Force, the versatility of the Marines, the reach of the Coast Guard, and the logistical backbone of the Merchant Marine. Flynn’s vision of an Army-dominated theater is not only impractical but also dangerous.
More:
https://gcaptain.com/army-lynchpin-myth-pacific/