Theresa May is lying about the effectiveness of her Brexit Plan. It DOES NOT DELIVER the Brexit that we voted for. Here's an explanation why.
https://www.ft.com/content/aeb53c82-82ac-11e8-96dd-fa565ec55929
https://www.ft.com/content/aeb53c82-82ac-11e8-96dd-fa565ec55929
Theresa May’s attempt to strong-arm her cabinet into backing a new vision for a softer Brexit has prompted the resignation of the minister in charge of her negotiations.
The trigger for David Davis to quit as Brexit secretary was a three-page government statement, issued after a marathon cabinet meeting on Friday at the prime minister’s Chequers country residence.
It represents one of the most significant expositions of UK economic policy since the 2016 referendum vote to leave the EU, offering concessions designed to resuscitate negotiations in Brussels.
But Mrs May’s vision remains incomplete, and her statement is peppered with ambiguities that she must eventually confront as she battles to win round the EU without losing the support of the Conservative party, parliament, or any more of her cabinet.
What are the big policy shifts?
The UK position crucially “evolves” in two ways that would allow for a Norway-style Brexit deal covering at least part of the EU single market.
The first is Britain’s proposal for a “free trade area for goods” involving the UK and the EU that in effect continues existing regulatory and customs arrangements for manufacturing and agricultural products after Brexit. This is achieved by the UK becoming a rule-taker, with a treaty-based commitment to “ongoing harmonisation with EU rules on goods”.
Just as important is Britain’s concession on enforcement. UK courts would pay “due regard” to European rulings in cases relating to EU-set rules. In other words, while Britain is a separate legal jurisdiction after Brexit, the European Court of Justice would be supreme in interpreting the UK-EU goods rule book.
There are caveats — for example the British parliament could veto changes to the rule book if it accepts the “consequences for market access”. But taken together, the safeguards offer no more freedom than Norway enjoys as a member of the European Economic Area. In his resignation letter Mr Davis dismissed the sense of parliamentary control as “illusory rather than real”.
Which issues are fudged?
Many policy issues remain ambiguous, or unaddressed.
This is most obvious in the area of customs and trade. Britain wants a “facilitated customs arrangement” with the EU, which allows the UK to control tariffs and pursue an independent trade policy. But in practice Britain also wants to continue “as if” it were within the EU customs territory. One senior EU official called the hybrid model “the fudge of the century”.
Services, which cover 80 per cent of Britain’s economy, are largely skirted over. The cabinet agreed to retain “regulatory flexibility” and accept less EU market access as a result.
The UK stance arouses suspicion in Brussels, with negotiators arguing it is hard to detach services from goods trade. They note that in areas such as financial services Britain still seems to want to replicate single market-style access from outside.
Britain’s stance also splits the four freedoms of the single market. Asked about the viability of continuing free movement for goods while limiting access for services, capital and people, one EU Brexit negotiator said: “No way, no way, no way.”
Mr Davis feared British policy in these areas was so flawed, and its negotiating hand so weak, that further big concessions would be “inescapable”. He warned these would effectively mean Britain never left the single market and customs union.
What are the other policy battlefronts?
The UK government statement is replete with other unresolved tensions that will play out during negotiations in Westminster and Brussels.
It calls for frictionless access to EU markets for UK fish products, at the same time as insisting the UK will take control of waters, potentially restricting the bloc’s access. The UK wants control of the common agricultural policy, while still automatically applying the EU’s agrifood rule book.
Such goals are hard to reconcile with the EU’s insistence on a level playing field after Brexit. While the UK pledges to maintain “high regulatory standards” for environment, social and employment law, it stops short of the harmonisation the EU expects from single-market participants.
One other highly sensitive policy area is left in the balance: immigration. Mrs May’s cabinet agreed to end EU free movement rules, but want to offer a “mobility framework” for tourists,