THIS
During McCabe’s liaisons with Deripaska, Strzok was running the FBI’s Post-Adjudication Risk Management plan, or PARM, a program initiated to catch problematic and criminal associations of FBI agents. Strzok and PARM should have snagged McCabe’s Russian associations, especially Deripaska. Many agents were fired for far less, under the stringent internal program. Where was Strzok’s oversight of McCabe or did Strzok simply look the other way?
CIA officials looked at McCabe’s Russian contacts, especially Deripaska, fearing a possible data breach like convicted FBI spy Robert Hanssen.
The CIA was quite sensitive about growing reports from FBI about McCabe’s Russian contacts, having learned hard lessons years earlier when Robert Hanssen was arrested for spying for the Russian government and the Soviet Union for more than two decades from his FBI perch. CIA assets died because of Hanssen.
After Hanssen, the Agency and the FBI vowed to instill tight controls on databases access, SIGINT, HUMINT after the Hanssen Damage Assessment Team (HDAT) shone light on how the Russian spy was able to infiltrate the federal law enforcement’s electronic backbone to sell secrets out the back door to the Russians for cash and diamonds.
Hanssen’s spying was investigated by the joint Justice Department and CIA HDAT task force. A report was issued by the Department of Justice’s Commission for the Review of FBI Security Programs and called the Hanssen data breaches “possibly the worst intelligence disaster in U.S. history.”
Mueller was FBI chief when the report was released and was tasked with implementing controls to prevent another Hanssen.
He failed.
https://truepundit.com/comey-mueller-ignored-mccabes-ties-to-russian-crime-figures-his-reported-tampering-in-russian-fbi-cases-files/