it's been asked several times in various venues, why didn't the FBI look at the "DNC server", so i went back through the indictment to clarify the question, and took stock of every "computer" or "server" specifically called out. i was surprised that there was no "DCCC server", and that "the russians" (or just the perpetrators) used a US based server in AZ and a "computer" (not a server, curiously worded) in IL.

anyway, for consideration, here's the list:

leased arizona server

10 dccc computers

33 dnc computers

leased illinois computer

DNC exchange server

[unspecified number of] computers of a U.S. vendor (“Vendor 1”)

that's a fair amount of specific compromise, and i wonder if maybe the FBI (even the clean parts, ha) didn't even need the DNC server to verify anything.

if the AZ server was through someone like rackspace or something, and/or regularly backed up - that could be all the evidence they needed.

>>2173704

i don't disagree with that sentiment at all.

just thought the list of computers/servers called out was interesting.

43 individual computers. that's a LOT of information, yet only a few users were listed as compromised. fox in the hen house!

>>2173800

"33" DNC computers could be a signal.

but in any case, it's an oddly specific number to throw out there. if they have evidence of 43 compromised DNC/DCCC computers - they have a lot of information…they also state that the "hackers" attempted to cover their tracks…meaning that the true number might be far greater.

listen - put yourself in the shoes of a 'willful enemy'. if you could remotely access a computer network, with the expectation of finding something "interesting"…would you stop at one or two? would you gather logins/passwords of a handful? just one key person?

no - every single member of the DNC/DCCC should be concerned. every single password, every single user, every single slush fund account…leave no stone unturned in an effort to clean out the debris.

it stinks - and i wouldn't be surprised if it's all handwaving to cover some other true crime, like the possibility of seth rich downloading specific documents and leaking them.

if IT was so incompetent that they couldn't tell their exchange credentials were borked, how could anyone tell that someone had stolen docs on a thumb drive?

they found out about the crime through the leak itself, and backtracked to cover it up.

>>2173945

i'm going to go look, so don't take this the wrong way, but do you know what day that was?

>>2173945

>John Mark Dougan

>raided March 14, 2016

>wikileaks last podesta email date

>2016-03-21 (email@e.washingtonpost.com john.podesta@gmail.com)

IF that raid was related to the "hack" it took place before the perpetrators were finished.

IF he was rated because of the email, the FBI already knew about it, but allowed it to continue.

based on the indictment timeline, IF that raid was related, holy fuck, it's all a lie. (but i mean, we kinda knew that)