>>22683995

Date

Nov 28, 1994

Description

Two days before the NATO meeting in Brussels, Clinton gives Yeltsin more reassurance about their partnership and the process of NATO expansion. The letter states: “I would like to reassure you now that what the NATO allies do at the upcoming North Atlantic Council (NAC) session in Brussels will be fully consistent with what you and I discussed in the White House during your visit.” Clinton tells Yeltsin that the conversation at the NAC will be not about the list of potential new NATO members or the timetable, but about working out a “common view on precepts for membership,” which will be subsequently presented “to all members of Partnership for Peace who want to receive it.” Expanding NATO would be “intended to enhance the security and promote the integrity of Europe as a whole” rather than “being directed at any country.” The letter notes that now, after Ukraine’s Rada has ratified accession to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, which will allow full removal of nuclear weapons from Ukraine, Clinton is ready to meet with Yeltsin and the presidents of Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan and to provide security assurances to those countries. The careful distinction is between the “guarantees,” which Yeltsin said he was ready to sign, and the word “assurances” that the U.S. insisted on using.

Source

Freedom of Information Lawsuit. State Department.

Document published in following posting(s):

NATO Expansion – The Budapest Blow Up 1994

Nov 24, 2021

https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/document/27160-doc-06-clinton-letter-yeltsin

>>22683995

Apr 15, 1995

Description

This very candid memo is the result of Strobe Talbott’s conversations in Moscow. It shows that he understands the Russian position on NATO expansion extremely well and appreciates the difficulty the president will face at the summit in Moscow. Unwittingly, though, Talbott’s memo points to the biggest problem—the president’s “determination to keep on track two strategies that are crucial to [his] vision of post Cold War Europe: admitting new members to NATO and developing a parallel security relationship between the Alliance and Russia.” These two strategies will prove irreconcilable in the end.

The memo walks Clinton through the main events on the road to NATO expansion so far: the trip to Europe in January 1994, the Washington Summit with Yeltsin in September 1994, and the “cold peace” blowup in Budapest in December, trying to provide explanations for Yeltsin’s actions in his domestic context. But despite all the empathy for Yeltsin’s predicament, the U.S. answer, the memo says, is “that the NATO expansion track will proceed even if the Russians refuse to permit progress on the NATO-Russia track.” Therefore, the president should try to persuade Yeltsin that it is in his interest to cooperate and sign the PFP papers. Talbott repeats to Clinton that there is strong opposition to NATO expansion across the political spectrum in Russia, but he believes that Yeltsin is so interested in a good summit and in integration with the West that “he has a strong personal motive for trying to square the circle—and for doing so at the Summit.” The NATO allies also want to see a good NATO-Russia relationship and a good summit because “there is nothing more offensive than a Russian on the defensive.”

The memo is a good representation of Clinton’s priorities at the moment and, in contrast to his communications with Yeltsin, the CSCE and other “new” European security structures are not even mentioned.

Source

Freedom of Information Lawsuit. State Department.

https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/document/27170-doc-16-strobe-talbott-memorandum-president-moment-truth

>>22684265