>>22582

I would not be concerned about C4 so much as I would be concerned about the security of the hardware.

Much like with aviation, federal requirements for auto makers have companies yield hardware designs and test results. Look up Equation Group and Gray Fish. If I have access to privileged schematics of a car's chips... And can spend time developing and testing attack vectors using combinations of firmware and hardware exploits... Then I could do some fun things to the vehicle.

Technically, you don't accelerate a vehicle. You submit a request to accelerate to the computer. Further, there is a pneumatic cylinder used to provide resistance to the brake, as with ABS, you don't exactly brake, either. Unless your transmission is a manual, you also don't shift. You are just telling the computer how you want it to shift.

If I can generate errors in the PLCs that run these systems, I can induce an emergency scenario. I could make you speed and then greatly reduce your ability to brake. I could... Possibly... Lock your transmission in gear or cause it to shift erratically.

Now... Depending upon the hardware - this may be almost impossible to do without direct access to the car. However, if the Bluetooth radio and the car's computer are hooked together too closely for some reason - there is a possible exploit for wireless. If the car virtualizes things like RFID or other such wireless inputs... There is an avenue. Hell - if a set of PLCs are connected by wires vulnerable to induced voltage spikes and faults therefrom... I would just RF Spike the car and could reliably induce a fault the car was not designed to resolve while operating.

When the targets of government agencies sit behind civilian vehicles, they become subject to attacks that are usually reserved for milspec equipment and designs. Engineers at Toyota are making cars that drive on roads and in town... Not EW hardened platforms tested to withstand the sadistic minds of radar enthusiasts.