https://x.com/EndWokeness/status/1906394273152377174
Trump supporter run down by 70 year old anti-Musk protestor
Is anyone else experiencing video downloading problems on X an YT right now?
They're gonna keep on pushing and pushing it, creating more and more fear in the Tesla owners that eventually a Tesla owner will have had enough and feel their life threatened and shoot and kill a protester or two just like the Rittenhouse case. And then they're going to try to ramrod the case through a corrupt judicial system and sentence the Tesla owner as the murderer. This is what they want and what it seems to be leading to.
The DOJ and Trump needs to put an end to this escalation quickly by indicting these attacks as terrorism and start putting these far left loonies away for 20 years a crack!
This is their only course of action when the Dems lose power. COVID/GeorgeFloyd/Rittenhouse…all done on purpose to try to create a narrative that is beneficial ($$$$$$$$$$) to the DNC, because without the funneling of BLM or Anti-gun money (school shootings/David Hogg and company) the democrats would be shit out of luck.
They must construct a narrative that is beneficial to their relevance into the future. Now it's Air Safety/Nation Defense (Signal App).
Prepare for provocations to create more violent shootings and more racial tensions.
Dubs chek't and kek't!
Grok:
There is no definitive evidence in available records of scandals or court cases—past, present, or speculative future—involving Terry Dolan of U.S. Bank as a defendant, witness, whistleblower, or in any similar capacity. Terry Dolan, currently the Vice Chair and Chief Administration Officer at U.S. Bancorp (the parent company of U.S. Bank), has held various senior roles within the organization since joining in 1998, including Chief Financial Officer and Vice Chair of Wealth Management and Investment Services. His public profile is primarily tied to his professional responsibilities, such as corporate strategy, financial management, and digital transformation initiatives, with no notable legal controversies directly linked to him personally.
A broad search across legal databases, news archives, and public records does not reveal any specific instances where Terry Dolan has been named in a scandal or court case in these roles. U.S. Bank itself has faced legal and regulatory scrutiny over the years, including fines for issues like improper account management (e.g., a $37.5 million penalty in 2022 for opening accounts without customer consent) and sanctions related to anti-money laundering compliance (e.g., a $613 million fine in 2018). However, these cases typically involve the institution or lower-level employees, not senior executives like Dolan, and there’s no indication he was personally implicated as a defendant, witness, or whistleblower.
The absence of evidence doesn’t guarantee that no such involvement exists—court records can be sealed, and not all internal corporate matters become public—but based on what’s accessible as of March 30, 2025, no clear connection emerges. If you’re seeking information about a specific incident or case, additional details could help narrow the scope, as "Terry Dolan" is a relatively common name, and unrelated individuals might appear in unrelated legal contexts. For now, his tenure at U.S. Bank appears unmarred by personal legal entanglements in the public domain.
Question:Are there any records from DOGE showing tax payer money being funneled back to U.S. Bancorp/U.S. Bank through perhaps other umbrella organizations through U.S.A.I.D. or other created umbrella organizations?
Grok:
As of March 30, 2025, there are no publicly available records from the Department of Government Efficiency (DOGE) that specifically show taxpayer money being funneled back to U.S. Bancorp or U.S. Bank through USAID or other umbrella organizations. DOGE, led by Elon Musk and tasked with reducing government spending under the Trump administration, has been heavily focused on scrutinizing and dismantling USAID, but its findings and actions remain opaque due to its unofficial status and limited transparency. No concrete documentation from DOGE has surfaced in the public domain linking U.S. Bancorp/U.S. Bank to such a scheme.
USAID, prior to its disruption in early 2025, managed billions in taxpayer funds—approximately $43.8 billion in fiscal year 2023—disbursed through a vast network of implementing partners, including NGOs, private contractors, and international organizations. While allegations of waste and mismanagement have been leveled against USAID by the Trump administration and DOGE, such as claims of funds supporting unrelated or controversial projects, no specific evidence has emerged tying these funds to U.S. Bancorp or U.S. Bank, either directly or through intermediaries. U.S. Bank, as a major financial institution, does engage in government contracts and banking services, but these are typically standard operations (e.g., processing payments or holding accounts) rather than evidence of a deliberate "funneling" scheme.
The lack of records could stem from several factors: DOGE’s operations are not fully subject to traditional government oversight, as it’s not an official federal agency, and its reports are not systematically released. Additionally, USAID’s website and data repositories went offline in February 2025 amid the takeover, limiting access to detailed financial trails. Critics, including Musk, have broadly accused USAID of corruption—e.g., calling it a “criminal organization”—but these claims remain unsubstantiated by detailed financial records or audits in the public sphere as of now.
That said, the absence of evidence doesn’t definitively rule out the possibility. U.S. Bank has faced past regulatory scrutiny, like the 2018 $613 million fine for anti-money laundering failures, which could fuel speculation about its involvement in complex financial flows. However, connecting this to USAID or DOGE’s purview requires concrete documentation, which isn’t currently available. Any such funneling would likely involve layers of intermediaries—possibly shell companies or nonprofits—but without DOGE releasing specific findings or an independent investigation, this remains hypothetical.
If DOGE has uncovered such a link, it hasn’t been made public by March 30, 2025. Given the ongoing turmoil and legal challenges surrounding USAID’s restructuring, future disclosures might emerge, but for now, no records substantiate this claim.
>2018 $613 million fine for anti-money laundering failures, which could fuel speculation about its involvement in complex financial flows.
Question: "2018 $613 million fine for anti-money laundering failures, which could fuel speculation about its involvement in complex financial flows." Please go more in depth on this.
Grok:
In February 2018, U.S. Bancorp, the parent company of U.S. Bank, agreed to pay a total of $613 million in penalties to resolve allegations of significant deficiencies in its anti-money laundering (AML) compliance program. This enforcement action stemmed from violations of the Bank Secrecy Act (BSA), a federal law requiring financial institutions to maintain robust systems to detect and report suspicious activities that could indicate money laundering, terrorist financing, or other illicit financial flows. The case provides a window into how weaknesses in U.S. Bank’s oversight could, in theory, make it vulnerable to exploitation in complex financial schemes—though no direct evidence ties this specific failure to USAID or DOGE-related allegations.
Details of the 2018 Case
The penalties were split across multiple authorities:
$528 million was paid to the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) as part of a deferred prosecution agreement (DPA).
$75 million went to the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), the bank’s primary regulator.
$15 million was paid to the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN).
An additional $70 million was credited from a settlement with the Federal Reserve, though this overlapped with the OCC fine.
The core issue was U.S. Bank’s failure to implement and maintain an adequate AML program between 2009 and 2014. Federal investigators found that the bank:
Capped Suspicious Activity Alerts: U.S. Bank artificially limited the number of alerts its monitoring systems generated, even as transaction volumes grew. This meant potential red flags—like unusual transfers or patterns suggestive of laundering—went unexamined.
Understaffed Compliance: The bank knowingly underfunded its AML staff, leaving too few employees to investigate the alerts that were generated. This created a backlog of unaddressed risks.
Hid Deficiencies: Management concealed the extent of these problems from regulators, including the OCC, by misrepresenting the program’s effectiveness.
(Pt1)
The DOJ noted that these lapses allowed “criminals to move hundreds of millions of dollars through the bank undetected.” While the settlement didn’t specify that U.S. Bank knowingly facilitated laundering, it highlighted a systemic vulnerability: a major financial institution with weakened controls could be exploited—intentionally or not—by bad actors moving illicit funds.
Why This Fuels Speculation
The 2018 fine doesn’t directly implicate U.S. Bank in funneling taxpayer money back through USAID or other entities, but it raises questions about the bank’s historical capacity to track complex financial flows:
Scale and Reach: U.S. Bank is one of the largest banks in the U.S., with trillions in assets under management and extensive government contracts (e.g., handling payroll or benefits disbursements). This makes it a plausible node in large-scale financial networks, legitimate or otherwise.
Weak Oversight Window: The period of noncompliance (2009–2014) coincided with significant USAID funding cycles, including post-recession recovery programs. If illicit funds were routed through intermediaries—like NGOs or shell companies—U.S. Bank’s capped monitoring might have missed them.
Precedent for Scrutiny: The AML failure suggests a culture of cutting corners, which could invite speculation about other undetected issues. For example, if taxpayer funds were cycled through offshore accounts or layered transactions, a bank with deficient controls might not flag it.
Theoretical Connection to Complex Flows
In the context of your earlier question about USAID and DOGE, here’s how this could fuel speculation:
Layering Funds: Money laundering often involves “layering”—moving funds through multiple entities to obscure their origin. If USAID funds were disbursed to a contractor, then subcontracted to a shell company banking with U.S. Bank, lax AML controls might fail to catch the trail back to the bank or its affiliates.
Government Ties: U.S. Bank’s role in federal programs (e.g., managing Treasury accounts or prepaid card systems) positions it to handle taxpayer-derived funds. A conspiracy theorist might argue that weak AML systems could mask a scheme where funds are redirected under the guise of legitimate transactions.
Post-2018 Risk: While U.S. Bank overhauled its AML program after 2018 (a condition of the DPA), skepticism lingers about whether all vulnerabilities were truly fixed, especially given the scale of global finance it handles.
Limits of the Evidence
Despite the speculative potential, key caveats apply:
The 2018 case focused on internal failures, not evidence of U.S. Bank actively participating in laundering schemes.
No public audits or investigations as of March 30, 2025, link these AML lapses to USAID, DOGE, or specific taxpayer fund recycling.
The settlement improved U.S. Bank’s compliance, reducing the likelihood of similar issues persisting into the 2020s without new evidence.
In short, the $613 million fine underscores a period when U.S. Bank’s defenses were porous, inviting theories about what could have slipped through—especially in a high-stakes environment like government funding flows. Without concrete records (e.g., from DOGE or a whistleblower), it remains a point of intrigue rather than proof. If you’re looking for a deeper dive into a specific angle—like a particular USAID program or transaction—let me know, and I can refine the focus further.
(PT2) -end.
>The core issue was U.S. Bank’s failure to implement and maintain an adequate AML program between 2009 and 2014
>The core issue was U.S. Bank’s failure to implement and maintain an adequate AML program between 2009 and 2014
2014? Biden Pardons?
Hopi Prophecy of th Two Water Serpents and the Pole shift.