I see gore/porn shill is here trying to discourage the search. Over the target.

Has anyone tried CH_Navy_Bund.jpg from Nov 6th post? It tells me wrong password after 66%

Realized this comment may be better suited here than in the general thread

>>2319081

The first review that shows for me on the Pixelknot app complains that he noticed the app sending data to another server. Dated May 2017

The Guardian Project replies they do no such thing over a year later. Dated June 2018

The app hasn't been updated since Feb 2017, so whatever that user found is still programmed in the app.

Can someone with Wireshark or another packet sniffer confirm any odd network activity from the app?

My hope is that traffic was transferred to a white hat server

>We Have It All

Trying something out here. Going to take the original file and several with messages with and without passwords to compare them in a hex editor to try and find any patterns. To those of you with the hardware to brute force, thank you for I don't have much to work with.

passwords: (none), Qanon, qanon, TrustThePlan

The shill shitposters are chatting right beneath our noses

>>2345191

I think it's a steg signature, its been noted before and it's in all of the one's I've generated not found in the original image

>>2330157

>>2333474

>>2334025

>>2345784

>>2346808

>>2347027

Thanks guys

>>2347058

Speaking of poorly written, is it possible that the developers made a mistake with the random seed generator? Using the same seed for each encryption.

https://github.com/guardianproject/F5Android/tree/master/src/main/java/sun/security/provider

https://www.synopsys.com/blogs/software-security/issues-when-using-java-securerandom/

>However, if you attempt to seed the following implementations before obtaining any output from the SecureRandom implementation, you will bypass the internal seeding mechanism of the SecureRandom implementation:

>sun.security.provider.SecureRandom

>com.ibm.crypto.provider.SecureRandom

>com.ibm.crypto.provider.SHA1PRNG

>com.ibm.crypto.provider.HASHDRBG

>com.ibm.crypto.provider.SHA2DRBG

>com.ibm.crypto.provider.SHA5DRBG

>This may be desirable in some situations; for example, if you need to generate the same outputs multiple times, you can seed your SecureRandom implementation with the same seed each time. However, when unpredictability is required, bypassing the internal seeding mechanism of the PRNG is not a good idea.

>>2348169

>…/PixelKnot/blob/version_2/PixelKnot/

https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=info.guardianproject.pixelknot&hl=en_US

>Updated: February 17, 2017

>Current Version:1.0.1

https://github.com/guardianproject/PixelKnot/releases/tag/1.0.1

>n8fr8 released this on Feb 16, 2017 · 0 commits to version_2 since this release

I'm probably tired or a dumbass, maybe both. But is version 2 in github the same as the one on in the play store right now?