FISA MEMO Pg. 10: AT LEAST SOME OF THE ACTUAL INDIVIDUALS MAKING MATERIAL STATEMENTS TO THE FISA COURT TO OBTAIN WARRANT TO SPY ON POTUS:

10

See Affidavits of Admiral Michael S. Rogers, United States Navy, Director, NSA;

Affidavits of James B. Corney, Director, FBI; Affidavits of John 0. Brennan, Director, CIA; and

Affidavits of Nicholas Rasmussen, Director, NCTC, which are appended to each of

Certifications

Admiral Rogers filed amended affidavits in

connection with the March 30, 2017 Submission.

>>2360186

10

See Affidavits of Admiral Michael S. Rogers, United States Navy, Director, NSA;

Affidavits of James B. Corney, Director, FBI; Affidavits of John 0. Brennan, Director, CIA; and

Affidavits of Nicholas Rasmussen, Director, NCTC, which are appended to each of

Certifications

Admiral Rogers filed amended affidavits in

connection with the March 30, 2017 Submission.

>>2360217

1. The October 26, 2016 Notice and Hearing

Since 2011, NSA's minimization procedures have prohibited use ofU.S.-person

identifiers to query the results of upstream Internet collection under Section 702. The October

26, 2016 Notice informed the Court that NSA analysts had been conducting such queries in

violation of that prohibition, with much greater frequency than had previously been disclosed to

the Court. The Notice described the results of an NSA IG Report which analyzed queries using a

set of known U.S.-person identifiers (those associated with targets under Sections 704 and 705(b)

of the Act, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1881c and 1881d(b)), during the first three months of 2015, in a subset

of particular NSA systems that contain the results of Internet upstream collection. That relatively

narrow inquiry found that. analysts had made.

separate queries using. U.S.-person

identifiers that improperly ran against upstream Internet data. The government reported that the

NSA IG and OCO were conducting other reviews covering different time periods, with

preliminary results suggesting that the problem was widespread during all periods under review.

At the October 26, 2016 hearing, the Court ascribed the government's failure to disclose

those IG and OCO reviews at the October 4, 2016 hearing to an institutional "lack of candor" on

NSA's part and emphasized that "this is a very serious Fourth Amendment issue."

RASMUSSEN SUBMITTED AN AFFIDAVIT TO SECURE/EXTEND THE FISA WARRANT AND ACCESS TO THE INTEL PRODUCED.

The FISA court would not allow the NCTC (which Rasmussen was head of) to collect, but did allow the NSA (and possibly others) to share intel seized as a result of the FISA warrant with the NCTC. This despite the fact that at least the NSC admitted to the court that it was conducting unauthorized intelligence gathering, raising 4th Am. issues (PER THE COURT).

This is obviously wildly important but I don't know why.>>2360341

Anyone AT ALL had a gander at that FISA MEMO/ORDER posted by Q today? WHAT A DROP!

So much goods in there. For example, p. 68, "…the government filed a notice… indicating that a failure of access controls in an FBI database containing raw Section702-acquired information resulted in [redacted] FBI employees improperly receiving access to such information." GEE WONDER WHO THOSE EMPLOYEES WERE (WORKING FOR)????

Essentially, despite admitted FISA(4th amendment) abuses, (at least) all those top-level names on page 10, footnote 10 and the Court itself approved of spying on POTUS with all the force of our national intelligence apparatus.

THIS IS THE PUDDING ANONS.

>>2360720

WHO DO YOU THINK THESE UNAUTHORIZED FBI EMPLOYEES WERE?????????

FISA Memo P. 82

"NSA examined all queries using identifiers for "U.S. persons targeted pursuant to

Sections 704 and 705(b) of FISA using the -

tool in-

… from November 1,

2015 to May 1, 2016." Id. at 2-3 (footnote omitted). Based on that examination, ''NSA estimates

that approximately eighty-five percent of those queries, representingllllll queries conducted by

approximately. targeted offices, were not compliant with the applicable minimization

procedures." Id. at 3. Many of these non-compliant queries involved use of the same identifiers

over different date ranges. Id. Even so, a non-compliance rate of 85% raises substantial

questions about the propriety of using of-to query FISA data. While the government

reports that it is unable to provide a reliable estimate of the number of non-compliant queries

since 2012, id., there is no apparent reason to believe the November 2015-April 2016 period

coincided with an unusually high error rate."