No contact for hours: Behind Netanyahu, IDF's failure to stop Hamas's Oct. 7 massacre
Enmity between the prime minister, defense minister, and the IDF chief prevented communication for hours as Hamas was murdering thousands and kidnapping hundreds in the early hours of Oct. 7.
When Hamas fired some 3,700 rockets, and its invasion force of around 5,600 men penetrated Israel's border at 119 different spots to take over a couple of dozen villages at 6:29 a.m. on October 7, Israel’s top officials went into shock.
While many of those same officials made a number of bold decisions over the course of the next two years, including against Iran, Hezbollah, and the Syrian Assad regime – and historians will need to weigh their accomplishments against their failures – all were drawn into the failure on October 7.
With Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and others publicizing selective aspects of what happened that morning, we can now exclusively reveal the puzzle of the interactions of three of the country's central characters at the time: Netanyahu, Defense Minister Yoav Gallant, and IDF Chief of Staff Lt.-Gen. Herzi Halevi.
The most important new takeaway is that the three did not speak until nearly four hours into the war, by which point hundreds of Israeli hostages had already been taken, and hundreds of Israelis had been killed. Why they did not speak earlier is part of the story that follows and likely part of a basic dysfunction that went beyond politics, which no one wants to address.
Also, we will give a response of sorts from Amit Saar, the former IDF intelligence analysis chief from 2021 to April 2024, who died of cancer on January 1, 2026, and whom Netanyahu attacked overnight for "rebelling" against him, though when Saar died, the prime minister gave him high compliments.
No generals in the room as Hamas massacred thousands in early hours of Oct. 7
Classified video footage of the IDF high command “pit,” which we viewed, showed that on October 7, not a single general was in the room. The midlevel officer in charge and his deputies were yelling at each other as reports of invasions flooded in. They had no overall defense plan.
Even a full hour into Hamas's invasion, at 7:30 a.m., the IDF high command only knew about approximately 40 percent of the penetrations into Israel from Gaza.
As of 10:00 a.m., hundreds of Israelis were already dead or kidnapped, and yet the IDF high command was still only aware of some 60 percent of border penetrations.
The Israeli military's top commanders did not really start to manage the nation’s defense until about 1:00 p.m, which was also around the time Netanyahu's first video to the public came out.
By that time, Hamas and Islamic Jihad had taken the overwhelming majority of the hostages, and most Israeli victims at places near the Gaza border, like Kfar Aza, Nir Oz, Beeri, and the Nova Music Festival, had already been murdered.
None of the top three officials made live public appearances in the early days, with IDF Chief Spokesman Brig. Gen. Daniel Hagari is the only one to do so.
Gallant is the only top official who can say that even his staff did not receive any warning prior to the 6:29 a.m invasion.
Halevi knew most of the top three, though even he had a very incomplete picture. Between 2:00 a.m. and 3:00 a.m., Halevi's bureau chief woke him up to give him initial updates about a possible Hamas border threat.
He left his bedroom for his home study and wrote a few notes to enhance his level of alertness. He wrote to himself, “We cannot just convince ourselves that this is nothing.”
But he and the entire intelligence and defense apparatus were convinced that at most, Hamas was planning one small penetration into one village to try to take a few hostages.
Only months into the war would IDF intelligence inform Halevi that it had intercepted Hamas's "Walls of Jericho" mass-invasion plan more than a year before, since mid-level officials had dismissed it as a fantasy.
What might Halevi have done differently had he known about the plan?
Maybe something more, but maybe nothing, given that all of Israel was convinced that Hamas was deterred.
https://www.jpost.com/israel-news/politics-and-diplomacy/article-886242