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Section 201 allows the U.S. president to impose temporary, safeguard tariffs or quotas on imported goods that cause or threaten serious injury to a domestic industry. It requires an investigation by the International Trade Commission to determine if increased imports are a substantial cause of injury, and any actions are meant to facilitate positive industry adjustment.
Section 301 targets unfair, unreasonable, or discriminatory foreign trade practices that burden or restrict U.S. commerce, enabling tariffs or other remedies.
The Trade Expansion Act of 1962
Another option lies in the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, signed into law by President John F. Kennedy.
Section 232 authorizes the president to impose tariffs or other import restrictions if the secretary of Commerce finds that certain imports threaten to impair the national security of the United States.
The statute directs the Commerce Department to consider not only traditional military needs, but also broader economic factors, including the health of domestic industries, employment, government revenues, and the capacity of U.S. producers to meet national defense requirements. Once the Commerce secretary submits a report finding a national security threat, the president has wide discretion to determine the appropriate response.
Trump relied heavily on Section 232 during his first term to impose tariffs on steel and aluminum imports, arguing that foreign overcapacity and dependence on imports undermined U.S. national security.
Those tariffs survived multiple legal challenges, including claims that Section 232 represents an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power. In 2020, the Supreme Court declined to review a challenge to these tariffs, allowing them to stand.
The Tariff Act of 1930
A third avenue comes from the Tariff Act of 1930, also known as the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act. This protectionist trade measure was signed into law by President Herbert Hoover in 1930.
Section 338 authorizes the president to impose discriminatory tariffs of up to 50% on imports from any country that discriminates against U.S. commerce. Unlike broader trade statutes aimed at systemic imbalances or national security, Section 338 is explicitly retaliatory. Its focus is not emergency powers or economic injury, but unequal treatment of American goods abroad.
The section is striking for both its breadth and its age. Enacted at the height of protectionist sentiment during the Great Depression, Smoot-Hawley is widely blamed for exacerbating global trade collapse. Yet Section 338 survived the postwar dismantling of high tariffs and remains embedded in the U.S. Code, a reminder of how much unilateral tariff authority Congress once contemplated – and never fully revoked.
Each of the provisions carries its own procedural requirements and political risks, but together they provide the president with a robust menu of options.
The Congressional Option
Another path always remains open: Congress itself. The president could seek explicit legislative authorization for a new tariff regime, either by expanding existing statutes or enacting new trade legislation.
That approach would be slower and politically more challenging. But it would also place tariffs on the firmest possible legal footing.
Not the End of the Tariff Wars
The Supreme Court’s ruling was a setback, but not a defeat. By narrowing one statutory tool while leaving many others untouched, the Court ensured that the battle over tariffs will now shift from the judiciary back to the political branches.
For the president, the question is no longer whether tariffs are possible – but which legal authority, and which political strategy, he will choose next.
https://justthenews.com/government/courts-law/john-roberts-leaves-room-trump-prevail