>>24399970

>A REMINDER - THE AMERICAN MILITARY IS THE SAVIOUR OF THE WORLD - 126 POSTS

>Note: The reason why anons are here, the military is the only way. It had to be this way.

94 post(s) found containing "iran".

48

Nov 02, 2017 1:44:30 PM EDT

Anonymous ID: zGyR4tyi No. 147640127

What is Q Clearance?

What hint does that explicitly refer to?

DOE?

Who would have the goods on U1?

Does stating 'Q' refer that person works in DOE?

No.

Does it refer that someone dropping such information has the highest level of security within all departments?

Why is this relevant?

(May 2010) BO "Russia should be viewed as a friendly partner under Section 123 the Atomic Energy Act of 1954"after agreeing to a new nuclear weapons reduction deal and helping US w/ IRAN.

Who is the enemy?

What is being continually stated by all D's?

Russia is what?

What did the Russia reset really provide?

Clearance/pathway to complete the U1 deal?

Why is the Canadian PM so important?

They never thought they were going to lose.

The calm before the storm.

8y, 4m, 2w, 2d, 19h, 8m ago

4chan pol

39

Nov 02, 2017 2:14:27 AM EDT

Anonymous ID: pGukiFmX No. 147588085

Would it blow your mind if I told you BO has been to NK and perhaps there now?

Why did his administration do little to slow their nuclear and missle capabilities?

Who feeds NK w/ strategic intel? IRAN?

What deal was done with IRAN under BO?

Why was the deal sealed under a top secret classification?

Why wasn’t Congress notified?

Why after BO left office all of a sudden NK has nukes and the tech to miniaturize for payload delivery within the US?

What about NSA CIA DI etc all confirming tech won’t be in place for 5+ years (statements made in 2016).

Why is all of this relevant and what does it tell you?

Big picture is rare.

>>24399970

>>24400564

>Who would have the goods onU1?

Why did BO send billions (in cash and wire) to IRAN?

50

Nov 02, 2017 2:06:58 PM EDT

Anonymous ID: zGyR4tyi No. 147642680

BIG DROP:

How did NK obtain Uranium?

How did IRAN obtain Uranium?

Why did BO send billions (in cash and wire) to IRAN?

AI Overview

Iran originally obtained uranium and nuclear technology primarily through pre-1979 Shah-era partnerships with Western nations (notably the US and Germany) and investments in international mining, followed by clandestine purchases via the A.Q. Khan black market network in the 1980s-90s

. Key supplies were secured through investments in Namibian mines, while enrichment technology was smuggled from Pakistan.

Key Historical Uranium Acquisition Points:

1970s Investments: The Shah’s government invested in the Rössing uranium mine in Namibia and contracted for supplies, though the 1979 revolution halted many direct transfers.

1974 Eurodif Investment: Iran lent money to France to help build the Eurodif uranium processing company in exchange for rights to 10% of the enriched uranium, though this right was rarely exercised.

1980s-1990s Smuggling: Following the revolution, Iran procured centrifuge technology, designs, and initial uranium material from Pakistani nuclear scientist A.Q. Khan’s network.

Soviet Era Sources: During the 1990s, Iran attempted to procure nuclear material from the former Soviet Union, specifically contacting sources in Kazakhstan.

Domestic Development: Iran eventually began developing its own mining capabilities, such as the Saghand mine, though it has struggled with low-grade domestic resources.

>>24400591

>Following the revolution, Iran procured centrifuge technology, designs, and initial uranium material from Pakistani nuclear scientist A.Q. Khan’s network.

AQ Khan is Dead – Long Live the Proliferation Network

Dr Aaron Arnold and Darya Dolzikova​

15 October 2021

5 Minute Read

AQ Khan’s legacy may not be in the nuclear kit he sold, but rather in how he sold it. His departure is a reminder of the limited progress made in countering proliferation networks.

Abdul Qadeer (AQ) Khan – often described as the father of Pakistan’s nuclear bomb and probably the world’s best-known proliferator –died last week of COVID-19. Khan is likely to be remembered as the ‘real-life Bond villain’ at the head of an international proliferation black market that helped supply nuclear and missile technology to countries like North Korea, Iranand Libya. Yet nearly 20 years after the extent of his nuclear bazaar came into focus, governments have yet to adequately address the corporate and financial infrastructure that allowed his network to operate.

Taking advantage of globalised manufacturing, supply chains, and financial and transportation channels, Khan established an international network of private suppliers and intermediaries that could provide necessary nuclear and missile-related technologies to customers willing to pay for them. A key part of Khan and his associates’ success was their ability to avoid scrutiny by setting up front companies in jurisdictions with poor corporate transparency, falsifying trade documents, exploiting opportunities for corruption in their business dealings, hiding payments and relying on intermediaries and accounts at banks with lax money laundering measures to handle their financial transactions. While these tactics were far from novel in the world of organised and financial crime, it appears to have been the first time that they had crossed over at this scale to the world of nuclear proliferation.

International Efforts

In an effort to tackle these gaps in non-proliferation efforts, as well as to address concerns over terrorist groups’ ability to acquire and use weapons of mass destruction (WMD), the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1540 in late 2004. The Resolution requires states to adopt ‘appropriate effective’ measures to prevent non-state actors from acquiring WMD and to prohibit the financing of such trade. In 2006, the Security Council also introduced sanctions on Iran and North Korea, in response to developments in the countries’ nuclear programmes. Among other restrictions, the sanctions prohibit the export of proliferation-sensitive goods to the two countries and mandate the freezing of assets belonging to the entities assisting Tehran and Pyongyang in their proliferation efforts. The expansion of these sanctions regimes over the years has targeted not just the governments responsible for the development of these nuclear programmes, but the expansive networks of suppliers, financiers and intermediaries that support them.

>https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/aq-khan-dead-long-live-proliferation-network