**The enriched uranium recently returned to the United States(announced by the U.S. Department of Energy’s National Nuclear Security Administration on May 8–9, 2026, with the shipment arriving in early May)originated from the United Kingdom and was fuel for Venezuela’s now-decommissioned RV-1 research reactor.

It consisted of 13.5 kg (about 30 pounds) of highly enriched uranium (HEU, enriched to just above 20% U-235) in the form of spent/low-burnup nuclear fuel assemblies stored at the reactor site at the Venezuelan Institute for Scientific Research (IVIC), about 15 km southwest of Caracas. The RV-1 was a U.S.-designed (General Electric) pool-type materials testing reactor that went critical in 1960 under the U.S. Atoms for Peace program and operated for physics and nuclear research until it shut down in 1991; the fuel then became surplus.

### Key details on origin and history:

• UK origin of this specific material: The RV-1 used nuclear fuel containing uranium from both the United States and the United Kingdom during its lifetime. Earlier repatriations (1998–1999) removed 56 spent fuel assemblies of U.S.-origin HEU back to the United States under the U.S. Research Reactor Spent Nuclear Fuel Acceptance Program. The remaining ~20 fuel assemblies (the ones just removed in 2026) were of U.K. uranium origin—low-burnup HEU supplied by the United Kingdom. This is confirmed in official IAEA statements and historical records from the reactor’s fuel inventory.

• The uranium was not Venezuelan-mined or enriched domestically; Venezuela has no domestic enrichment capability. It was foreign-supplied reactor fuel under international safeguards.

### What happened to it:

The material was securely packaged into a spent-fuel cask at IVIC, transported overland (~100–160 miles) to the port of Puerto Cabello under Venezuelan military escort, then shipped by sea aboard a specialized U.K. Nuclear Transport Solutions vessel to the U.S. Savannah River Site in South Carolina. There, it will be processed (down-blended) into high-assay low-enriched uranium (HALEU) for future U.S. nuclear energy programs. The operation was a joint U.S.–Venezuela–U.K.–IAEA effort coordinated by the NNSA’s Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation.

This completes the removal of all enriched uranium from Venezuela, eliminating a potential proliferation/security risk from the legacy reactor site. No other sources or origins (e.g., Russian, Iranian, or Venezuelan domestic production) are indicated in official U.S., IAEA, or related reporting.

Source: GROK A.I.

(me) >>24594551

>I asked GROK about Iran’s uranium existence and source:

Yes, enriched uranium exists in Iran.

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has verified and documented Iran’s production and accumulation of enriched uranium for years through its safeguards monitoring. As of June 13, 2025 (the last date for which the IAEA had detailed verification data before losing access following Israeli-U.S. military strikes in mid-June 2025), Iran’s total enriched uranium stockpile was estimated at 9,874.9 kg. This included:

• 440.9 kg of uranium enriched up to 60% U-235 (near weapons-grade highly enriched uranium, or HEU — a level with no credible civilian use and only one short technical step from 90% weapons-grade).

• 184.1 kg enriched up to 20% U-235.

• 6,024.4 kg enriched up to 5% U-235.

• 2,391.1 kg enriched up to 2% U-235.

Iran is the only non-nuclear-weapon state under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) to have produced and stockpiled uranium enriched to 60%. The IAEA has repeatedly stated that this material remains in Iran, with the majority of the 60% HEU (roughly 200+ kg) believed to be stored in underground tunnel complexes at the Esfahan (Isfahan) Nuclear Technology Center. Some quantities may also be at Natanz or Fordow, though access to all enrichment sites has been denied since the 2025 strikes, creating a “continuity of knowledge” gap. Satellite imagery and IAEA analysis indicate the Isfahan tunnels were largely spared and show ongoing activity consistent with material storage. Iran’s foreign minister has described some material as “under the rubble” with “no plan” to recover it, but the IAEA assesses the stockpile is likely intact.

The uranium originated entirely from domestic Iranian sources.** Iran mines its own natural uranium ore, processes it into yellowcake (uranium concentrate), converts it to uranium hexafluoride (UF6) gas at the Isfahan Uranium Conversion Facility, and then feeds it into its domestic centrifuge enrichment cascades at Natanz, Fordow, and related sites. There is no evidence of imported enriched uranium or significant foreign-sourced natural uranium feedstock in the current stockpile.

### Key details on Iran’s uranium origin and supply chain:

• Primary mines:

• Saghand Uranium Mine (Yazd province): Iran’s largest, an underground mine with ~1,400 tons of reserves and a design capacity of ~50 tonnes of uranium per year. It became fully operational around 2013 with Chinese technical assistance in exploration and development. Ore is milled at the nearby Ardakan Yellowcake Production Plant.

• Gchine (Gachin) Mine (near Bandar Abbas): A smaller open-pit mine (~21 tonnes uranium/year capacity) that began production in 2004–2006. It was originally linked to Iran’s earlier clandestine nuclear efforts and produces yellowcake at the Bandar Abbas Uranium Production Plant. Operations have been limited at times.

• Iran has additional smaller deposits (e.g., Narigan) and has explored extracting uranium from phosphates, but Saghand and Gchine have been the backbone of its enrichment feedstock since the mid-2000s.

• Historical note: In the early 1980s, Iran imported ~531 tonnes of yellowcake from South Africa, some of which was converted and used in early enrichment experiments. However, domestic mining and milling now supply the program’s needs. Iran’s known uranium resources are modest (~9,900 tonnes total identified/inferred per the latest Red Book data), sufficient for its current enrichment activities and potential weapons production but not for a large commercial nuclear power program long-term.

• No foreign uranium in the enriched stockpile: The enrichment technology itself originated from the Pakistani A.Q. Khan network (centrifuge designs and components acquired in the 1980s–1990s), with some early Chinese assistance on mining/conversion. But the actual uranium atoms being enriched are Iranian-mined natural uranium (primarily U-238 with ~0.7% U-235).

This domestic fuel cycle has allowed Iran to produce all of its current enriched uranium inventory independently. The program remains under IAEA scrutiny where access is permitted, but the loss of verification since 2025 has heightened proliferation concerns. No other sources (e.g., Russian, Chinese, or covert imports of enriched material) are indicated in official IAEA or intelligence reporting.

Hantavirus Remains Alive Just 2-3 Days Outside Rodents

Spread pattern inside HV Hondius suggests rodents are on board the ship for continued cases–was not tracked inside the boat on passengers shoes from site excursions. WHO blunder. Passengers locked down in cabins with rodents aboard now resulting in developing cases. Ship should have been evacuated and decontaminated weeks ago. Virus not spreading person-to-person. @McCulloughFund

https://x.com/p_mcculloughmd/status/2053893879242359155