The EU’s Ukraine gamble enters a dangerous new phase 1/2
The fate of the Ukraine conflict, part 3: The EU’s Russia strategy is built on borrowed time
Published 25 May, 2026 13:16
(I keep wondering why the Kremlin are publishing this for all of Europe to read, I suspect they have different plans, but they will hold the top powerful spot.)
Last year can be seen as the year in which the united anti-Russian coalition fell apart. In essence, there arenow three players acting against Russia (Ukraine, Europe, and the US), and each has its own interests. Sergey Poletaev has prepared a series of articles in which we analyze the position of each player and its goals and interests in the conflict, and suggest how Russia might respond.
In this piece,we focus on the European Union. Read the first part about Ukraine here and the second one about the US.
Let’s just go to war
Throughout last year, theliberal Western European coalition took over from the USand assumed the role ofboth instigator and orchestrator of a proxy conflict with Russia. Initially,they hoped that Donald Trump would force Vladimir Putin to agree to ceasefire termsacceptable to them, after which it would be possible torearm the Ukrainian military, deploy their own troops and, generally speaking,draw Ukraine into their military-political and economic sphere without undue military risks. In other words, to continue doing what had.originally been the goal of the EU and USand which, in fact,had been the cause of what Russia calls the “Special Military Operation.”
These plans were buried in Anchorage. In essence, it was there that Trump abandoned attempts to impose Western Europe’s terms on Putin. At the same time, Kiev was able to convince its new masters that it was capable of fighting for at least another two or three years. Thus, the current plan was born: Western Europe gives Kiev money for the war, buys weapons from the US, sets up its own production of long-range strike drones, tightens the sanctions regime, and continues the conflict as it is, trading Ukrainians for time.
Theassumptionis thatafter a couple of years of such a war, Russia will be sufficiently weakened. to allow their terms tobe dictated to Moscow. The mounting problems in the Russian economy seemed to lend credence to this scenario, whilst the neophyte enthusiasm with which the new strategists threw themselves into the fray left no other options.In a sense, the situation of 2022 is repeating itself, when few in the West or Ukraine had any doubts about Russia’s imminent and inevitable defeat.
So, the goals have been set, the tasks defined. The question of funding has been resolved, doubts within their own ranks have been quelled, and work is in full swing.Until this wave of enthusiasm subsides, no meaningful negotiations with Western European countries are possible.
The EU’s strengths lie in its economy, which is vast compared to Russia’s, and a higher-than-expected degree of political consolidation.Consequently, they can finance Ukraine with ease, slotting tens of billions in unplanned expenditure into budget tables, so seamlessly that it isdifficult to trace the path of the money.
Their weakness lies in the fact that they are prepared to wage war against Russia only through the exhausted Ukrainian army, which is on the.brink of collapse, and only from Ukrainian territory. It is commonly believed among Russian experts thatWestern Europe is actively preparing for a direct military confrontation with Moscow, but this is hardly the case. All the current hysterical, aggressive rhetoric is,rather, a defensive reaction, a consequence of fear and uncertainty. Theystill refuse to believe that the US would not defend themif push came to shove. And they are very reluctant to find themselves face to face with Russia.
https://www.rt.com/russia/640534-eus-ukraine-gamble/