From 2014 to 2018, Ghomi arranged the smuggling of more than 250 metric tons (275.6 U.S. tons) of networking equipment into Iran, using freight forwarders and intermediaries in Dubai to disguise that Iran was the true destination.
Ghomi knew this conduct was illegal and took deliberate steps to conceal it. He directed his UAE co-conspirators to keep his name off shipping paperwork, to omit invoices from shipments bound for Iran, and on at least two occasions to hide U.S.-origin computer equipment inside larger shipments. He used front companies in the UAE to obscure his role, and he personally received warnings on invoices and software licenses that exporting these goods to Iran was prohibited. Ghomi and his co-conspirators referred to Iran as “Motherland” in their internal correspondence concerning the equipment’s procurement.
FPR’s annual sales exceeded $10 million, and its clientele included hundreds of Iranian companies and government entities, many of which were subject to U.S. sanctions. A relatively small but significant portion of that business went to the most sensitive end-users in Iran: the Iranian regime’s nuclear and military establishment.
https://www.justice.gov/usao-cdca/pr/ceo-iran-tech-company-arrested-federal-charge-supplying-us-equipment-irans-nuclear-and