TYB
ELECTION MITIGATION PLAN - 2026
14-pages
Date: July 22, 2026
Subject: Proposed DHS/CISA Operational Guidance for the November Federal Election – 2026.
https://tinapeters.us/documents/news-media/2026/07/Risk-Mitigation-Election-Plan-2026.pdf
Cover Letter to CISA - ELECTION MITIGATION PLAN - 2026
July 24, 2026
Nicholas M. Andersen, Acting Director
Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency
Department of Homeland Security
Thank you for meeting with us on Monday and for giving us the opportunity to present our concerns and proposed path forward for the 2026 federal election.
The November election is rapidly approaching, there is little time for solutions that require years of study, wholesale replacement of existing infrastructure, or complicated changes that state and local election officials cannot realistically implement before Election Day. A practical risk-mitigation plan must be
executed quickly—one that meaningfully improves election security while recognizing the political, legal, logistical, and operational realities on the ground.
With that objective in mind, we have developed the enclosed “2026 Risk Mitigation Election Plan (RMEP).”
RMEP is designed as a politically practical and operationally achievable approach that will work within a short-timeframe. It does not assume that every electronic component of the current election system can be eliminated before November. Instead, it focuses on reducing unnecessary electronic dependence, moving voters to hand-marked paper ballots wherever possible, strengthening ballot reconciliation and chain of custody, maintaining resilient paper voter records, improving the cybersecurity of systems that must remain in use, and independently verifying electronic tabulation through a full human count before certification.
The objective is clear: reduce the opportunity for cheating. We do this by insisting the steps outlined in this plan are enacted by every state. Acting quickly, will give states more time to make the transition as manageable as possible for the local officials who must carry it out.
Also included in this packet are three separate letters from three of the most knowledgable cybersecurity professionals in America: Dr. Andrew W. Appel, Eugene Higgins Professor Emeritus & Senior Research Scientist, and Dr. Philip B. Stark, Distinguished Professor of Statistics, University of California, Berkeley and a former Election Assistance Commission Advisor, and lastly from Dr. J. Alex Halderman, Professor of Computer Science and Engineering at the University of Michigan and Director of Michigan’s Center for Computer Security and Society. All three letters are independent, stand-alone communications and were not written as endorsements of, or in support of, the enclosed RMEP. They should be considered entirely on their own merits. However, the technical concerns and recommendations raised independently
by their authors reinforce several of the same underlying risks that the RMEP is intended to address—particularly the use of ballot-marking devices (BMDs) and the limitations of relying on a fixed-percentage manual audit as the primary verification of electronic election results.
We believe the remaining time before the 2026 election should be treated as an opportunity for immediate, practical risk reduction. Not every long-term election-security issue can be resolved before November, but significant improvements can still be made if action begins now.
Our hope is that the enclosed plan provides CISA with a clear, workable framework that can be quickly evaluated, refined where necessary, and translated into guidance and assistance for state and local election
officials. Time is of the essence - we stand ready to assist you and your staff any way possible.
Respectfully,
Colonel Conrad Reynolds (USA Ret.), Ms. Tina Peters, Mr. Clay Parikh, Mr. Will Huff
https://tinapeters.us/documents/news-media/2026/07/CISA-Cover-Letter-Reynolds-Peters-Parikh-Huff-2026-07-24.pdf
Suggested Principles for State Statutes Regarding Ballot Marking and Vote Tabulation
March 18, 2024
Executive Summary
We believe that the goal of laws, regulations and directives relating to elections must be focused on fairness, security, transparency, and accessibility. Each state should strive to approach the gold standard in every category, so that no reasonable candidate or party may have grounds to object that the process was unfair, insecure, or compromised. The process must be transparent, so the public may be assured the winners won and the losers lost.
We believe that no system is perfect, with each having trade-offs. Hand-marked and hand-counted ballots remove the uncertainty introduced by use of electronic machinery and the ability of bad actors to exploit electronic vulnerabilities to remotely alter the results. However, some portion of voters mistakenly mark paper ballots in a manner that will not be counted in the way the voter intended, or which even voids the ballot. Hand-counts delay timely reporting of results, and introduce the possibility for human error, bias, or misinterpretation.
Technology introduces the means of efficient tabulation, but also introduces a manifold increase in complexity and sophistication of the process. This places the understanding of the process beyond the average person’s understanding, which can foster distrust. It also opens the door to human or machine error, as well as exploitation by sophisticated and malicious actors.
Rather than assert that each component of the process can be made perfectly secure on its own, we believe the goal of each component of the elections process is to validate every other component.
Consequently, we believe that the hallmarks of a reliable and optimal election process are hand-marked paper ballots, which are optically scanned, separately and securely stored, and rigorously audited after the election but before certification. We recommend state legislators adopt policies consistent with these guiding principles, which are further developed below.
https://blog.citp.princeton.edu/2024/03/18/suggested-principles-for-state-statutes-regarding-ballot-marking-and-vote-tabulation/
Dr. Andrew W. Appel’s July 21 letter to CISA
July 21, 2026
Nicholas M. Andersen, Acting Director
Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency
Department of Homeland Security
Dear Mr. Andersen:
The CISA “Election Report” dated July 13, 2026 describes CISA’s very useful activities 2019-2024 in assessing the security of U.S. jurisdictions’ election infrastructure and in assisting those jurisdictions in improving their security. In that report CISA accurately described an inherent problem with Ballot Marking Devices (BMDs), that is, the kind of voting machine on which voters indicate their selections on a touchscreen. In CISA’s words, the BMDs “printed voters’ completed ballots on paper but encoded their selections in a barcode that voters had no way to verify. A researcher showed that hackers could change the votes encoded in the barcode, without even having physical access to the machines.”
This kind of insecurity applies not only to the model of BMD specifically mentioned in that report, but to BMDs made by all vendors. With more or less difficulty, hackers could alter the software in the machines, for all the reasons described in CISA’s report. That’s why the report specifically recommends,
“Use human-readable paper ballots.”
But in fact there is a severe election-integrity problem with all BMDs, not just the ones that produce bar codes. Hackers could alter the software in those machines to print different votes onto the paper ballot than the ones that the voter selected. You might think, “but the voter would notice,” but in fact many
different assessments of real voters have found the vast majority of voters would not notice. And once the paper ballot is marked with a fraudulent vote, that vote will survive any kind of recount or audit, because it’s marked right there on the paper.
You might think, “but at least some voters would notice.” But those few voters aren’t in a position to do anything about it, except to ask the pollworker to void their ballot and try again.
This assessment is the clear consensus among election cybersecurity experts; see >>24891087 Suggested Principles for State Statutes Regarding Ballot Marking and Vote Tabulation, a 2024 letter signed by 20 experts.
Therefore I urge CISA to advise U.S. jurisdictions that using Ballot Marking Devices (BMDs) is high risk; that BMDs should be used only as a disability accommodation for voters who cannot mark a paper ballot by hand. Furthermore, many jurisdictions currently using BMDs already count those ballots with polling-place optical scanners that are able (without any alteration or new purchases) to count handmarked optical-scan ballots. Switching to hand-marked ballots, tabulated by optical scanners but recountable and auditable by human inspection, would significantly improve election integrity in those states currently using BMDs.
Sincerely,
Andrew W. Appel
Opinions in this letter are my own and do not represent the position of Princeton University.
https://tinapeters.us/documents/news-media/2026/07/Appel-Letter-to-CISA-Andersen-2026-07-21.pdf
DHS Requires States to Adopt Common-Sense Election Security Measures Before Receiving Federal Funds
Release Date: July 10, 2026
Protecting the nation’s critical infrastructure – including election security – is a top priority for President Trump and Secretary Mullin
WASHINGTON – The United States Department of Homeland Security (DHS), through the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), is taking decisive action to safeguard the integrity of American elections.
Threats to election systems are constantly evolving. This week, FEMA published the funding opportunity for the Homeland Security Grant Program, making over $1 billion of taxpayer funds available to state, Tribal Nations, territorial, and local governments. Before receiving award funds, states and other recipients must take critical, common-sense steps to protect U.S. elections.
“Election security is national security and protecting the Nation’s critical infrastructure is a top priority,” said DHS Secretary Markwayne Mullin. “Under President Trump’s leadership, we are taking decisive action to protect election systems from threats like foreign interference, insider threats, and cyberattacks. These new requirements for homeland security grant recipients will preserve election integrity and ensure that Americans can trust the results.”
To strengthen election security, the Department of Homeland Security is requiring all grant recipients to take several key actions:
• First, states must submit a plan for transitioning away from unsecure electronic voting systems that use bar codes and QR codes to count votes and instead use equipment that accepts hand-marked paper ballots. This change helps create a necessary and reliable paper trail, making it easier to verify results and detect any irregularities.
• Second, after each federal election, states must conduct a manual audit of at least 5% of all ballots cast. This common-sense process involves physically reviewing a random selection of ballots to confirm that the machine reported results match results on the paper ballots. This will ensure accuracy and detect any machine errors or manipulation.
• Third, states are required to reconcile the number of voters who participated in each federal election with the number of ballots cast. This step ensures that the number of ballots cast matches the number of voters, a common-sense step that will help jurisdictions identify discrepancies prior to certification.
• Fourth, within 120 days of accepting the grant award, states must use the reliable and free U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services’ Systematic Alien Verification for Entitlements (SAVE) system to verify the citizenship status of everyone listed in the state voter registration database. This measure helps ensure that only eligible citizens are registered to vote.
▶[To the extent that the functionality of the SAVE system has been impacted by the June 22, 2026 order in the League of Women Voters v. U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Civ. Action No. 25-3501, while on appeal, for any person who is registered to vote but for whom a State does not have records of citizenship, the State may resolve this uncertainty by submitting relevant information to USCIS for an immigration records search consistent with the requirements of 8 U.S.C. § 1373.]
• Finally, states must also use the SAVE system, or another authorized government system, to verify the citizenship of anyone working at polling places or operating election systems. This requirement applies to all individuals involved in the administration of elections, further protecting the process from potential vulnerabilities.
…
https://www.dhs.gov/news/2026/07/10/dhs-requires-states-adopt-common-sense-election-security-measures-receiving-federal
Dr. Philip B. Stark’s July 21 letter to CISA
Dear Mr. Andersen:
I write in reference to the auditing recommendations in the 10 July 2026 press release, at the URL
>https://www.dhs.gov/news/2026/07/10/dhs-requires-states-adopt-common-sense-election-security-measures-receiving-federal
>after each federal election, states must conduct a manual audit of at least 5% of all ballots cast. This common-sense process involves physically reviewing a random selection of ballots to confirm that the machine reported results match results on the paper ballots. This will ensure accuracy and detect any machine errors or manipulation.
I have two serious concerns about this. First, examining a random sample of 5% of ballots in general will not suffice to ensure accuracy and detect machine errors or manipulation. The sample size required to detect errors or manipulation depends on many things, including the amount of error or manipulation, the number of votes cast, how the random sample is drawn, and how the random sample is used. Second, auditing some contests in an election gives no assurance about any other contests in that election: every
contest needs some scrutiny.
How the random sample is drawn is key. For instance, the quotation above suggests that the sample involves selecting entire precincts or scan batches of ballots—groups for which the voting system reports vote subtotals that can be compared to the manual tally. That is inefficient and ineffective.
…
https://tinapeters.us/documents/news-media/2026/07/Stark-Letter-to-CISA-Andersen-2026-07-21.pdf
Dr. J. Alex Halderman’s July 24 letter to CISA
Re: CISA’s Report on Vulnerabilities in Electronic Voting and Ballot-Counting Systems
https://tinapeters.us/documents/news-media/2026/07/Halderman-Letter-to-CISA-Andersen-2026-07-24.pdf
>Dr. Philip B. Stark’s July 21 letter to CISA
100 Days to Secure the 2026 Election: Paper Ballots, Full Hand Counts, Real Accountability
July 26, 2026
By Tina Peters
A practical election-security plan built for the time remaining before November—not another years-long study.
—
The 2026 Risk Mitigation Election Plan begins with a simple premise: if every electronic component cannot be replaced or independently proven secure before November, the election process must be designed so an electronic compromise cannot silently determine the certified result.
Presented to CISA by Colonel Conrad Reynolds (USA Ret.), Tina Peters, Clay Parikh, and Will Huff, the plan focuses on safeguards that can be deployed within the approximately 100 days remaining before the November 3 federal election.
The six immediate controls
1. Transition the general electorate away from ballot-marking devices and toward preprinted, human-readable, hand-marked paper ballots wherever operationally possible, while preserving accessible equipment for voters who need it.
2. Use existing tabulators for the initial unofficial election-night count after polls close.
3. Require strict ballot chain of custody throughout the election process.
4. Apply the “Bank-Teller Method”: independently hand-count every ballot for federal contests before certification and reconcile that count with the tabulator result.
5. Maintain paper poll books or parallel paper participation records so electronic failures cannot stop voting or eliminate the voter-to-ballot reconciliation trail.
6. Recruit and train count-only election workers who report when counting begins rather than working an entire Election Day shift.
The Bank-Teller Method
A bank teller does not rely solely on a computer balance; the physical cash must reconcile with the accounting total. The plan applies the same principle to federal elections.
Count one is electronic: existing tabulators produce the initial result. Count two is human: independent teams hand-count the federal contests using the physical paper ballots without first consulting the machine result. Any discrepancy must be investigated, resolved, and documented before certification.
The method is intentionally straightforward: two independent counts of the same physical evidence, conducted using two different methods.
A 100-day implementation clock
Days 1–7: Classify counties, identify equipment and ballot types, assess chain of custody, verify network exposure, and escalate technical barriers.
Days 8–30: Build county implementation plans and begin remediation for paper ballots, poll books, reconciliation, staffing, and cybersecurity controls.
Days 31–60: Recruit workers and run timed mock counts using the actual November ballot.
Days 61–85: Correct worker shortages, ballot-supply problems, counting bottlenecks, poll-book failures, chain-of-custody weaknesses, and cybersecurity gaps.
Days 86–100: Lock final procedures, produce ballots and poll books, complete training, assign workers, verify cybersecurity configurations, and deploy.
The non-negotiable security floor
Implementation may vary by state law, county size, equipment, and personnel. The plan argues that the core security principles should not:
• Use hand-marked paper wherever operationally possible.
• Account for and secure the physical ballots.
• Independently verify the electronic count before certification.
• Maintain a paper-based record of voter participation.
• Reduce and monitor the remaining electronic attack surface.
Read the complete plan
Download >>24891004 the complete 14-page 2026 Risk Mitigation Election Plan (PDF)
Read >>24891050 the accompanying July 24 letter to CISA (PDF)
Read >>24891090 Dr. Andrew W. Appel’s July 21 letter to CISA (PDF)
Read >>24891134, >>24891150 Dr. Philip B. Stark’s July 21 letter to CISA (PDF)
Read >>24891146 Dr. J. Alex Halderman’s July 24 letter to CISA (PDF)
https://tinapeters.us/news/100-days-secure-2026-election/
>ELECTION MITIGATION PLAN - 2026
>14-pages
>>24891157 Pages 1 - 5
>>24891161 Pages 6 - 10
Pages 11 - 14 END
@WendyRogersAZ
100 Days to Secure the 2026 Election: Paper Ballots, Full Hand Counts, Real Accountability ·
>100 Days to Secure the 2026 Election: Paper Ballots, Full Hand Counts, Real Accountability
>By Tina Peters
>A practical election-security plan built for the time remaining before November
From tinapeters.us
9:57 PM · Jul 31, 2026 7.1K Views
https://x.com/WendyRogersAZ/status/2083311160678641992
@WhiteHouse
Dream team. 🇺🇸
A historic Cabinet meeting at Camp David with the most successful, transformational Cabinet!
1:18 AM · Aug 1, 2026 32.5K Views
https://x.com/WhiteHouse/status/2083361663374250197
Swamp drain.
==TO FACILITATE POSITIVE ADJUSTMENT TO COMPETITION
FROM IMPORTS OF QUARTZ SURFACE PRODUCTS==
Proclamations
July 31, 2026
BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
A PROCLAMATION
-
On May 18, 2026, the United States International Trade Commission (ITC) transmitted to the President a report (ITC Report) on its investigation under section 202 of the Trade Act of 1974, as amended (Trade Act) (19 U.S.C. 2252), with respect to imports of quartz surface products (QSP), which are classifiable in the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States (HTSUS) in subheadings 6810.99.0020, 6810.99.0040, and 7020.00.6000.
-
The ITC reached an affirmative determination under section 202(b) of the Trade Act (19 U.S.C. 2252(b)) that QSP is being imported into the United States in such increased quantities as to be a substantial cause of serious injury to the domestic industry producing an article like or directly competitive with the imported article.
-
Pursuant to section 301(a) of the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement Implementation Act (USMCA Implementation Act) (19 U.S.C. 4551(a)), the ITC made negative findings as to whether imports of Canada and Mexico, considered individually, account for a substantial share of total imports and contribute importantly to the serious injury caused by imports.
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Pursuant to statutes implementing certain free trade agreements to which the United States is a party, the ITC further found that imports of QSP that are a product of Australia, each Dominican Republic-Central America-United States Free Trade Agreement country (i.e., Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua) (CAFTA-DR countries), as well as Colombia, Jordan, the Republic of Korea, Panama, Peru, and Singapore, individually, are not a substantial cause of serious injury or threat thereof.
…
https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2026/07/to-facilitate-positive-adjustment-to-competition-from-imports-of-quartz-surface-products/
>TO FACILITATE POSITIVE ADJUSTMENT TO COMPETITION
>FROM IMPORTS OF QUARTZ SURFACE PRODUCTS
Trump Imposes 4-Year Tariff-Rate Quota on Quartz Surface Imports
The tariffs aim to help U.S. producers adjust after the International Trade Commission found they suffered serious injury.
President Donald Trump on Friday signed a proclamation establishing a four-year tariff-rate quota on imports of quartz surface products, citing harm to the domestic industry from a surge in foreign shipments.
The action follows the U.S. International Trade Commission’s (ITC) conclusion that quartz surface products are being imported in high enough quantities as to be a substantial cause of serious injury to U.S. producers of like or directly competitive articles. The ITC launched the probe after a petition by the Quartz Manufacturing Alliance of America.
The ITC submitted its report to the president on May 18. A supplemental report from July 2 cited unforeseen developments that led to the import increase.
Quartz surface products are engineered slabs and fabricated items. They are commonly used for countertops, vanities, and other surfaces.
Under the proclamation, quota quantities will increase each year while the applicable duty rates for goods imported both within and above the quota will decline in the second, third, and fourth years.
“I determine that it is appropriate and feasible to impose a safeguard measure in the form of a tariff-rate quota on imports of QSP … for a period of 4 years, with annual increases in the within-quota quantities and reductions in the rates of duty applicable to goods entered within and in excess of those quantities in the second, third, and fourth years,” the proclamation states.
…
https://www.theepochtimes.com/us/trump-imposes-4-year-tariff-rate-quota-on-quartz-surface-imports-6070102
Mitch McConnell: Monday Deadline for Kentucky Special Election Explained
A critical deadline is approaching in Kentucky as questions surrounding Senator Mitch McConnell continue to grow amid his prolonged absence from Congress.
McConnell, an 84-year-old Kentucky Republican, has not been seen publicly for weeks after suffering a fall at his Washington, D.C., home that left him briefly unconscious. His absence has sparked questions about transparency around his health as well as representation for Kentucky, given Republicans’ narrow majority in the Senate.
McConnell’s office says that he continues to work remotely with his staff. His team has released photographs of him at a hospital but has done little to quell questions about his health and whereabouts.
His absence also carries political implications. McConnell leaving his role would leave open a seat in the solidly Republican state at a time when Senate Republicans need every vote they can get to advance President Donald Trump’s agenda. The Republican is already set to retire at the end of his term in office after a 40-year stint as senator.
How that new senator would be selected remains a contested question.
In most states, a governor is able to appoint a new senator when there is a vacancy—but in Kentucky, it’s a more complicated question. State lawmakers in 2024 passed a law that prohibits the governor from appointing an interim senator, instead requiring him to call a special election to fill the seat.
Although Kentucky votes reliably Republican at the federal level, its voters have backed Democratic Governor Andy Beshear twice to lead the state. The law essentially bars him from appointing a Democratic senator, and analysts believe a special election would favor Republicans; Trump carried Kentucky by more than 30 points in the 2024 election, so a special Senate election would be an uphill battle for Democrats.
However, McConnell has not indicated that he plans to leave the Senate prior to the end of his term in December. He has already said he is retiring, with Republican Representative Andy Barr and Democrat Charles Booker running to replace him.
Forecasters like the Cook Political Report consider the race to be safe for Republicans in November.
Could a Kentucky Special Election Hinge on August 3?
The August 3 deadline, which falls on Monday, is viewed by some as an important date as to whether Beshear can call a special election to allow Kentucky voters to elect a new senator, though many of the questions about Kentucky’s vacancy laws remain untested in the courts. There are several competing legal provisions, so it’s unclear exactly how this would play out.
Section 152 of Kentucky's Constitution states that if there are more than three months between a vacancy and election, a special election would need to be called to fill that seat. But if the vacancy opened up less than three months until the election, a special election would be delayed.
The midterm elections are set for November 3, so Monday would mark three months earlier.
…
https://www.newsweek.com/mitch-mcconnell-august-3-deadline-kentucky-special-election-explained-12265893
Centennial Institute
Western Conservative Summit 2026: Friday Morning Session
After a two-year hiatus, this milestone Summit will consider A New Birth of Freedom: Reigniting the American Dream. As we mark the 250th anniversary of the Declaration of Independence and look toward the next 250 years of American exceptionalism, it is imperative that we take a moment to reflect, recommit, and rearticulate the intellectual foundations of American conservatism, rooted in the self-evident truths of the Declaration: that our rights come from God, not government; that among these are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness; and that government exists to secure these rights, not to grant or redefine them.
Streamed live 12 hours ago 3:28:14
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JWX3LV-v-vY
>Friday Morning Session
Western Conservative Summit 2026: Friday Evening Session
LIVE Started streaming 2 hours ago
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hpdBLwN1U44
@JohnfKennedy608
Holy Crap!
10:45 AM · Jul 31, 2026 75.1KViews 4:35
https://x.com/JohnfKennedy608/status/2083142001264918937
General Spalding
So important to understand. The communists are everywhere.
>Holy Crap!
2:37 AM · Aug 1, 2026 1.1KViews
https://x.com/robert_spalding/status/2083381488846868944