Anonymous ID: 14a0e8 Sept. 2, 2018, 1:41 p.m. No.2849240   🗄️.is 🔗kun   >>9329 >>9717 >>9888

https://taskandpurpose.com/google-china-artificial-intelligence/https://taskandpurpose.com/google-china-artificial-intelligence/

 

The Hidden Moral Pitfalls Of Google, China, and Artificial Intelligence

By 'Mal Ware'

on June 19, 2018

 

The Hidden Moral Pitfalls Of Google, China, and Artificial Intelligence

By 'Mal Ware'

on June 19, 2018

 

Google recently announced it would be pulling out of a high profile DARPA Artificial Intelligence (AI) program called MAVEN citing ethics concerns and a petition from 4,000 of its employees.

 

This decision came just before The Economist ran a cover story detailing the Chinese government’s brutal oppression of the Uyghur population in the Zinjang province of western China. Uyghurs are a Muslim Turkic minority, ethnically and religiously distinct from the ruling Han Chinese. The Chinese government has turned the province into a technologically enabled police state, with invasive monitoring of all forms of communication, biometric identity controls, and novel applications of machine learning and artificial intelligence.

 

In December, Google announced it would be opening a new AI research center in China, expanding its existing presence in the country. China was an attractive option for AI research because it is a huge market and its lack of privacy laws could give its software engineers access to the world’s largest data sets. “I believe AI and its benefits have no borders” said Dr. Fei-Fei Li, Chief Scientist at Google Cloud. Google has also said that they will not allow their technology to be used for weapons or surveillance that would violate “internationally accepted norms.” Despite ending the MAVEN contract, it is continuing to pursue defense work.

 

The concern is that so much AI research could be considered dual use. A machine learning technique that is used to detect cancer can be repurposed for an improved Google Glass device with the rapid facial recognition that Chinese security services have been pursuing. There are no “internationally accepted norms” about privacy. The most damning of Edward Snowden’s revelations was not that the government was breaking the law, but that the law allowed so much. The Supreme Court will soon announce a decision that will have broad implications on how much privacy US law should allow, but the matter is hardly settled anywhere.

 

Whatever Google decides, other AI firms will have to make similar decisions about what they build and who they build it for. Huge sums of money are being thrown at any firm that does or claims to do AI. With China’s non-existent intellectual property laws, any firm that does business with or in China could be unwittingly supporting the most advanced surveillance state in the world. Or, they could be training the software engineers who will. Greed and naivety can be a dangerous combination.

Anonymous ID: 14a0e8 Sept. 2, 2018, 1:43 p.m. No.2849271   🗄️.is 🔗kun   >>9289 >>9354 >>9907

Google Will Not Renew Pentagon Contract That Upset Employees

 

June 1, 2018

 

SAN FRANCISCO — Google, hoping to head off a rebellion by employees upset that the technology they were working on could be used for lethal purposes, will not renew a contract with the Pentagon for artificial intelligence work when a current deal expires next year.

 

Diane Greene, who is the head of the Google Cloud business that won a contract with the Pentagon’s Project Maven, said during a weekly meeting with employees on Friday that the company was backing away from its A.I. work with the military, according to a person familiar with the discussion but not permitted to speak publicly about it.

 

Google’s work with the Defense Department on the Maven program, which uses artificial intelligence to interpret video images and could be used to improve the targeting of drone strikes, roiled the internet giant’s work force. Many of the company’s top A.I. researchers, in particular, worried that the contract was the first step toward using the nascent technology in advanced weapons.

 

Google’s self-image is different — it once had a motto of “don’t be evil.” A number of its top technical talent said the internet company was betraying its idealistic principles, even as its business-minded officials worried that the protests would damage its chances to secure more business from the Defense Department.

 

About 4,000 Google employees signed a petition demanding “a clear policy stating that neither Google nor its contractors will ever build warfare technology.” A handful of employees also resigned in protest, while some were openly advocating the company to cancel the Maven contract.

 

Months before it became public, senior Google officials were worried about how the Maven contract would be perceived inside and outside the company, The New York Times reported this week. By courting business with the Pentagon, they risked angering a number of the company’s highly regarded A.I. researchers, who had vowed that their work would not become militarized.

 

Jim Mattis, the defense secretary, had reached out to tech companies and sought their support and cooperation as the Pentagon makes artificial intelligence a centerpiece of its weapons strategy. The decision made by Google on Friday is a setback to that outreach.

 

But if Google drops out of some or all of the competition to sell the software that will guide future weaponry, the Pentagon is likely to find plenty of other companies happy to take the lucrative business. A Defense Department spokeswoman did not reply to a request for comment on Friday.

Anonymous ID: 14a0e8 Sept. 2, 2018, 1:44 p.m. No.2849289   🗄️.is 🔗kun   >>9300

>>2849271

 

(contd)

 

Ms. Greene’s comments were reported earlier by Gizmodo.

 

The money for Google in the Project Maven contract was never large by the standards of a company with revenue of $110 billion last year — $9 million, one official told employees, or a possible $15 million over 18 months, according to an internal email.

 

But some company officials saw it as an opening to much greater revenue down the road. In an email last September, a Google official in Washington told colleagues she expected Maven to grow into a $250 million-a-year project, and eventually it could have helped open the door to contracts worth far more; notably a multiyear, multibillion-dollar cloud computing project called JEDI, or Joint Enterprise Defense Infrastructure.

 

Whether Google’s Maven decision is a short-term reaction to employee protests and adverse news coverage or reflects a more sweeping strategy not to pursue military work is unclear. The question of whether a particular contract contributes to warfare does not always have a simple answer.

 

When the Maven work came under fire inside Google, company officials asserted that it was not “offensive” in nature. But Maven is using the company’s artificial intelligence software to improve the sorting and analysis of imagery from drones, and some drones rely on such analysis to identify human targets for lethal missile shots.

 

Google management had told employees that it would produce a set of principles to guide its choices in the use of artificial intelligence for defense and intelligence contracting. At Friday’s meeting, Ms. Greene said the company was expected to announce those guidelines next week.

 

Google has already said that the new artificial intelligence principles under development precluded the use of A.I. in weaponry. But it was unclear how such a prohibition would be applied in practice and whether it would affect Google’s pursuit of the JEDI contract.

 

Defense Department officials are themselves wrestling with the complexity of their move into cloud computing and artificial intelligence. Critics have questioned the proposal to give the entire JEDI contract, which could extend for 10 years, to a single vendor. This week, officials announced they were slowing the contracting process down.

 

Dana White, the Pentagon spokeswoman, said this week that the JEDI contract had drawn “incredible interest” and more than 1,000 responses to a draft request for proposals. But she said officials wanted to take their time.

 

”So, we are working on it, but it’s important that we don’t rush toward failure,” Ms. White said. “This is different for us. We have a lot more players in it. This is something different from some of our other acquisition programs because we do have a great deal of commercial interest.”

 

Ms. Greene said the company probably would not have sought the Maven work if company officials had anticipated the criticism, according to notes on Ms. Greene’s remarks taken by a Google employee and shared with The Times.

 

Another person who watched the meeting added that Ms. Greene said Maven had been “terrible for Google” and that the decision to pursue the contract was done when Google was more aggressively going after military work.

 

Google does other, more innocuous business with the Pentagon, including military advertising on Google properties and Google’s ad platform, as well as providing web apps like email.

Anonymous ID: 14a0e8 Sept. 2, 2018, 1:44 p.m. No.2849300   🗄️.is 🔗kun

>>2849289

 

(contd)

 

Meredith Whittaker, a Google A.I. researcher who was openly critical of the Maven work, wrote on Twitter that she was “incredibly happy about this decision, and have a deep respect for the many people who worked and risked to make it happen. Google should not be in the business of war.”

 

I am incredibly happy about this decision, and have a deep respect for the many people who worked and risked to make it happen. Google should not be in the business of war. https://t.co/aVK0U5kyJv

— Meredith Whittaker (@mer__edith) June 1, 2018

 

Even though the internal protest has carried on for months, there was no indication that employee criticism of the deal was dying down.

 

Earlier this week, one Google engineer — on the company’s internal message boards — proposed the idea of employees protesting Google Cloud’s conference at the Moscone Center in San Francisco in July with a campaign called “Occupy Moscone Center,” fashioned after the Occupy Wall Street protests.

 

That engineer resigned from the company this week in protest of Maven and planned for Friday to be his last day. But he said he was told on Friday morning to leave immediately, according to an email viewed by The Times.

 

Peter W. Singer, who studies war and technology at New America, a Washington research group, said many of the tools the Pentagon was seeking were “neither inherently military nor inherently civilian.” He added, “This is not cannons and ballistic missiles.” The same software that speeds through video shot with armed drones can be used to study customers in fast-food restaurants or movements on a factory floor.

 

Mr. Singer also said he thought Google employees who denounced Maven were somewhat naïve, because Google’s search engine and the video platform of its YouTube division have been used for years by warriors of many countries, as well as Al Qaeda and the Islamic State.

 

“They may want to act like they’re not in the business of war, but the business of war long ago came to them,” said Mr. Singer, author of a book examining such issues called “LikeWar,” scheduled for publication in the fall.

Anonymous ID: 14a0e8 Sept. 2, 2018, 1:55 p.m. No.2849470   🗄️.is 🔗kun   >>9477

Google, Looking to Tiptoe Back Into China, Announces A.I. Center

 

https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/13/business/google-ai-china.html

 

By Carlos Tejada

 

Dec. 13, 2017

 

阅读简体中文版閱讀繁體中文版

 

HONG KONG — Google pulled some of its core businesses out of China seven years ago, after concluding that government controls and surveillance ran counter to its commitment to a free and open internet.

 

Since then, as China’s online scene has grown and prospered, the American search giant has been looking for ways to tiptoe back in.

 

On Wednesday, it unveiled a small but symbolically significant move toward that end: a China-based center devoted to artificial intelligence. The move nods to the country’s growing strength in A.I., thanks to substantial government funding prompted by Beijing’s ambition of having a say in the technologies of the future.

 

Google said the center would have a team of experts in Beijing, where the company has hundreds of employees in research and development, as well as other roles. The center will be led by Fei-Fei Li, who runs Stanford University’s Artificial Intelligence Lab and leads the artificial intelligence arm of Google’s Cloud business, and Jia Li, the head of research and development for the A.I. division of Google Cloud.

 

The Silicon Valley company, which announced the center’s opening at a software developer conference in Shanghai, cited China’s growing academic and technical contributions to the A.I. field, and said the new center would be “working closely with the vibrant Chinese A.I. research community.”

 

“The science of A.I. has no borders,” Fei-Fei Li said in a post on Google’s website, and “neither do its benefits.”

 

Google did not disclose financial details.

 

The company is only the latest big technology name to set up an A.I. shop in China to capitalize on growing skills and lavish state support. Microsoft, IBM and other Western and domestic stalwarts are busy hiring Chinese staff members in a field with a wide variety of potential applications.

 

China’s A.I. push is part of a government-driven effort to upgrade the country’s technological abilities and to wean itself off foreign-made software and advanced equipment. The push has prompted Western corporate executives, and increasingly the Trump administration, to complain that Beijing unfairly nurtures their potential rivals.

 

The new Google A.I. center could deepen the company’s fraught but complicated relationship with China, now home to the world’s biggest population of online users.

 

Google closed its search business in China in 2010, saying it would no longer tolerate Beijing’s censorship requirements and government-linked efforts to hack the Gmail accounts of human rights activists and others. Google’s services were subsequently blocked in the country, and China’s internet developed its own answers to the company’s products, from email and search to video-sharing and chat.

 

Still, Google never left China entirely. It has an active business distributing online ads for desktop computers and mobile applications, and Chinese makers of smartphones use its Android mobile device software.

 

The two sides have shown signs of warming. Last week, Sundar Pichai, Google’s chief executive, spoke at China’s annual internet conference in the city of Wuzhen, saying the company did robust business helping Chinese firms seeking customers abroad. And this year, Google began offering its translation software in China.

Anonymous ID: 14a0e8 Sept. 2, 2018, 1:55 p.m. No.2849477   🗄️.is 🔗kun

>>2849470

 

(contd)

 

“We have 600-plus employees in China, and we had a similar number in 2010,” said Taj Meadows, a Google spokesman. “Roughly half of them are engineers working on global products. Work on A.I. will be in a similar vein.”

 

Tech figures inside and outside the country are watching whether Google opens a mobile app store there, but there has been little indication of progress on that front.

Anonymous ID: 14a0e8 Sept. 2, 2018, 2 p.m. No.2849548   🗄️.is 🔗kun   >>9555

By Olivia Gazis CBS News August 15, 2018, 6:00 AM

New head of "DARPA for spies" warns that China is attracting top research talent

 

https://www.cbsnews.com/news/new-head-of-darpa-for-spies-warns-that-china-is-attracting-top-research-talent/

 

China's outsize investment in technology industries and priority research areas like synthetic biology and artificial intelligence may mean top talent that might have remained in the United States is instead lured overseas, according to the newly named director of the Intelligence Advanced Research Project Activity (IARPA), Stacey Dixon.

 

"We're talking billion-dollar investments," Dixon said, "and it's scary, because those are large investments that can really shift what research is accomplished."

 

In an interview with "Intelligence Matters" host and CBS News senior national security contributor Michael Morell, Dixon said the resources and attention China has dedicated in recent years to developing certain capabilities pose "a challenge."

 

"We have not indicated that we are going to be making the same sort of investments," she said. "And so, we're sort of losing some of that talent that I think otherwise would have stayed in the U.S."

 

IARPA, which invests in specialized, cutting edge research projects aimed at enhancing the operational and analytical capabilities of U.S. intelligence agencies, does for the intelligence community what the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) does for the Department of Defense. Though much younger and smaller an organization, it is sometimes referred to as "DARPA for spies." (DARPA's budget is around $3 billion; IARPA's budget is classified.)

 

Dixon, who holds three advanced degrees in mechanical engineering, has spent the last two years as IARPA's deputy director. Her 15-year career trajectory has spanned a handful of intelligence agencies – including the CIA and the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency – and includes an oversight role on Capitol Hill, where she worked as a staffer on the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence.

 

On Tuesday, Dixon was tapped by Director of National Intelligence Dan Coats to lead the organization, replacing its current director, Jason Matheny.

 

"Stacey brings extraordinary knowledge and experience to the position and I'm certain that she will maintain IARPA's high bar for technical excellence and relevance to intelligence priorities," Coats said in a statement. "I look forward her continued work in delivering breakthrough capabilities to partners throughout the national security community."

Anonymous ID: 14a0e8 Sept. 2, 2018, 2:01 p.m. No.2849555   🗄️.is 🔗kun

>>2849548

 

(contd)

 

In her conversation with Morell – which took place while Dixon was still deputy director – Dixon said the introduction of machine learning to processes that involve high-volume data sets and can comprise images, language and other signals has been crucial to maintaining competitiveness.

 

"You want to be able to even think and process faster than maybe the human brain can think, because the amount of data that's being put in front of people right now – it's more than people can take in," she said.

 

Among IARPA's four areas of focus are analysis, anticipatory intelligence, collection and computing. Generally, Dixon said, improving analytical capabilities is about making better use of data to, in turn, make better decisions. Anticipatory intelligence is essentially signals-informed forecasting.

 

"There's a lot of information out there publicly available that really you can derive signals from," Dixon explained. A growing volume of conversations on social media may indicate pending civil unrest or economic instability; restaurant cancellations or pharmacy visits may suggest disease outbreak, she said.

 

"We take the forecasting all the way to geopolitical events," Dixon told Morell, "to try to predict who is going to win foreign elections, whether other countries are going to do things like launch missiles."

 

Collection, she said, "is all about just the signals themselves…getting information from an area that you couldn't collect from before," including by using synthetic biology to enhance biological sensors.

 

"So – what are the signals that are going to let us know that someone has been handling narcotics or handling explosives?" Dixon explained. "We're really trying to do an entirely different way of collecting the data."

 

Computing makes up a broader research category, Dixon said, and spans everything from enhancing the security of microchips and software to emerging, high-performance computing concepts. "Whether it's quantum computing, cryo computing or neuromorphic computing," she said, "those are all things that we are investing in because we know that the traditional classical methods that we're using for computing aren't going to last forever."

 

Despite being a relatively young organization, IARPA has already developed or enhanced some capabilities that have led to important operational successes, Dixon said.

 

"We're able to go back and look at the agencies who have received our capabilities and ask them whether they've been using them. And to our great pleasure we've actually been able to track down success stories," Dixon told Morell.

 

"Operationally, they've put our capabilities or tools into practice and then been able to do something really exciting," she continued, without offering details.

 

She only hinted: "It's been very rewarding…for our organization to see the impact that we've had on the community in very, very high-profile things."

Anonymous ID: 14a0e8 Sept. 2, 2018, 2:03 p.m. No.2849592   🗄️.is 🔗kun   >>9597

Intellectual Property and China: Is China Stealing American IP?

 

April 10, 2018 By

Paul Goldstein Q&A with Sharon Driscoll

 

https://law.stanford.edu/2018/04/10/intellectual-property-china-china-stealing-american-ip/

 

President Trump announced stiff new tariffs in March, hitting back at China for what he calls “the unfair and harmful acquisition of U.S. technology.” According to a 2017 report by the United States Trade Representative, Chinese theft of American IP currently costs between $225 billion and $600 billion annually. How extensive is IP theft in China? Why does it happen, and how can it be stopped? In this Q&A, Stanford Law School Professor Paul Goldstein discusses the issues.

 

Is the estimate in the US Trade Representative (USTR) report, in your opinion, accurate?

 

The very width of the estimate should indicate how much guesswork has gone into the numbers game. The challenge in coming up with a more precise number stems less from uncertainties about the valuation of the stolen IP than from differing views as to what IP in fact is being appropriated and how.

Stanford Law School Professor Paul Goldstein

 

How do Chinese companies take IP? Is it theft?

 

Historically, the oldest forms of appropriation of American and other foreign-created intellectual goods were film, record and software piracy, and counterfeiting of luxury goods and pharmaceuticals.

 

As is happening today, IP got injected into the trade process, but the waltz was long and slow. The USTR would complain of China’s failure to halt piracy of US-created goods; the two countries would enter into a MOU [memorandum of understanding] in which China would agree to clean up its act; three years later the USTR would identify continuing violations and come back and say, “this time we really mean it;” and the two countries would enter into another, more detailed MOU, and so on.

 

Eventually what happened was that, as China’s domestic copyright industries found themselves competing with cheap knock-offs of foreign goods, they pressed the Chinese government to fortify the IP enforcement process on its own. (To put this in perspective, this is also what happened a century earlier in the US, which until 1890 failed to protect foreign works, and then waited yet another century before joining the major international copyright treaty.)

 

Although piracy and counterfeiting remain issues in China, the two newer forms of siphoning off foreign IP value are theft—often cyber theft—of extraordinarily valuable trade secrets and know-how, and the technology transfers required of American and other foreign companies as a condition to doing business on Chinese soil. Traditions of territoriality and sovereignty, as well as the willingness of foreign companies to trade IP for access to the Chinese market, give the latter a degree of legitimacy that outright industrial espionage lacks.

 

What tools are available for the president to address IP theft?

 

Section 301, which is the trade lever presently being deployed by the Trump administration, was amended in 1984 to authorize the president to impose trade sanctions against countries that failed adequately to protect intellectual property rights. However, trade sanctions are a very blunt policy instrument, satisfactory perhaps in the relatively unusual situation where a country’s legislation fails to protect subject matter or rights as required by a governing treaty, but far less satisfactory as a tool against individual depredations, which are usually better dealt with through criminal or civil law enforcement.

Anonymous ID: 14a0e8 Sept. 2, 2018, 2:03 p.m. No.2849597   🗄️.is 🔗kun

>>2849592

 

(contd)

 

American IP owners have in recent years enjoyed increased success in enforcing their rights in Chinese courts. Also, the Economic Espionage Act, passed by Congress in 1996 in response to FBI and CIA reports of industrial espionage not only by China, but also by Cuba, France, Israel and Russia, added federal criminal sanctions to the civil liability for trade secret theft already imposed by state law. In 2016, Congress added civil remedies to the criminal penalties.

 

Addressing these discrete appropriations with trade sanctions is like performing microsurgery with a sledge hammer.

 

How do you think this challenge is best addressed? How can China and other countries be made to adhere to IP agreements?

 

Within the confines of trade, that’s a hard question. A friend who oversaw IP policy for the USTR several administrations ago once commented to me that people thought of the USTR as John Wayne rushing into dens of IP iniquity, six-shooters ablaze, when the reality was that he was Archie Bunker shooting off nothing more than his mouth. The US and other countries have achieved important successes under the World Trade Organization’s TRIPs Agreement [Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights] with a dispute resolution process that is far more deliberate than the 301 process. But, although many sober voices have argued for this as the preferable route, it’s far from clear that TRIPs will cover all of the forms of IP appropriation that are the object of the current 301 process, or that the current administration has the will or the patience to follow this avenue. And there are other trade alternatives, such as a bilateral investment treaty with China that could draw on the IP provisions of the so-called TRIPs-Plus free trade agreements with other countries.

Anonymous ID: 14a0e8 Sept. 2, 2018, 2:13 p.m. No.2849748   🗄️.is 🔗kun   >>9781

https://aim4truth.org/2017/02/19/russian-hackers-found/

 

Anonymous Patriots February 19, 20178:36 am

Russian Hackers Found

 

“If someone steals your keys to encrypt the data, it doesn’t matter how secure the algorithms are.”

 

Dmitri Alperovitch, founder of CrowdStrike.

 

“Russians” did not hack the DNC system. However, Russian named Dmitri Alperovitch is the hacker and he works for President Obama. In the last five years the Obama administration has turned exclusively to one Russian to solve every major cyber-attack in America, whether the attack was on the U. S. government or a corporation. Only one “super-hero cyber-warrior” seems to “have the codes” to figure out “if” a system was hacked and by “whom.”

 

Dmitri’s company, CrowdStrike has been called in by Obama to solve mysterious attacks on many high level government agencies and American corporations, including: German Bundestag, Democratic National Committee, Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee (DCCC), the White House, the State Department, SONY, and many others.

 

CrowdStrike’s philosophy is: “You don’t have a malware problem; you have an adversary problem.”

 

CrowdStrike has played a critical role in the development of America’s cyber-defense policy. Dmitri Alperovitch and George Kurtz, a former head of the FBI cyberwarfare unit, founded CrowdStrike. Shawn Henry, former executive assistant director at the FBI is now CrowdStrike’s president of services. The company is crawling with former U. S. intelligence agents.

 

Before Alperovitch founded CrowdStrike in 2011, he was working in Atlanta as the chief threat officer at the antivirus software firm McAfee, owned by Intel (a DARPA company). During that time, he “discovered” the Chinese had compromised at least seventy-one companies and organizations, including thirteen defense contractors, three electronics firms, and the International Olympic Committee. He was the only person to notice the biggest cyberattack in history! Nothing suspicious about that.

Alperovitch and the DNC

 

After CrowdStrike was hired as an independent “vendor” by the DNC to investigate a possible cyberattack on their system, Alperovitch sent the DNC a proprietary software package called Falcon that monitors the networks of its clients in real time. According to Alperovitch, Falcon “lit up,” within ten seconds of being installed at the DNC. Alperovitch had his “proof” in TEN SECONDS that Russia was in the network. This “alleged” evidence of Russian hacking has yet to be shared with anyone.

 

As Donald Trump has pointed out, the FBI, the agency that should have been immediately involved in hacking that effects “National Security,” has yet to even examine the DNC system to begin an investigation. Instead, the FBI and 16 other U. S. “intelligence” agencies simply “agree” with Obama’s most trusted “cyberwarfare” expert Dmitri Alperovitch’s “TEN SECOND” assessment that produced no evidence to support the claim.

 

Also remember that it is only Alperovitch and CrowdStrike that claim to have evidence that it was Russian hackers. In fact, only two hackers were found to have been in the system and were both identified by Alperovitch as Russian FSB (CIA) and the Russian GRU (DoD). It is only Alperovitch who claims that he knows that it is Putin behind these two hackers.

Anonymous ID: 14a0e8 Sept. 2, 2018, 2:16 p.m. No.2849781   🗄️.is 🔗kun   >>9797

>>2849748

 

(contd)

 

Alperovitch failed to mention in his conclusive “TEN SECOND” assessment that Guccifer 2.0 had already hacked the DNC and made available to the public the documents he hacked – before Alperovitch did his ten second assessment. Alperovitch reported that no other hackers were found, ignoring the fact that Guccifer 2.0 had already hacked and released DNC documents to the public. Alperovitch’s assessment also goes directly against Julian Assange’s repeated statements that the DNC leaks did not come from the Russians.

 

The ridiculously fake cyber-attack assessment done by Alperovitch and CrowdStrike naïvely flies in the face of the fact that a DNC insider admitted that he had released the DNC documents. Julian Assange implied in an interview that the murdered Democratic National Committee staffer, Seth Rich, was the source of a trove of damaging emails the website posted just days before the party’s convention. Seth was on his way to testify about the DNC leaks to the FBI when he was shot dead in the street.

 

It is also absurd to hear Alperovitch state that the Russian FSB (equivalent to the CIA) had been monitoring the DNC site for over a year and had done nothing. No attack, no theft, and no harm was done to the system by this “false-flag cyber-attack” on the DNC – or at least, Alperovitch “reported” there was an attack. The second hacker, the supposed Russian military (GRU – like the U. S. DoD) hacker, had just entered the system two weeks before and also had done “nothing” but observe.

 

It is only Alperovitch’s word that reports that the Russian FSB was “looking for files on Donald Trump.” It is only this false claim that spuriously ties Trump to the “alleged” attack. It is also only Alperovitch who believes that this hack that was supposedly “looking for Trump files” was an attempt to “influence” the election. No files were found about Trump by the second hacker, as we know from Wikileaks and Guccifer 2.0’s leaks. To confabulate that “Russian’s hacked the DNC to influence the elections” is the claim of one well-known Russian spy. Then, 17 U. S. intelligence agencies unanimously confirm that Alperovitch is correct – even though there is no evidence and no investigation was ever conducted.

 

How does Dmitri Alperovitch have such power? Why did Obama again and again use Alperovitch’s company, CrowdStrike, when they have miserably failed to stop further cyber-attacks on the systems they were hired to protect? Why should anyone believe CrowdStrikes false-flag report?

 

After documents from the DNC continued to leak, and Guccifer 2.0 and Wikileaks made CrowdStrike’s report look foolish, Alperovitch decided the situation was far worse than he had reported. He single-handedly concluded that the Russians were conducting an “influence operation” to help win the election for Trump. This false assertion had absolutely no evidence to back it up.

 

On July 22, three days before the Democratic convention in Philadelphia, WikiLeaks dumped a massive cache of emails that had been “stolen” (not hacked) from the DNC. Reporters soon found emails suggesting that the DNC leadership had favored Hillary Clinton in her primary race against Bernie Sanders, which led Debbie Wasserman Schultz, the DNC chair, along with three other officials, to resign.

 

Just days later, it was discovered that the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee (DCCC) had been hacked. CrowdStrike was called in again and once again, Alperovitch immediately “believed” that Russia was responsible. A lawyer for the DCCC gave Alperovitch permission to confirm the leak and to name Russia as the suspected author. Two weeks later, files from the DCCC began to appear on Guccifer 2.0’s website. This time Guccifer released information about Democratic congressional candidates who were running close races in Florida, Ohio, Illinois, and Pennsylvania. On August 12, Guccifer went further, publishing a spreadsheet that included the personal email addresses and phone numbers of nearly two hundred Democratic members of Congress.

 

Once again, Guccifer 2.0 proved Alperovitch and CrowdStrike’s claime to be grossly incorrect about the hack originating from Russia, with Putin masterminding it all. Nancy Pelosi offered members of Congress Alperovitch’s suggestion of installing Falcon, the system that failed to stop cyberattacks at the DNC, on all congressional laptops.

 

Key Point: Once Falcon was installed on the computers of members of the U. S. Congress, CrowdStike had even further full access into U. S. government accounts.

Alperovitch’s “Unbelievable” History

Anonymous ID: 14a0e8 Sept. 2, 2018, 2:17 p.m. No.2849797   🗄️.is 🔗kun   >>9807

>>2849781

 

(contd)

 

Alperovitch’s “Unbelievable” History

 

Dmitri was born in 1980 in Moscow were his father, Michael, was a nuclear physicist, (so Dmitri claims). Dmitri’s father was supposedly involved at the highest levels of Russian nuclear science. He also claims that his father taught him to write code as a child.

 

In 1990, his father was sent to Maryland as part of a nuclear-safety training program for scientists. In 1994, Michael Alperovitch was granted a visa to Canada, and a year later the family moved to Chattanooga, where Michael took a job with the Tennessee Valley Authority.

 

While Dmitri Alperovitch was still in high school, he and his father started an encryption-technology business. Dmitri studied computer science at Georgia Tech and went on to work at an antispam software firm. It was at this time that he realized that cyber-defense was more about psychology than it was about technology. A very odd thing to conclude.

 

Dmitri Alperovitch posed as a “Russian gangster” on spam discussion forums which brought his illegal activity to the attention of the FBI – as a criminal. In 2005, Dmitri flew to Pittsburgh to meet an FBI agent named Keith Mularski, who had been asked to lead an undercover operation against a vast Russian credit-card-theft syndicate. Alperovitch worked closely with Mularski’s sting operation which took two years, but it ultimately brought about fifty-six arrests. Dmitri Alperovitch then became a pawn of the FBI and CIA.

 

In 2010, while he was at McAfee, the head of cybersecurity at Google told Dmitri that Gmail accounts belonging to human-rights activists in China had been breached. Google suspected the Chinese government. Alperovitch found that the breach was unprecedented in scale; it affected more than a dozen of McAfee’s clients and involved the Chinese government. Three days after his supposed discovery, Alperovitch was on a plane to Washington where he had been asked to vet a paragraph in a speech by the secretary of state, Hillary Clinton.

 

2014, Sony called in CrowdStrike to investigate a breach of its network. Alperovitch needed just “two hours” to identify North Korea as the adversary. Executives at Sony asked Alperovitch to go public with the information immediately, but it took the FBI another three weeks before it confirmed the attribution.

 

Alperovitch then developed a list of “usual suspects” who were well-known hackers who had identifiable malware that they commonly used. Many people use the same malware and Alperovitch’s obsession with believing he has the only accurate list of hackers in the world is plain idiocy exacerbated by the U. S. government’s belief in his nonsense. Alperovitch even speaks like a “nut-case” in his personal Twitters, which generally have absolutely no references to the technology he is supposedly the best at in the entire world.

Dmitri – Front Man for His Father’s Russian Espionage Mission

 

After taking a close look at the disinformation around Dmitri and his father, it is clear to see that Michael Alperovitch became a CIA operative during his first visit to America. Upon his return to Russia, he stole the best Russian encryption codes that were used to protect the top secret work of nuclear physics in which his father is alleged to have been a major player. Upon surrendering the codes to the CIA when he returned to Canada, the CIA made it possible for a Russian nuclear scientist to become an American citizen overnight and gain a top secret security clearance to work at the Oakridge plant, one of the most secure and protected nuclear facilities in America. Only the CIA can transform a Russian into an American with a top secret clearance overnight.

Anonymous ID: 14a0e8 Sept. 2, 2018, 2:17 p.m. No.2849807   🗄️.is 🔗kun   >>9822 >>9830

>>2849797

 

(contd)

 

We can see on Michael Alperovitch’s Linked In page that he went from one fantastically top secret job to the next without a break from the time he entered America. He seemed to be on a career path to work in every major U. S. agency in America. In every job he was hired as the top expert in the field and the leader of the company. All of these jobs after the first one were in cryptology, not nuclear physics. As a matter of fact, Michael became the top expert in America overnight and has stayed the top expert to this day.

 

Most of the work of cyber-security is creating secure interactions on a non-secure system like the Internet. The cryptologist who assigns the encryption codes controls the system from that point on.

 

Key Point: Cryptologists are well known for leaving a “back-door” in the base-code so that they can always have over-riding control.

 

Michael Alperovitch essentially has the “codes” for all Department of Defense sites, the Treasury, the State Department, cell-phones, satellites, and public media. There is hardly any powerful agency or company that he has not written the “codes” for. One might ask, why do American companies and the U. S. government use his particular codes? What are so special about Michael’s codes?

Stolen Russian Codes

 

In December, Obama ordered the U. S. military to conduct cyberattacks against Russia in retaliation for the alleged DNC hacks. All of the attempts to attack Russia’s military and intelligence agencies failed miserably. Russia laughed at Obama’s attempts to hack their systems. Even the Russian companies targeted by the attacks were not harmed by Obama’s cyber-attacks. Hardly any news of these massive and embarrassing failed cyber-attacks were reported by the Main Stream Media. The internet has been scrubbed clean of the reports that said Russia’s cyber-defenses were impenetrable due to the sophistication of their encryption codes.

 

Michael Alperovitch was in possession of those impenetrable codes when he was a top scientist in Russia. It was these very codes that he shared with the CIA on his first trip to America. These codes got him spirited into America and “turned into” the best cryptologist in the world. Michael is simply using the effective codes of Russia to design his codes for the many systems he has created in America for the CIA.

 

KEY POINT: It is crucial to understand at this junction that the CIA is not solely working for America. The CIA works for itself and there are three branches to the CIA – two of which are hostile to American national interests and support globalism.

 

Michael and Dmitri Alperovitch work for the CIA (and international intelligence corporations) who support globalism. They, and the globalists for whom they work, are not friends of America or Russia. It is highly likely that the criminal activities of Dmitri, which were supported and sponsored by the FBI, created the very hackers who he often claims are responsible for cyberattacks. None of these supposed “attackers” have ever been found or arrested; they simply exist in the files of CrowdStrike and are used as the “usual culprits” when the FBI or CIA calls in Dmitri to give the one and only opinion that counts. Only Dmitri’s “suspicions” are offered as evidence and yet 17 U. S. intelligence agencies stand behind the CrowdStike report and Dmitri’s suspicions.

Michael Alperovitch – Russian Spy with the Crypto-Keys

 

Essentially, Michael Alperovitch flies under the false-flag of being a cryptologist who works with PKI. A public key infrastructure (PKI) is a system for the creation, storage, and distribution of digital certificates which are used to verify that a particular public key belongs to a certain entity. The PKI creates digital certificates which map public keys to entities, securely stores these certificates in a central repository and revokes them if needed. Public key cryptography is a cryptographic technique that enables entities to securely communicate on an insecure public network (the Internet), and reliably verify the identity of an entity via digital signatures. Digital signatures use Certificate Authorities to digitally sign and publish the public key bound to a given user. This is done using the CIA’s own private key, so that trust in the user key relies on one’s trust in the validity of the CIA’s key. Michael Alperovitch is considered to be the number expert in America on PKI and essentially controls the market.

Anonymous ID: 14a0e8 Sept. 2, 2018, 2:18 p.m. No.2849830   🗄️.is 🔗kun   >>9839

>>2849807

 

(contd)

 

Michael’s past is clouded in confusion and lies. Dmitri states that his father was a nuclear physicist and that he came to America the first time in a nuclear based shared program between America and Russia. But if we look at his current personal Linked In page, Michael claims he has a Master Degree in Applied Mathematics from Gorky State University. From 1932 to 1956, its name was State University of Gorky. Now it is known as Lobachevsky State University of Nizhni Novgorod – National Research University (UNN), also known as Lobachevsky University. Does Michael not even know the name of the University he graduated from? And when does a person with a Masters Degree become a leading nuclear physicist who comes to “visit” America. In Michael’s Linked In page there is a long list of his skills and there is no mention of nuclear physics.

 

Also on Michael Alperovitch’s Linked In page we find some of his illustrious history that paints a picture of either the most brilliant mind in computer security, encryption, and cyberwarfare, or a CIA/FBI backed Russian spy. Imagine that out of all the people in the world to put in charge of the encryption keys for the Department of Defense, the U. S. Treasury, U. S. military satellites, the flow of network news, cell phone encryption, the Pathfire (media control) Program, the Defense Information Systems Agency, the Global Information Grid, and TriCipher Armored Credential System among many others, the government hires a Russian spy. Go figure.

Michael Alperovitch’s Linked In Page

 

Education:

 

Gorky State University, Russia, MS in Applied Mathematics

 

Work History:

 

Sr. Security Architect

 

VT IDirect -2014 – Designing security architecture for satellite communications including cryptographic protocols, authentication.

 

Principal SME (Contractor)

 

DISA-Defense Information Systems Agency (Manager of the Global Information Grid) – 2012-2014 – Worked on PKI and identity management projects for DISA utilizing Elliptic Curve Cryptography. Performed application security and penetration testing.

 

Technical Lead (Contractor)

 

U.S. Department of the Treasury – 2011 – Designed enterprise validation service architecture for PKI certificate credentials with Single Sign On authentication.

 

Principal Software Engineer

 

Comtech Mobile Datacom – 2007-2010 – Subject matter expert on latest information security practices, including authentication, encryption and key management.

 

Sr. Software Engineer

 

TriCipher – 2006-2007 – Designed and developed security architecture for TriCipher Armored Credential Authentication System.

 

Lead Software Engineer

 

BellSouth – 2003-2006 – Designed and built server-side Jabber-based messaging platform with Single Sign On authentication.

 

Principal Software Research Engineer

 

Pathfire – 2001-2002 – Designed and developed Digital Rights Management Server for Video on Demand and content distribution applications. Pathfire provides digital media distribution and management solutions to the television, media, and entertainment industries. The company offers Digital Media Gateway, a digital IP store-and-forward platform, delivering news stories, syndicated programming, advertising spots, and video news releases to broadcasters. It provides solutions for content providers and broadcasters, as well as station solutions.

Anonymous ID: 14a0e8 Sept. 2, 2018, 2:19 p.m. No.2849839   🗄️.is 🔗kun

>>2849830

 

(contd) last

 

Obama – No Friend of America

 

Obama is no friend of America in the war against cyber-attacks. The very agencies and departments being defended by Michael Alperovitch’s “singular and most brilliant” ability to write encryption codes have all been successfully attacked and compromised since Michael set up the codes. But we shouldn’t worry, because if there is a cyberattack in the Obama administration, Michael’s son Dmitri is called in to “prove” that it isn’t the fault of his father’s codes. It was the “damn Russians”, or even “Putin himself” who attached American networks.

 

Not one of the 17 U. S. intelligence agencies is capable of figuring out a successful cyberattack against America without Michael and Dmitri’s help. Those same 17 U. S. intelligence agencies were not able to effectively launch a successful cyberattack against Russia. It seems like the Russian’s have strong codes and America has weak codes. We can thank Michael and Dmitri Alperovitch for that.

 

It is clear that there was no DNC hack beyond Guccifer 2.0. Dmitri Alperovitch is a “frontman” for his father’s encryption espionage mission.

 

Is it any wonder that Trump says that he has “his own people” to deliver his intelligence to him that is outside of the infiltrated U. S. government intelligence agencies and the Obama administration? Isn’t any wonder that citizens have to go anywhere BUT the MSM to find real news or that the new administration has to go to independent news to get good intel?

 

It is hard to say anything more damnable than to again quote Dmitri on these very issues:

 

“If someone steals your keys to encrypt the data, it doesn’t matter how secure the algorithms are.” Dmitri Alperovitch, founder of CrowdStrike