>>3100258 (pb)
Given appropriate resources, I could manage the construction of a hardware/software industry that required no IT field at all. The way interfaces (hardware and software) are designed is ludicrous at best and criminal at worst.
I'll do better than that. I'm not the only one working in this direction.
Not interested in protecting anything. It isn't one idea. The idea is this: Given what we now know about computers, how should an entire ecosystem of computing systems be designed - hardware and software. Ignore ALL existing systems and design from scratch. Open source AND open specification with self-testing integrated; many implementations included. Without open specification and self-testing, any system can be corrupted by a sufficiently resourced adversary (cabal.)
It goes further but this isn't the place for more detail.
People exist who know this is not only possible, but exactly how to do it. I'm not going to be much more detailed about this until the dust settles more. After the cabal, the entire hardware/software industry needs to be replaced. It is compromised as fuck.
It is a difficult nut to get your head around. I'm in a very unique position given my history (which I won't elaborate on.) If you're deep in the hardware/software/IT industries, it is difficult to unlearn everything. To get an idea of what is possible, you literally have to undo all of the assumptions in your head about how computers work and imagine what COULD be done. Once you do that, then start hammering it and optimizing the simplicity down over and over and over again. Once you've done this for a few years, you realize that it is actually not so difficult. The results will be … spectacular in ways that few in the computing industry can imagine. Computers are capable of a lot more than people think, and not in the ways we're told to think about computers.
I think that anon is asking if everyone is OK with the NSA being able to track everyone here. He's asking if Q is a ruse to implement full digital surveillance state.
(IMO, if that's the case, then we're all fucked. I do not think that's the case. Just sayin'.)
At the end of the day, it is all just transistors. Software people rarely understand that. There are a lot of categories for specialization within everything I've just mentioned. It is possible, for example, to build secure hardware out of insecure parts. That needs to be front-and-center in the design of any system that the user believes to be secure. There are ways to do secure communication that is actually secure, etc.
>Do we eventually have to start using 32 million bit encryption to keep our shit secure?
No. Don't use math. Use quantum noise. $0.50 worth of electronics parts gets you a quantum noise generator that you can easily use to generate arbitrarily large one-time pads. Use them between endpoints with intelligently designed hardware and nobody can decode anything without a copy of the pad before it is used. I'm sure the NSA guys just fell in love with me, but everything I've just said is public domain.
Forget about the dream of maximum security + maximum convenience. If it is worth protecting, it is worth physically delivering a one-time pad to each end-point. Cost of storage is near $0 now anyway, so cost isn't an issue.
It is possible to make secure and convenient systems out of existing parts even though they're insecure. The hardware designs would have to change substantially, though, but the user wouldn't know the difference (just a box.) CPU and memory have worked the same way (with inconsequential optimizations) for decades. There is no indication that CPU or memory would change as a unit component other than optimizations (and the eventual removal of exploits.)
There is no algorithm for quantum noise. No amount of computing power can decode it because there's no cyclic pattern. You can simply XOR the noise with the signal - incredibly simple implementation. NSA can't decode it. They'd have to get a copy of the pad before it is destroyed (before you use it) in order to decode a padded transmission, or they'd have to compromise the hardware being used at an endpoint so they can get at the data directly. (You can design the hardware such that there are no viable attack vectors, though.)
Funny you mention core memory - I almost built one just to see it work. :-)
>The actual doing is always the problem.
With the cabal having control over NSA with the legal structure that has been in place, it was virtually impossible. However…let's see what happens. If Q delivers, it is a new ballgame.
One time pad - look it up. It is a bit-for-bit key. The pad needs to be as large as the data sent/received. Invented in the late 1880's as a character cypher.
Since you're coming at this thinking about encryption, you're thinking it is inconvenient. But the cost of storage is virtually free now. Reorient your priorities and consider what you value. If your data is worth anything, it is probably worth exchanging a physical key with the other endpoint to KNOW you cannot be surveilled.
As long as you never use the same bits twice, there will never be a pattern. That's the idea. It literally is perfect security.
The caveat, of course, is you need full security on the generation and handling of the pads. So the generation should be done in a Faraday shield, the pads need to be handled securely (keep them on your person and exchange in person). The endpoint hardware has to be secure and the software on the endpoint hardware has to be secure. All of this isn't all that difficult if you start with all of this in mind.
Forget about doing this with any existing hardware or software platforms, though, because they're ALL compromised as fuck. Start by building your own hardware that is designed in such a way that the only attack is a DOS (which is un-preventable.) Once you have that, then build the software. Certainly not all that difficult given the prize for completion.
and yet…there are usually 751…
It would be possible to use the reflectors on the moon for comms. Annoying, but possible. However, would they not need the use of the telescope to do this? Wouldn't that totally fuck up the observatories' ability to do other things?
I think not. I think they were using the observatory as a comm endpoint or bridge and it has little to do with the telescope. I think it has more to do with being on high ground.
>Wouldn't need main lens.
Exactly. I think the observatory/CP angle is a slide. They don't need either. But high ground would be useful as hell. Also, because they're on high ground, I can pretty much guarantee that every observatory has a radio tower and the clowns put their own relays on it.
>Is this possible between observatories?
Yes. You'd be surprised how far you can go between mountains with a parabolic dish and off-the-shelf radio hardware. Even relatively low power stuff. I think the record for standard WIFI hardware is something like 300 miles (with a 1M dish.) I suspect they had a repeater system in place and that was a node that probably went into Mexico (they're around 80-100 miles from the border.)