Anonymous ID: e07786 Sept. 26, 2018, 4:01 a.m. No.3190716   🗄️.is 🔗kun   >>0736

DOD Fails to Implement Biosecurity Years after Army Lab Mistakenly Sent 575 Anthrax Samples

SEPTEMBER 25, 2018

 

Years after a U.S. Army laboratory accidentally sent hundreds of live anthrax bacteria samples to 194 facilities around the globe, the Department of Defense (DOD) has not implemented biosafety and biosecurity programs to prevent a repeat of the potentially deadly mistake. The failure has left government labs and the public at risk, according to a federal audit conducted by the Government Accountability Office, the investigative arm of Congress. The probe was conducted after an Army lab at the Dugway Proving Ground in Utah inadvertently made 575 shipments of live Bacillus anthracis, the bacterium that causes anthrax, to contractors worldwide.

 

A military investigation could not pinpoint the exact cause of the failure, which is hard to believe, but the probe led to the recommendation of specific actions to improve security at facilities that handle dangerous agents and toxins. That was more than three years ago. The DOD even created a special office, known as Biological Select Agents and Toxins (BSAT) Biorisk Program, to oversee the new security measures. Years later, it has yet to carry out the safety measures. The DOD has devised a BSAT Biosafety and Biosecurity Program, congressional investigators found, but hasn’t bothered to put it in place. “DOD has not developed a strategy and implementation plan for managing the program,” the report states. “Without a strategy and implementation plan, Dugway Proving Ground, Utah, and DOD’s laboratory facilities that currently produce and handle BSAT may be unclear about DOD’s strategy to harmonize BSAT operations to ensure safety, security, and standardization of procedures throughout DOD’s BSAT enterprise.”

 

The probe further discovered that the DOD has no estimated time frames for when it will adequately secure dangerous biological matter, even though a deadline was set for early last year by federal legislators. Congressional investigators visited six military laboratories in the course of their probe and interviewed staff. Apparently, the Army created a list with dozens of measures to boost security at labs and, though some have been implemented, there is no way to assess their effectiveness. “What’s at stake here is that these labs deal with very dangerous biological materials, in this case, Bacillus anthracis, that could potentially cause anthrax,” said Joseph Kirschbaum, the lead GAO investigator in this case, in an agency broadcast. Kirschbaum, a defense capabilities expert, added that “the assessment of these high-risk bioagents is vital for our own safety and the ability to conduct military options in the future, so it was really important that the Department of Defense continue to take this seriously.” Does the DOD really need a federal audit to remind it of this?

 

More Sauce @ https://www.judicialwatch.org/blog/2018/09/dod-fails-to-implement-biosecurity-years-after-army-lab-mistakenly-sent-575-anthrax-samples/

Anonymous ID: e07786 Sept. 26, 2018, 4:14 a.m. No.3190782   🗄️.is 🔗kun   >>0828

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Secretary Kirstjen M. Nielsen Statement on President Trump’s National Biodefense Strategy

Release Date:

September 18, 2018

 

Secretary of Homeland Security Kirstjen M. Nielsen released the following statement in support of President Trump’s National Biodefense Strategy:

 

“Biological threats—whether naturally occurring, accidental, or deliberate in origin—are among the most serious threats facing the United States today. As part of the President’s efforts to better protect Americans, the National Biodefense Strategy sets the course for the U.S. to combat 21st century biothreats. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) stands ready to support the implementation of this strategy, in close coordination with the Department of Health and Human Services.

 

“Late last year, I directed the formation of the DHS Office of Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction office (CWMD) to elevate and streamline our efforts to stop terrorists and rogue actors from using chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear agents against us. Since then, the CWMD Office has renewed the Department’s emphasis on bio security with efforts to develop and deploy a new biodetection system, update emergency responder and medical personnel guidance, examine new technologies, and provide support to our frontline operating components. As threats continue to evolve, our defenses must evolve as well. The CWMD Office will continue to address complex biological threats to the nation, but DHS needs additional authorities to be fully execute its mission. I look forward to working with Congress to pass the proposed authorizing legislation that will best position our CWMD response, mitigation, and recovery measures.

 

“DHS will continue to work closely with federal, state, local, tribal, and territorial partners, as well as industry and non-government organizations, to ensure we combat evolving biological threats and prepare to respond to biological disasters. By coordinating actions across the interagency, we can better anticipate, prevent, prepare for, respond to, mitigate, and recover from biological disasters.”

Anonymous ID: e07786 Sept. 26, 2018, 4:16 a.m. No.3190789   🗄️.is 🔗kun   >>0791

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National Biodefense Strategy Act of 2016

The National Biodefense Strategy Act of 2016 is a bill introduced in the United States Senate by U.S. Senator Ron Johnson (R-Wisconsin). The bill would amend the Homeland Security Act of 2002 by requiring the government to change its current policy and programs to coordinate and improve biodefense preparedness. Johnson is the current chairman of the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs.

 

The bill was placed on the Senate legislative calendar and is currently awaiting further action.

 

Johnson wrote the bill in response to the Blue Ribbon Study Panel on Biodefense's findings on the state of US preparedness for biological disaster, either as a result of terrorist activity, inadvertent release of hazardous pathogens or a disease pandemic. In October 2015 the panel found the government's preparation for biodefense lacking in that it was fragmented across a multiplicity of federal agencies, among other problems. The bipartisan panel, with members such as former senators Joe Lieberman (I-Connecticut) and Tom Daschle (D–South Dakota) was organized by the first Secretary of Homeland Security Tom Ridge.