Doing Some Digging On Ivo Daalder and James Lindsay
They are both senior fellows at the Brookings Institute.
In the summer of 2001, the two co-authored a piece for Project Muse.
Should an outgoing president make foreign policy commitments that might bind the incoming administration? To judge by the vitriol that greeted President Bill Clinton's foreign policy actions in his last weeks in office, many believe that the answer is an emphatic "no." Senator Jesse Helms (R-N.C.) fulminated that Clinton's decision on December 31, 2000, to sign the treaty establishing the International Criminal Court (ICC) was "outrageous" and "a blatant attempt by a lame-duck president to tie the hands of his successor." 1 William Safire excoriated Clinton's last-ditch attempt to negotiate an Israeli-Palestinian peace deal as a "hubristic stunt … that cannot be said to represent America's national interest." On the contrary, "in his zeal to be remembered as a peacemaker," Safire claimed, "Clinton was passing on to his successor the increased risk of a Mideast war." 2 Rumors that Clinton might travel to Pyongyang to conclude a missile deal with North Korea's Kim Jong-il elicited a stern warning from senior Republicans on Capitol Hill. "We urge that, in the closing days of your administration, you not attempt to bind our nation and the incoming administration to a new policy toward North Korea," Senate Majority Leader Trent Lott (R-Miss.), House Speaker Dennis Hastert (R-Ill.), and others wrote Clinton on December 14. "Rather, we urge you to respect the prerogatives of the new administration to seek to overcome the disagreements of the past six years by forging a bipartisan policy toward North Korea." 3
Most notable about these criticisms of Clinton's last-minute foreign policy endeavors is the appeal to a set of principles that presumably should govern lame-duck presidencies in their final days in office. Unless reelected to a second term, presidents should not initiate new foreign policy efforts following elections, or so this argument goes. The search for a foreign policy [End Page 15] legacy is inappropriate at the end of a president's tenure, if not entirely illegitimate. Presidents preparing to leave office should do nothing to tie the hands of their successors. Yet a closer look at the criticisms of Clinton's actions reveals that what passes for a principled critique is in fact little more than a substantive disagreement over policy. Helms opposes the ICC as, in his words, "an unprecedented assault on American sovereignty." 4 Safire believes that the deal Clinton put on the table in an effort to bridge the gap between Israelis and Palestinians harmed Israeli security. Finally, Hill Republicans opposed a missile deal with the dictatorial regime in Pyongyang.
Undoubtedly, the political climate changes following a presidential election in which the incumbent leaves office, especially if his successor represents a different political party. Neither the lame-duck status of the outgoing president nor the certainty that a new president will take office the following January, however, is reason to curtail the fundamental constitutional right of sitting presidents to pursue foreign policy as they deem best. The most recent transition also did not represent a particularly novel or egregious use of presidential power in making foreign policy during the interregnum. President Dwight Eisenhower laid the foundation for the Bay of Pigs invasion during the 1960-1961 transition; Richard Nixon and Lyndon Johnson disagreed profoundly about U.S. policy toward the Soviet Union and Vietnam in 1968-1969; Jimmy Carter pursued negotiations to secure the release of U.S. hostages in Iran up to the moment Ronald Reagan assumed office in January 1981; and the elder George Bush sent U.S. troops on an open-ended mission into Somalia in December 1992. Indeed, a brief review of these past actions points to the importance of formulating a set of mutually agreeable rules that should govern the foreign policy behavior of both the outgoing and the incoming administrations during presidential transitions.
Substance over Principle
https://muse.jhu.edu/article/36628
Table of Contents:
The New Russian Identity
China's Challenge to Pax Americana
China, Taiwan, and the World Trade Organization
Through the Looking Glass: Editor's Note←–
To Be an Enlightened Superpower
First Among Equals
Add Five 'E's to Make a Partnership
The Keystone of World Order
Participate in the African Renaissance
Justice for All
What Is Right Is in U.S. Interests
Less Is More
Balance from Beyond the Sea
The Specter of Unilateralism←——
Wanted: A Global Partner
Guide Globalization into a Just World Order
The Strategic Significance of Global Inequality←—-
Will Debt Relief Really Help?
Pragmatic Engagement or Photo Op: What Will the G-8 Become?
The Silver-Bullet Presidency
https://muse.jhu.edu/issue/2111