sure seems to line up with what is happening real time in America, lots of people being diagnosed with a new polio like disease… Q, is this (or some derivative) what is affecting all the children?

sauce:

https://www.coursehero.com/file/p5n9o52/Polio-virus-made-from-scratch-300000-DARPA-project-2002-The-first-part-of-the/

and

sauce:

https://io9.gizmodo.com/the-10-maddest-of-the-mad-science-projects-funded-by-da-1597799224

In the late 1990s, concerns over biological weapons prompted DARPA to establish the "Unconventional Pathogen Countermeasures Program," in order to "develop and demonstrate defensive technologies which afford the greatest protection to uniformed warfighters, and the defense personnel who support them, during U.S. military operations."

DARPA failed to inform anyone that one of its "unconventional" projects was $300,000 to fund a trio of scientists who thought it would be a neat idea to synthesize polio. They constructed the virus using its genome sequence, which was available on the Internet, and obtained the genetic material from companies that sell made-to-order DNA.

And then, in 2002, the scientists published their research—basically, a how-to guide—in the journal Science. Eckard Wimmer, a professor of molecular genetics and the leader of the project, defended the research, saying that he and his team had made the virus to send a warning that terrorists might be able to make biological weapons without obtaining a natural virus.

This project would have been controversial at any time, but publishing it less than a year after the September 11 terrorist attacks was truly clueless—prompting panicky headlines such as "New Life for Polio?", "A New Terror Risk," and "Surfing for a Satan Bug."

Most of the scientific community called it an "inflammatory" stunt without any practical application. Polio would not be an effective terrorist bioweapon because it's not as infectious and lethal as many other pathogens. And, in most cases, it would be easier to obtain a natural virus than to build one from scratch. The only exceptions would be smallpox and ebola, which would be nearly impossible to synthesize from scratch using the same technique.

"It's critically important to hold a national dialog among biologists, health care experts, politicians, and the general public about the future of biological work with biological weapons implications," said Steven Block, a Stanford University expert on the applications of biotechnology to biowarfare. "But publishing research like this is a poor way indeed to open the conversation." Block later said that the incident set back discussions about how to properly defend against biological weapons by "at least three years," since new calls for regulation by Congress "had a chilling effect."